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Abstract
Little scholarly attention has been paid to cases of remedial adjudication involving public
institutions that have violated environmental statutes. This analysis seeks to fill this void. It
centers on judicial legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness, issues which have been extensively
studied in the context of remedial adjudication involving public institutions that have violated
constitutional rights. Legitimacy focuses on what is the appropriate role of the courts in
formulating and implementing remedies; capacity on whether the courts have the ability to
formulate and implement remedies; and effectiveness on whether judicial remedies lead to the
elimination of the legal violations within a reasonable amount of time and at a reasonable cost.
The analysis is based on a federal and a state court case, each of which concerns the enforcement
of water pollution control laws and the cleanup of Boston Harbor. It concludes that the judge's
actions have the greatest impact in determining the legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness of
court intervention. The most legitimate approach for a court to take in remedy formulation is to
first defer that task to the relevant regulatory agency, the institution, and the other parties to the
case. That way the policy decisions that attend remedy formulation are made by politically
responsible parties. Such deference can also enhance the courts' capacity to formulate remedies
since the parties are better equipped than the courts to decide which remedial path is most
appropriate. Deference can also generate a working relationship among the parties which can
improve the chances for successful remedy implementation. If the parties fail to generate an
acceptable remedy the court must take over the task of remedy formulation. When this occurs,
the analysis found, that despite the complexity of the issues involved, courts can have the
capacity to make sound remedial decisions.
Legitimate remedies must strive to bring the institution into compliance with the law. While the
court has discretion to determine the means of reaching compliance, it should not replace
legislative goals with ones that are judicially crafted. One of the most important powers that a
court possesses to ensure the implementation of its orders is its legitimacy. When the court acts
legitimately it can enhance the prospects for implementation, when it does not those prospects
are likely to be diminished. A courts' ability to ensure implementation also depends on the
credibility of judicial threats to use sanctions and on whether those sanctions impose meaningful
costs on those who obstruct implementation. If court sanctions do not have "teeth" they will
likely be ineffective. Finally, the analysis found that court can be highly effective, especially
when it encourages the parties to search for opportunities to save time and money and takes
advantage of them when they arise.
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Chapter I
Remedial Adjudication in Environmental
Institution Cases: Framing the Issues
While the debate over remedial adjudication has raged in the context of
public institutions that have violated constitutional rights, little attention has
been paid to cases involving public institutions that have violated environmental
statutes (hereinafter referred to as environmental institutions), e.g., a municipal
sewage treatment plant that is violating the effluent standards of the Federal
Clean Water Act (CWA). What is available on this topic focuses primarily on the
sanctions the courts use to enforce remedial orders and the effectiveness of such
sanctions. 1 This dissertation seeks to fill this void in the literature by analyzing
the legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness of the courts in remedial adjudication
involving environmental institutions.
In addition to adding to the literature on remedial adjudication, this
analysis will provide insights into the dynamics of environmental institution
cases that will be of practical value to those parties, especially the judge, who are
involved in such cases. A deeper understanding of the dynamics of
environmental institution cases will put the parties in a better position to
structure the remedial process in a way that enhances the legitimacy, capacity,
and effectiveness of judicial intervention.
1 See, for example, Glenn E. Deegan, "Judicial Enforcement of State and Municipal
Compliance with the Clean Water Act: Can the Courts Succeed?" Boston College
Environmental Affairs Law Review 19 (1992): 765-803; Marcia R. Gelpe, "Pollution
Control Laws Against Public Facilities," Harvard Environmental Law Review 13, no. 1
(1989): 69-146; and Note, "Regulation of Noncompliant Publicly Owned Treatment Works
Under the Clean Water Act," William Mitchell Law Review 10 (1984): 901-934.
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Remedial Adjudication in the Constitutional Context: Framing the
Debate
In 1976, the term "public law litigation" was coined to describe those cases
in which the primary goal is the "vindication of constitutional or statutory
policies."2 One of the most interesting aspects of this form of litigation is the role
of the courts in formulating and implementing remedies for the violations of law
that are found during court proceedings. Those remedies usually involve
affirmative injunctions or court orders, requiring that specific steps be taken to
bring violators into compliance with the law. Most of the literature on public law
litigation focuses on cases involving the violation of the constitutional rights of
individuals who are either in the custody of public institutions or have services
provided by those institutions, e.g., prison inmates, mental hospital patients, or
minority students in public schools. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment
ensures that persons not be denied "the equal protection of the laws," thus
providing the foundation for most of the school desegregation cases; the Eighth
Amendment, outlawing "cruel and unusual punishments," is the basis for many
prison overcrowding cases.3
In attempting to vindicate constitutional rights, the courts have issued
extremely detailed and far-reaching orders that have included the specification of
administrative operating standards and procedures ranging from establishing
acceptable percentages of white and black students that desegregated schools
must attain, the size and condition of cell blocks and other facilities in prisons,
and the staffing levels of nurses and physicians at mental institutions.4 Judicial
2 Abram Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation," Harvard Law Review
89, no. 7 (May 1976): 1284.
Bernard Schwartz, Swann's Way (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 3; John J.
DiIulio, Jr., Courts. Correction. and the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press,
1990).
4 "The decrees in these cases [institution cases] mandate massive changes in the operation
of an institution and its program, changes involving the physical condition of the facility,
its staffing, the quality of its services, or a combination of these items." Gerald E. Frug,
"The Judicial Power of the Purse," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 126, no. 4
(April 1978): 719; For example, in one of the most widely debated of the public law
litigation cases, Wyatt v. Stickney, a District Court judge ruled that mentally ill patients
confined in Alabama State hospitals were being denied their constitutional "right to
Chapter I
Dolin, Remedial Adjudication
remedies have not only been extremely detailed, but they have also been
expensive. Although estimates of the costs incurred in complying with judicial
remedies are "rare", it is clear, from the available literature, that they can be
considerable.5 The impact of such court orders has spawned an extensive debate
on the proper role of the courts in constitutional remedial adjudication. The
central themes of this debate are the legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness of
court intervention.
Legitimacy addresses the fundamental issue of what approach the courts
should take in remedying constitutional violations, given the context of our
governmental system. Concerns about legitimacy are supported by a traditional
reading of the separation of powers doctrine, which posits that each of the three
branches of government has its separate function.6 The legislative branch makes
the laws, the executive branch administers them, and the judicial branch
interprets and enforces them. Under this conception, the judiciary is not
supposed to make policy, that being the responsibility of the other two branches
which are expressly political in nature.7 The doctrine's exclusion of the judiciary
from policymaking is buttressed by concerns about democratic accountability.
Some are wary of the potential for "arbitrary rule" of unelected and, therefore,
treatment," under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and ordered
that a variety of institutional changes be made at three hospitals. The orders remedying
those violations included the following stipulations: "[t]he minimum day room area shall
be 40 square feet per patient"; "[t]here will be one toilet provided for each eight patients. .
. "; temperature in the hospitals "shall not exceed 83 F nor fall below 68 F"; and it also
established the minimum numbers of treatment personnel for each 250 patients, e.g., two
psychiatrists and 6 licensed practical nurses. "The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a
Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change," The Yale Law Journal 84 (1975): 1338-
1339.
5 According to Frug, who was writing in 1978, "Estimates of the cost of compliance with
federal court orders in the institution cases are rare, but the few hints available indicate
the sum will be substantial." 727.
6 According to Philip Kurland, "Separation of powers certainly encompasses the notion
that there are fundamental differences in government functions -- frequently but not
universally denoted as legislative, executive, and judicial -- which must be maintained as
separate and distinct, each sovereign in its own area, none to operate in the realm
assigned to another. The tendency even today is to think of the constitutional separation
of powers in these terms." "The Rise and Fall of the 'Doctrine' of the Separation of
Powers," Michigan Law Review (December 1986): 593.
7 Robert F. Nagel, "Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies,"
Stanford Law Review 30 (April 1978): 661-662.
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"unreachable authorities," such as permanently appointed judges at the state and
federal level.8*
In light of these concerns, it is no surprise that scholars worry about the
potential for the judiciary to usurp the traditional prerogatives of the other
branches of government through the development of remedies that establish
policy, by determining the allocation of administrative and financial resources.
To that end, a key question in the legitimacy debate is what is the appropriate
role of the courts in remedy formulation? How should the courts approach this
task, who should be involved, and what types of remedial decisions should the
courts make?9
The legitimacy debate focuses not only on remedy formulation but also on
implementation. While the court has formal sanctions it can employ to enforce
the implementation of its orders, e.g., holding public officials in contempt of
court, many scholars argue that the courts most powerful sanction is intangible,
namely its ability to compel implementation as long as its remedial behavior is
8 Nathan Glazer, "Toward and Imperial Judiciary," The Public Interest 41 (Fall 1975): 122.
According to Frug, the "shift of power away from elected officials to individuals
appointed for life weakens the democratic accountability of government." 742. "Critics
of judicial policy-making argue, with good reason, that it is dangerous to permit
unaccountable officials to shape public policy. There are strong risks that such officials
will impose their own ideas upon the country even though the citizenry desires different
policies. In a democracy, the citizens should be the ultimate decision makers concerning
public policy, not unelected, life-tenured judges." Christopher E. Smith, Courts and
Public Policy (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1993): 22. "[A] democratic political
system is one in which public policies are made, on a majority basis, by representatives
subject to effective popular control at periodic elections which are conducted on the
principle of political equality and under conditions of political freedom." H. Mayo, An
Introduction to Democratic Theory (1960): 70, cited in Mnookin, In the Interest of
Children (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1985), 33. As Bickel notes, a
"[c]oherent, stable, -- and morally supportable -- government is possible only on the basis
of consent, . . . and the secret of consent is the sense of common venture fostered by
institutions that reflect and represent us and that we call to account." Alexander Bickel,
The Least Dangerous Branch (1962): 20, cited in Frug, "The Judicial Power of the Purse,"
742-743.
* Of course, not all judges at the state level are appointed. Many are elected. In the latter
situation, the concerns about "unreachable authorities" is not present. The dissertation,
however, focuses on cases in which the judge is appointed.
9 See for example, Susan P. Sturm, "A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies," The
Georgetown Law Journal 79, no. 5 (June 1991).
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perceived as legitimate by and, therefore, can command the respect and assent of
those entities who are responsible for remedy implementation.10 Given this,
there are not only concerns that the courts formulate remedies in a manner that is
perceived as legitimate, but also that in attempting to secure the implementation
of those remedies, the court avoid taking actions that are considered illegitimate.
Thus another question in the legitimacy debate is what types of remedy
formulation and implementation actions are perceived as legitimate by the
relevant actors and what types are not?
The debate over capacity focuses, in part, on whether the courts have the
ability to gather the information necessary to adequately evaluate the causes of
constitutional violations and alternative remedies, to understand that
information and to use that understanding in establishing remedies that will lead
violators into compliance with the law. 11 In other words, do the courts have the
institutional means to make informed remedial decisions? The debate over
capacity extends beyond remedy formulation to implementation. A remedy, no
matter how well crafted or reasoned, is useless if it is not successfully
implemented. Here, questions arise about the courts' ability to monitor the
implementation of remedies, to respond flexibly to changing circumstances, and
to use its powers to overcome obstacles to implementation.12
Finally, the debate over effectiveness focuses on whether judicial remedies
lead to the elimination of the specified violations of constitutional rights within a
reasonable amount of time and at a reasonable cost. 13 If prisoners were being
10 Colin Diver, "The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in
Public Institutions," Virginia Law Review 65 (1979): 103-105.
11 Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1977); Ralph Cavanagh and Austin Sarat, "Thinking About Courts: Toward
and Beyond a Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence," Law & Society 14 (Winter 1980):
371-419.
12 See, for example, Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 55; and Stuart A. Scheingold,
The Politics of Rights (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974): 123;
"Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation," Harvard Law Review
Vol. 91 (1977): 428-463; "Special Project: The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform
Litigation, Columbia Law Review 78, no. 4 (May 1978): 815-841; and Robert C. Wood,
ed., Remedial Law (Amherst, MA: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1990).
13 See, for example: Nathan Glazer, "Should Judges Administer Social Services," The Public
Interest 50 (Winter 1978): 64-80; Dilulio, Courts, Correction. and the Constitution; Smith,
14
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subject to cruel and unusual punishments, if mental patients were being
deprived of their constitutional right to treatment, or if black school children
were not receiving "equal protection under the laws," the question then becomes
have those violations ceased as a result of court intervention? Furthermore, the
duration and cost of such intervention must be considered in assessing
effectiveness, for "justice delayed is justice denied," and in a society with limited
resources, we cannot afford to vindicate rights, no matter how dear, at any price.
Remedial Adjudication in the Environmental Context: The Focus of
this Study
This analysis is predicated on the assumption that the basic questions
raised in the constitutional literature pertaining to legitimacy, capacity, and
effectiveness are the same ones that should be asked in the environmental
context -- the questions are trans-substantive. Thus, the dissertation focuses on
what is the legitimate role of the courts in formulating and implementing
remedies for environmental institutions, are the courts capable of making
informed remedial decisions and successfully implementing their orders, and are
judicial remedies effective in eliminating the violations of environmental law
within a reasonable amount of time and at a reasonable cost?
As important as identifying what the dissertation covers is identifying
what it does not. The dissertation is not intended to contribute any new insights
into the debate over legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness of the courts in
constitutional remedial adjudication. That task is best left to those constitutional
scholars who are already engaged in such an endeavor. Nor is this dissertation
intended to be a comparative study of constitutionally- and environmentally-
based remedial adjudication, attempting to highlight where and how the courts'
role differs in those two settings. Rather, the dissertation analyzes remedial
adjudication involving environmental institutions on its own terms.
The Courts and Public Policy, 72; Lino A. Graglia, Disaster by Decree (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1976): 279.
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Organization of this Study
Chapter Two begins with an overview of the framework for
environmental protection in the United States, focusing on the central importance
of statutes and regulatory agencies, and describing how the courts become
involved in remedial adjudication. Next, the chapter establishes criteria that can
be used to evaluate the legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness of remedial
adjudication in environmental institution cases.
Chapters Three through Five present two case studies of remedial
adjudication and focus on the remedial efforts of a state court and a federal court
to bring the publicly owned sewage treatment facilities serving the Boston area
into compliance with state and federal water pollution control laws. Chapter
Three covers the historical antecedents of court intervention. It describes the
development of the sewage system and analyzes what factors caused it to violate
the law and precipitate state court involvement in 1982.
Chapter Four details the state court case in which the Metropolitan
District Commission (MDC), the state agency in charge of operating the sewage
system, was sued for failing to comply with a variety of state pollution control
laws. After finding violations of the law, the court became actively involved in
formulating and implementing a remedy, the ultimate outgrowth of which was
the creation of a new public authority, in 1984, to take over the responsibilities of
the MDC.
Chapter Five details the federal court case that followed the state
litigation, in which the court found the newly established Massachusetts Water
Resources Authority (MWRA) to be in violation of the CWA. Since 1985, that
authority has been operating under a court-ordered schedule that is designed to
bring it into compliance with the act. As it stands currently, the schedule will be
in force through the end of this century when the last of its numerous deadlines,
the completion of a new secondary sewage treatment plant, are to be met. At the
end of chapters Four and Five is an analysis of court actions in light of the criteria
for legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness outlined in Chapter Two. The final
16
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chapter steps back from the specifics of the cases to focus more broadly on the
legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness of remedial adjudication in environmental
institution cases.
Methodology
I have chosen the case study approach for a number of reasons.14
The "thick" description that goes along with case study research is well suited to
analyzing the ways in which the issues of legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness
play out in particular situations. While this form of research does not allow one
to prove cause-effect relationships or draw broad generalizations, it does provide
the opportunity to explore specific cases, in-depth, and to understand what
happened in those cases and why. That exploration and understanding, in turn,
can be used to generate insights about how to structure a process in a way that
will likely lead to desired outcomes.
The two case studies were chosen because of their similarities and
differences. They are similar in the sense that each of them provides
opportunities to explore the issues of legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness, and
they also offer exciting and interesting perspectives on these issues. Those
perspectives, however, are different in each case. This is important because it
makes it possible to compare and contrast the two cases and illustrate how
different approaches affected the outcomes of judicial intervention.
The data for this study were drawn from four sources. The first is the
voluminous court records for each case. During the remedial process, the parties
to the litigation provide the court with numerous submissions, including briefs,
affidavits, other assorted documents, and oral testimony. The court, in turn, put
into writing its opinions and orders and, in the state case, a special master
appointed by the court also submitted his findings in a formal report.
14 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods (Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publications, 1989).
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The second source of data was interviews with key participants in the
remedial process (a list of interviewees is provided in the Appendix). The
interviews were loosely structured and their purpose was to elicit first-hand
perspectives on what happened, why, and how that reflected on the issues of
concern. In many cases, more than one interview with informants was
conducted.
The third source of data included studies, reports, books and articles that
have been written on the pollution problems in Boston Harbor and the
regulatory and legal efforts undertaken to resolve them. These documents have
been written by state and federal regulatory agencies, interest groups, the MDC
and the MWRA, and academic scholars.
The final source of data are newspaper articles. Boston Harbor and the
litigation that surrounds it has been extensively covered by area newspapers.
Such articles proved invaluable in piecing together events and getting real-time
quotes from the participants in the process.
Major Conclusions
The major conclusions of this dissertation are as follows:
1). The judge is the single most important actor in remedial
adjudication in environmental institution cases. His perspective on the
proper role of the court, and the actions he takes as a result, will have the
greatest impact in determining the legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness
of court intervention.
2). Remedy formulation in environmental institution cases is not a
mechanical process in which the nature of the violation clearly indicates
exactly what steps need to be taken to bring the institution back into
compliance with the law. There are alternative remedial paths that can be
chosen. Each path involves choices about which technologies should be
18
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used, how much time the violating institution should have to come into
compliance, and how issues of technological, financial, and administrative
feasibility should be factored into the remedial decision. Furthermore,
each remedial alternative implies a different allocation of societal
resources and, therefore, in selecting a remedy one is necessarily engaged
in establishing policy for the institution.
In light of concerns about the allocation of governmental power
and judicial policymaking, the most legitimate approach for a court to take
is to first defer the task of remedy formulation to the regulatory agency in
charge of administering the law and the violating institution -- those
parties that are politically responsible for making policy decisions. Other
parties which should be given the opportunity to participate in the
remedial negotiations between the regulatory agency and the institution
are those that are official litigants in the case and, as a result, have legal
standing to participate in remedy formulation.
3). Judicial deference to the parties is likely to enhance the courts'
capacity to formulate remedies. The parties are better equipped than the
courts, by virtue of expertise and knowledge, to decide which of the many
potential remedial paths is most appropriate given the legal requirements
and the specific circumstances facing the institution. By deferring to the
parties the court can, in effect, leverage its own capacity.
4). In successfully deferring to the parties during remedy formulation,
the court can help generate a working relationship among the parties and
a heightened commitment to the remedy which can improve chances for
effective remedial implementation.
5). Deference to the parties cannot go on indefinitely. Without a
remedial plan, there will be no movement towards the cessation of
violations, the ultimate goal of remedial adjudication. If deference to the
parties fails to generate an acceptable remedy, the court has to take over
the task of remedy formulation. Deciding when it is legitimate for the
19
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court to take on this task is extremely difficult and depends on the balance
of the arguments for and against the court's assumption of this role.
6). To be legitimate, remedies must strive to bring the institution into
compliance with the law's requirements, regardless of whether or not the
judge believes that doing so is in the public interest. If the application of a
general law in a specific situation leads to a politically unacceptable
outcome, it should be up to the legislators to change the law and, as a
result, force the court to modify the remedy. While the court can use its
discretion to determine the means of reaching compliance, it should not
have the power to, in effect, replace legislative ends or goals with ad-hoc,
judicially crafted goals.
7). Despite the complex nature of the issues involved in remedial
adjudication or environmental institutions, there is reason to believe that
the courts, when faced with the need to formulate a remedy, can have the
capacity to gather relevant data and understand it well enough to make
informed and reasonable remedial choices that are likely to be effective.
8). Judicial capacity to implement remedies is, in large part, contingent
upon the courts' ability to monitor the implementation process and
respond flexibly to changing circumstances. Remedy implementation
takes place within a dynamic environment. As implementation proceeds,
new information becomes available on both the nature of the violation and
the feasibility of proposed remedies. To keep the implementation process
on track, the court must not only be aware of this information, but also be
able to use it to alter the remedial regime when appropriate.
9). One of the most important powers that a court possesses to ensure
the implementation of its orders is its inherent legitimacy as an institution.
When the court acts in a legitimate manner, those political actors who are
responsible for remedy implementation are much more likely to comply
with court orders in an expeditious manner. This is because when a court
supports a remedial scheme, a powerful moral sanction is brought into
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play that is based on the strongly held ideal that the court is a just arbiter
of what the law requires and that, therefore, court orders deserve respect
and should be carried out. However, to the degree that the courts take
actions, either during remedy formulation or implementation, that are
illegitimate, it is likely that the relevant political actors will tend to oppose
court orders, thereby reducing the court's ability to further
implementation.
10). The courts' ability to ensure implementation of its remedies not
only depends on its moral sanction, but also on whether the threat of
sanctions is percieved as credible by relevant actors and the sanctions
themselves, when applied, are able to impose meaningful costs on those
who place obstacles in the way of implementation. If court sanctions do
not have "teeth," they will likely be ignored and the obstacles will not be
overcome.
11). The courts can be highly effective in leading to a cessation of
violations. Effectiveness will likely be contingent upon the courts'
legitimacy and its capacity. If courts lack legitimacy in the eyes of relevant
political actors, the chances of their remedies being successfully
implemented are diminished. Also if the court lacks the capacity to
formulate sound remedies, successful implementation would be of limited
value, for it would not remedy the violation which is the root cause of the
litigation.
The effectiveness of judicial intervention also depends on the
courts' ability to achieve compliance within a reasonable amount of time
and at a reasonable cost. The courts' ability to respond flexibly to
changing circumstances can help to ensure that these goals are achieved.
A rigid remedial scheme runs the risk of missing opportunities to take
advantage of ways to save both time and cost while still moving into
compliance with the law. The courts can enhance the effectiveness of
remedial adjudication by encouraging the parties to search for
Chapter I
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opportunities to save time and money and by being receptive to taking
advantage of such opportunities when they arise.
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Criteria for Analyzing Remedial Adjudication in
Environmental Institution Cases
The questions raised in the introduction concerning the legitimacy,
capacity, and effectiveness of the courts in environmental institution cases do not
offer a basis for actually evaluating whether a court, in a specific case, has acted
in a legitimate, capable, and effective manner. For example, stating that one of
the questions posed by the issue of legitimacy is "how should the courts
approach the task of remedy formulation," says nothing about how we would
know if the approach used by a court was in fact legitimate. To answer that type
of question the terms legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness must be
operationalized through the creation of criteria that can be used as benchmarks
against which to measure actual court behavior. This chapter sets out those
criteria.
The first part of the chapter details the environmental protection
framework in the United States, focusing on the role of statutes and the
regulatory process. An understanding of that framework is essential, for it
determines how courts get involved in remedial adjudication, and it greatly
affects the way in which the criteria are construed. The chapter then presents, in
turn, the criteria for legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness. Dividing the debate
over remedial adjudication into smaller debates concerning legitimacy, capacity,
and effectiveness is not an accurate reflection of reality.1 For example, if the
1 Mnookin and Horowitz address the artificiality of separating out interrelated issues of
legitimacy and capacity (both of them consider effectiveness as being a part of capacity).
"These issues [legitimacy and capacity], while separate, are related. If a court assumes a
policymaking role that the public percieves as illegitimate, the court's capacity to
implement reform may be quite limited, either because its decrees are ignored or because
of political backlash. Conversely, if limitations on judicial capacity lead to the
formulation of unsatisfactory policies, the percieved failure of the courts may contribute
to a loss of legitimacy." Mnookin, 25; "Of course, legitimacy and capacity are related. A
court wholly without capacity may forfeit its claim to legitimacy. A court wholly without
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court acts in an illegitimate manner, it might decrease its capacity to ensure the
implementation of its orders. Similarly, if courts lack capacity to formulate
remedies, the remedies might be flawed and, therefore, ineffective. Nevertheless,
breaking the larger debate into smaller ones is a useful analytical device and,
therefore, this chapter will deal with each of the smaller debates in turn, while
accepting that there is some overlap.
The criteria are neither exhaustive nor conclusive. They are based on my
review of the literature on remedial adjudication and my sense of the difficulties
confronting a court when it becomes involved in an environmental institution
case. I will demonstrate the usefullness of these criteria by applying them to the
two cases covered in chapters four and five.
The Environmental Regulatory Framework
Environmental institutions in the United States operate within an
environmental protection framework, the central features of which are extensive
statutes and a formalized regulatory process designed to ensure the application
of statutory requirements to such institutions.2 Over the past twenty-five years,
the federal government has enacted a wide range of environmental statutes, e.g.,
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. The states, too, have enacted a great variety of environmental
laws, either as a response to federal activity or of their own volition.3 Statutes
affect environmental insitutions by establishing standards for operation. For
example, most federal statutes set national, minimum standards with which the
states, and the environmental institutions in those states, must comply. State
legitimacy will soon suffer from diminished capacity." Horowitz, The Courts and Social
Policy 18.
2 "Today . . . environmental law is primarily statutory." Daniel A. Farber, "Equitable
Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions," University of Pittsburgh Law
Review 45 (1984): 513.
3 Daniel P. Selmi and Kenneth A. Manaster, State Environmental Law (Deerfield, IL: Clark,
Boardman, Callaghan, 1992).
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laws also establish standards, either independently or as a result of the federal
push.
Statutes, however, are only part of the story when it comes to determining
what environmental institutions must do in light of the law. There is a
formalized and extensive regulatory process that is designed to transform broad
statutory requirements into operational requirements that apply to specific
institutions. The first step in this transformation is the development of
regulations, a task delegated by the legislative branch to environmental,
regulatory agencies, e.g., the federal EPA or a state Department of Environmental
Protection. Through the rulemaking process, such agencies, which are staffed by
scientific, technical, administrative, and legal experts, operationalize statutory
standards, transforming the latter into specific requirements that apply to the
regulated community.
This is a particularly difficult and involved process. Statutes are often
vague or ambiguous, a result of the limitations of the legislative process, e.g., the
lack of expertise on the part of elected officials, which restricts their ability to
establish specific goals, and the need to keep statutory goals or ends somewhat
ambiguous in order to maintain winning coalitions. 4 Furthermore, the legislative
history in which the statute is embedded often serves only to further confuse
matters.5 Through floor statements and other insertions into the legislative
record, legislators with contending perspectives on how the statute's provisions
should be construed, attempt to influence the manner in which regulatory
agencies interpret those provisions. Not only must the regulatory agencies take
into account legislative "instructions", but also the public's perspective on what
regulations should issue -- a perspective that is not uniform, but fractured along
the fault lines created by the diverse universe of interested stakeholders. Indeed,
4 See, for example, Lawrence D. Brown and Bernard J. Frieden, "Rulemaking by
Improvisation: Guidelines and Goals in the Model Cities Program," Policy Sciences 7, no.
4 (1976): 456-457. As Francine Rabinowits, Jeffrey Pressman, and Martin Rein note, ". . .
legislative ambiguity and contradiction is frequently the price paid for getting sufficient
support to pass a bill." "Guidelines: A Plethora of Forms, Authors, and Functions,"
Policy Sciences 7, no. 4 (1976): 414.
5 See, for example, Stephen Breyer, "On The Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes," Southern California Law Review 65, no. 2 (January 1992): 845-874.
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the typical rulemaking process provides a number of opportunities for public
review of and comment on developing regulations. 6 Another difficulty in the
rulemaking process is the uncertainty surrounding regulatory decisions. Most
environmental regulations are based on a variety of scientific, technical, and
economic feasibility data which is far from conclusive. Conflicting research
findings and interpretations of such findings must be factored into the
decisionmaking process.
Vague or conflicting statutory directives, differing perspectives, and great
levels of uncertainty combine to ensure that agency regulations will invariably be
controversial. 7 The opponents of regulatory decisions often end up in court in an
attempt to either block regulations or force the agency or the courts themselves to
change them. For example, in the early 1980s, former EPA Administrator
Ruckelshaus estimated that 80 percent of EPA's rules were challenged in court,
and 30 percent of them were changed due to litigation.8 More recent estimates
have indicated similar numbers. 9
6 For example, the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) generally adheres to
the "notice-and-comment" or "informal" rulemaking process outlined in the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA). This process essentially directs federal agencies to
give notice of a proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and allow interested parties
"to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without the opportunity for oral presentation." The agency then
considers such comments in revising the proposed rule and publishes, again in the
Federal Register the final rule, generally 30 days before it goes into effect. Although
informal rulemaking is the most common means of transforming statutory provisions
into regulations, agencies also use formal rulemaking procedures when required to by
statute. Formal rulemaking is covered by the APA and requires the agency to hold
hearings at which time evidence is presented in a court-like atmosphere, often with cross-
examination and rebuttal by the parties. See, for example, Peter L. Strauss, A n
Introduction To Administrative Justice In the United States (Durham, North Carolina:
Carolina Academic Press, 1989): 155-159.
7 Lawrence Susskind and Gerald McMahon, "The Theory and Practice of Negotiated
Rulemaking," Yale Journal of Regulation 3 (1985): 135; For excellent discussions of
agency discretion, see Ted Greenwood, Knowledge and Discretion in Government
Regulation (New York: Praeger, 1984); and Gary C. Bryner, Bureaucratic Discretion (New
York: Pergamon Press, 1987).
8 Susskind and McMahon, 134.
9 According to former EPA Administrator, William K. Reilly, "[flour of every five decisions
I make are contested in court. We spend as much time designing our rules to withstand
court attack as we do getting the rules right and out in the first place." Mathew L. Wald,
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The next step in regulatory process is the issuance of permits. Typically,
each pollution source receives a permit from the regulatory agency, which details
the specific pollution control limits and, in many cases, the control technologies
that the source must, respectively, achieve or install. The permit, therefore,
tailors the broad statutory and regulatory requirements to reflect the unique
situation facing individual polluters. Permit development, like the rulemaking
process, allows interested parties to have input into the process. The agency and
the institution usually interact during the writing of the permit, tranferrring
information that enables the agency to develop the relevant institution-specific,
factual base and informally negotiating/discussing the terms of the permit.
Draft permits are also subject to public review and comment.
Following permit issuance, the regulatory framework usually provides an
opportunity for additional agency-institution interaction as well as public input.
That is when the institution develops the detailed plans needed to build the
pollution control facilities that will bring it into compliance with the law. Those
plans are reviewed and approved by the regulatory agency. Most
environmental projects, of any significant size, that are carried out under the
auspices of federal law will also require the preparation of an environmental
impact statement, which details the environmental, social, economic, historic,
and archeological impacts of a proposed project and its alternatives, including
the "no-project" alternative. 10 While EISs do not require that a specific project
alternative be chosen, it is intended to get the project proponent to evaluate
alternatives before proceeding, in the hope that such evaluation might lead to
selection of the project with the fewest negative impacts.11 The EIS process also
provides for public input. Interested parties are given an opportunity to
comment on the EIS as it move through draft and onto final form. Many states
"U.S. Agencies Use Negotiations to Pre-empt Lawsuits Over Rules," The New York
Times, 23 September 1991, Al, B10.
10 Richard A. Liroff, A National Policy for the Environment (Bloomington: Indianca
University Press, 1976).
11 Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucracies Think: The Environmental Impact Statement
Strategy of Administrative Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984).
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have similar laws that require significant projects to be reviewed in
environmental impact reports.12
There are still other stops in the regulatory process that could potentially
impact the operations of environmental institutions. On the road to compliance,
institutions may have to site a new facility, thereby needing to go through
government agency reviews and sign-offs required by state and local siting laws,
each of which have their own procedures for review and public input.13 And
there will likely be other agency approvals that will have to be obtained so that a
particular project can proceed, e.g., land-use permits.
As is the case with rulemaking, regulatory decisions concerning permits,
EIS's, and other agency approval processes are appealable in court. Those who
believe that such approval processes were not conducted in compliance with
legal requirements can bring their grievances before a judge. If the court sides
with those bringing the suit, the agency could be required to revisit the approval
process, taking into account the factors that the court determined had been
improperly left out during the initial review.
The strength of the normal regulatory process is that the agencies, which
have the greatest expertise in determining what steps are necessary to come into
compliance with environmental laws and regulations and are, in fact, designed to
perform this task, can use their expertise in determing how to apply those laws
and regulations of general application to specific circumstances, in a manner that
is informed, at various points during the process, by the knowledge and concerns
of the regulated institutions and the public. It is during this process that
concerns about financial, administrative, and technological feasibility are taken
into account in determining how the law will be applied in the instant case.
12 For example, the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act requires the preparation of an
Environmental Impact Report for significant projects that involve state agencies. Eric Jay
Dolin and Judith Pederson, Marine-Dredge Materials Management in Massachusetts:
Issues, Options and the Future (Boston, MA: MIT Sea Grant Program and the
Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management, December 31, 1991): 23.
13 See, for example, Michael O'Hare, Lawrence Bacow, and Debra Sanderson, Facility Siting
and Public Opposition (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1983).
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Environmental agencies are given the primary responsibility for enforcing
the law. State and federal agencies have a wide array of enforcement tools at
their disposal that can be roughly arrayed in a hierarchical manner that reflects
the severity of the violation and the violator's posture once the violation is
identified. If violations are minor, or it is a first time violation, the agency is
likely to use administrative enforcement mechanisms such as engaging in
informal conversations with the violator in the hopes that highlighting the
violation will lead to compliance. As violations become more severe or of longer
standing, the agency will attempt to use other administrative mechanisms such
as administrative orders with compliance schedules or, where it is called for in
the statute, the imposition of administrative fines. If the violator doesn't respond
to any of these enforcement efforts, the agency can file a lawsuit against the
institution. Such lawsuits are not instituted lightly, and are reserved for cases in
which there are alleged to be serious violations.14
Typically, while the lawsuit proceeds, the agency and the violator will try
to reach an out-of-court agreement on the remedy. Such agreements, called
consent decrees, do not include any findings of fact, nor do they indicate that any
law has been violated. Instead, they detail the remedial steps the institution will
take to come into compliance with the law that was allegedly violated.15 The
decree is then entered in court and, if the latter finds it acceptable, it becomes
judicially enforceable. Only in a few cases will agency enforcement actions move
beyond a consent decree to the point where the court finds violations of law and
becomes involved in remedy formulation.
Environmental agencies are not the only ones that can initiate law suits to
compel environmental institutions to come into compliance with the law.
Virtually all federal, environmental statutes, and many state statutes enable
14 See, for example, Melnick's discussion of the steps leading up to the filing of a suit in
enforcement cases concerning the violation of State Implementation Plans under the
Federal Clean Air Act. R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1983): 195-202.
15 Jeffrey G. Miller, Citizen Suits: Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987): 89-90.
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citizens to bring such suits.16 Federal provisions enable citizens to sue not only
the violating institution, but also the enforcement agency for failing to carry out
"non-discretionary duties" in the law, e.g., taking enforcement action against
those who violate permit requirements. As is the case with lawsuits brought by
agencies, most citizen suits end in consent decrees, with only the most unusual or
serious cases moving to the courts' finding of a violation of law and its direct
involvement in remedy formulation.17
The Remedial Adjudication Process Begins
No matter how the case gets to court, once the judge determines that a law
is being violated, the remedial adjudication process begins. Then it is up to the
judge to determine what type of remedy is appropriate. In environmental
institution cases, money damages are not a sufficient remedy. 18 The statutes
establish environmental protection goals which are to be met by the regulated
community. To allow regulated institutions, therefore, to, in affect, pay for the
privilege to continue polluting would render the statutes and the goals they
establish meaningless. Furthermore, there is little reason to believe that
monetary damages would be viewed as an acceptable remedy by affected
parties. If, for example, a municipal incinerator is violating federal Clean Air Act
emission limits that are intended to protect human health, those who are
potentially being adversely affected by the emissions are not looking to be
compensated for such affects, but are interested in getting the incinerator to
comply with the emission limits, thereby protecting their health.
In cases concerning statutory violations by environmental institutions, the
courts will inevitably be involved in issuing injunctions, court orders that
indicate the actions the institution must take to come into compliance. The
16 Miller; In Massachusetts there is a "Ten Citizens Suit Statute," that enables citizens to
bring suit to restrain actions that are in violation of state and local environmental law.
Susan M. Cooke and Donald S. Berry, eds., Massachusetts Environmental Law Handbook
(Government Institutes, Inc., June 1991): 26.
17 "Most enforcement cases are settled by negotiated consent decrees, whether brought by
government or citizen enforcers." Miller, 89.
18 Zygmunt J.G. Plater, Environmental Law and Policy: A Coursebook on Nature. Law. and
Society (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1992): 142.
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judicial enforcment sections of most environmental statutes direct the courts to
issue injunctions to compel compliance with the law.19 Those sections usually
are not specific and give the judge great discretion in determining what type of
injunction is appropriate. 20 While such injunctions may be negative, ordering an
institution to stop its illegal activity or, in a worst case, requiring the institution
to shut down, these are not the kinds of injunctions that are of interest here.
Instead, this dissertation focuses on cases in which there are ongoing violations
of the law that will not cease barring some sustained form of remedial relief. The
violations cannot simply be stopped in short order. Shutdown, too, will rarely be
a practical alternative given the essential services supplied by environmental
institutions, e.g., sewage treatment. 21 Instead, the court, in determining ways to
compel compliance, will have to consider orders that are in the form of positive,
injunctive relief, which outline what steps the violating institution is to pursue so
that violations cease.
The Criteria for Evaluating Legitimacy
While the court has considerable discretion in determining the content of a
remedy, there are a few widely accepted cannons of legitimate judicial behavior
that serve to place limits on such discretion. The ultimate goal of the remedy is
to bring the violating institution back into compliance with the law. This
necessarily means that the remedy should reflect the violations uncovered during
19 Sheldon M. Novick, Law of Environmental Protection (Washington, D.C.: ELI, March
1994): 8-102.
20 According to Novick:
"The primary judicial enforcement remedy available under most of the environmental
regulatory statutes is injunctive relief. The wording of the relevant sections varies among
the statutes, but most are variants of the CAA [Clean Air Act] section 113(b), which
authorizes EPA to commence an action for a temporary or permanent injunction and
grants jurisdiction to the courts to restrain the violation and require compliance with the
act. CWA [Clean Water Act] section 309(b), [and] RCRA [Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act] section 3008(b), . . . appear to go further, authorizing 'appropriate' relief to
be granted."
8-102.
21 Gelpe, 78.
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litigation and seek to, in fact, remedy those violations. 22  The remedy
formulation process is not a time during which other problems, not officially
before the court, are to be addressed and resolved. Additionally, great emphasis
is placed on the need for the judge to maintain impartiality and, in the process,
remain faithful to the application of the law.23 To that end, the remedy is not
supposed to be based on the judge's own opinion of what is necessary to remedy
the violations. The judge should not use their discretionary powers to create
remedies that reflect personal biases about how things should be as opposed to
the popular will embodied in statutory requirements. 24 Although nobody
argues that judicial decisionmaking is totally neutral, there is a big divide
between a judge who strives for impartiality and one who "calls them as he sees
them."25 Along the same lines, judges are not supposed to "be swayed [in their
judgements] by partisan interests, public clamor or fear of criticism."26 Finally,
judges, as well as court personnel subject to the judges control, are supposed to
22 "In general, the nature of the remedy must reflect the nature of the violation." Phillip J.
Cooper, Hard Judicial Choices (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 21. "In
litigation, there must be a logical connection between the rights asserted by the parties
and the court's remedy." Mnookin, 61. "[T]he shape of the legal wrong, as well as the
injury suffered by the person aggrieved, defines what relief is appropriate." Diver, 47.
23 Canon 3 of the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct states, in part, that "A
judge shall be faithful to the law. . . ". Martindale-Hubbel Law Digest. New lersey-
Wyoming Law Digests, Uniform Acts, A.B.A. Codes (New Providence, N.J.: Martindale-
Hubbel, 1994): ABA-65. The same language can be found in many state codes of judicial
conduct, including that of Massachusetts.
24 Although referring to the Supreme Court, Glazer hints at this problem -- "The Court is
committed to an activist posture, with great impact on various areas of life, by the
expansion of the reach of legal principles on the basis of which it operates. Some assert,
and in some angry dissents Justices themselves charge, that no legal logic guides the
Court -- that it is simply legislating its views on difficult problems." "Toward an Imperial
Judiciary?" 115.
25 "Are judges really neutral, unbiased decision makers whose special knowledge of law
provides clear answers to the difficult questions brought to the courts for resolution? Of
course not. Beneath the black robes are human beings ... Like other people in American
society, judges possess values, attitudes, biases, and political interests which color their
decisions." Christopher E. Smith, Courts. Politics, and the Judicial Process (Chicago:
Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1993): 129-130; A judge "is governed by a professional ideal of
reflective and dispassionate analysis of the problem before him and is likely to have had
some experience in putting this ideal into practice." Chayes, 1308.
26 This language is part of Canon 3 of the American Bar Association Code of Judicial
Conduct.
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refrain from making public comments on pending or impending proceedings
before the court that are likely to affect the outcome of those proceedings.27
There are other limits on remedial discretion that reflect the nature of the
remedy and the regulatory process. In order to come into compliance with the
law, violating institutions will likely have to upgrade or build new pollution
control facilities. This involves facility planning and design, and, if necessary,
formal review and approval by the appropriate regulatory agencies in the form,
for example, of EISs and operating permits. It may also involve siting new
facilities, a process that will have to be performed in accordance with relevant
siting laws and recieve regulatory approval. Court involvement cannot displace
these processes. Indeed, any remedy must respect the integrity of the formalized
regulatory process. To that end, a remedy can establish timetables for such
planning, design, and siting and the accompanying regulatory reviews, but it
should not determine, in advance, the outcome of such regulatory processes. To
do the latter would not only displace the legally established framework for
making such decisions, but it would also deprive the public of its right to
influence the outcome of regulatory decisions through the process of public
participation. Instead of determining the outcome of the regulatory process,
remedial adjudication must be responsive to that outcome. For example, if a
remedy required the siting of a new facility, it would be up to the violating
institution to plan and design the facility and conduct the siting process in
accordance with relevant laws and regulations. The end result of these efforts
must be incorporated into the remedy unless, of course, the regulatory process is
legally challenged. For example, a suit might be brought claiming that the siting
decision was not in compliance with the law. If a court found that to be the case,
a new or modified siting process would have to take place and the remedy, once
again, would have to reflect the outcome of that regulatory process.
Another limit imposed by the regulatory process concerns the regulations
themselves. The process of translating statutes of general application into
regulations, which, for example, gives meaning to terms such as Best Available
27 This can also be found in Canon 3.
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Technology and establishes acceptable pollutant loadings, is a task that the
legislature specifically assigned to the regulatory agency. This task is carried out
during formal and informal rulemaking and is judicially reviewable within a
context that is separate from the one facing the judge during remedial
adjudication. In the latter case, therefore, it is not up to the judge to re-evaluate
the validity of the regulations that are to be applied. If, for example, the law
required that an environmental institution achieve certain pollutant effluent
standards that were developed via the rulemaking process and were either not
legally contested or, if contested, were upheld by a higher court, the judge, in
fashioning a remedy, should not decide that such standards were somehow
improper and should not be applied. Rather, it is the judge's responsibility to
ensure that the standards and requirements embodied in the regulations are
achieved.
Deferring to the Parties
Beyond these limits, there is no prescribed process for remedy formulation
that courts must follow. Indeed, there are many possible approaches that the
court can take. The court could, for example, ask one of the parties to the case,
e.g., the violating institution or the regulatory agency in charge of overseeing the
implementation of the law, to propose a remedy, develop a remedy on its own
based on the information gathered during litigation, or bring in an outside expert
to develop a remedy.28 The most legitimate approach for the court to take is to
defer the responsibility of remedy formulation to the regulatory agency and the
violating institution. More specifically, the court should request that these
entities attempt to negotiate an agreement on a remedy that can be presented to
the court for review.
The rationale behind this approach has to do with the nature of remedial
decisions. Formulating a remedy in environmental institution cases is not a
mechanical act, where the specific outline of the remedy flows directly from the
nature of the violation. There are many discretionary choices that have to be
28 Sturm, "A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies,"1365-1376.
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made in determining what constitutes compliance and, therefore, what
requirements should be included in a remedial decree. The source of such
discretion may be a lack of clarity in the statute itself, or in the legislative history,
which can lead to varying definitions of compliance. Even when the statute and
accompanying history is relatively clear, in moving the violating institution into
compliance, there still are discretionary decisions that necessarily attend the
application of general statutes and regulations to individual cases. 29 For
example, what pollution control facilities are necessary to come into compliance,
how long will it take to construct them, how much time should the
environmental institution have to complete the prescribed remedial actions, and
how should cost and the institutional capacity of the violator be taken into
account in making such determinations? Of course, there is no one "correct"
remedy. Therefore, formulating a remedy requires weighing the pros and cons
of alternatives paths and selecting among them. And, since each potential
remedy implies a different allocation of financial and administrative resources,
the act of remedy formulation inevitably establishes policy for the institution in
question.
It is primarily because remedy formulation establishes policy that judicial
deference to the regulatory agency and violating institution is appropriate.
Having these two entities make the remedial decisions ensures that policy
choices are made by politically responsible and democratically accountable
executive branch entities, thereby allaying concerns about the courts
overstepping the bounds within which the separation of powers would have
them stay. Of course, some may argue that such entities are not as
democratically accountable as one might think, pointing out, for example, that
the job-protected civil servants in regulatory agencies, who make many of the
decisions concerning the implementation of law, are hardly accountable. While
such criticisms are not unfounded, there is no doubt that regulatory agencies and
environmental institutions are much more accountable than an unelected
29 "Even the most comprehensive statutory guide to remedy formulation will not ... make
the court's role purely ministerial. Statutes are designed to have general application, and
the court must, therefore, evaluate the propriety of applying any remedies offered by the
statutory standards to the particular situation." Columbia Law Review, Special Project,"
794.
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judiciary, and it is that comparison which is important here. And, regardless of
questions about their "purity" as democratically responsive actors, they are the
entities that society has chosen, by democratic means, to be responsible for
implementing the environmental laws in question.
Other reasons for defering first to the regulatory agency and the violating
institution have to do with the importance of committment and cooperation.
Being able to participate in negotiations and to agree on a remedial approach is
likely increase the committment of both entities to its implementation, for they
are much more likely to view the agreement as fair and appropriate, and be
invested in seeing it succeed. 30 As for cooperation, when the formalized
regulatory process runs properly, prior to any violation, the regulatory agency
and the institution often develop a working relationship that includes, among
other things, informal meetings, information transfers, and negotiations over
permits, in which the shared goal is the implementation of environmental law.
Court intervention doesn't diminish the value of this relationship. No matter
what remedy is chosen, implementation will undoubtedly be more successful
when the regulatory agency and the institution work together to achieve a
common goal. This outcome is most likely when that goal is a remedy
formulated, not by the court, but by those entities most responsible for remedy
implementation.
To further enhance legitimacy, the judge should request that any other
groups or government entities who are parties to the case participate in remedial
negotiations between the regulatory agency and the violating institution. Such
parties could include, for example, an environmental organization or a city or
town that initially brought suit against the institution. It also could include any
30 "Those who participate feel that they 'own' the agreement, and are therefore more likely
to support its implementation." Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the
Impasse (New York: Basic Books, 1987): 27; "[P]articipation plays a crucial role in
promoting cooperation with the remedy. Direct involvement influences the participants
to accept the result." Susan P. Sturm, "The Promise of Participation," Iowa Law Review.
Vol. 78, No. 5 (July 1993): 996-997. "To the extent that the decree reflects their proposals,
defendants are more likely to acquiesce in its implementation." Diver, 84.
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party that came forward and asked the court to intervene in the case and was
granted that right.
By virtue of their official status in the case, all of the parties have the right
to, at a minimum, comment on any remedy adopted by the court. Thus, the
judge could ask the regulatory agency and violating institution to formulate a
remedy and then allow the other parties to comment on it before deciding
whether to accept it. However, by asking all of these groups to engage in
remedial negotiations, their concerns could be addressed at the outset and the
likelihood of presenting a unified remedy to the court would be increased.
Evaluating a single remedial proposal in which disagreements have been worked
out should be an easier task for the court than evaluating a proposal offered by
the reguatory agency and violating institution in light of potentialy conflicting or
critical comments presented by the other parties. And, for the reasons cited
earlier, agreement among the parties is likely to increase their commitment to the
remedy and reduce the odds of them opposing its implementation.
What about other groups or individuals who will be affected by the
remedy, but are not parties to the case -- should they participate in remedial
negotiations? There are, at least, two arguments in favor of such inclusion. The
first is based on the idea that participation maintains the dignity of the individual
by giving those that are affected by decisions emerging from social processes a
"formally guaranteed opportunity to [in turn] affect" such decisions. 31 While
dignity is certainly an important value, in the judicial context, the right to
participate in remedy formulation should not be a guaranteed, unconditional
right. Instead, it should be predicated upon the individuals or groups coming
forward, presenting their rationale for being allowed to intervene in the case, and
having the judge decide whether such intervention is warranted given the
circumstances of the case. If the judge decides in favor of intervention, the
individual or group then becomes a party to the case.
31 Lon Fuller, "Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator," Wisconsin Law Review Vol. 3
(1963): 79, cited in Sturm, "A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies," 1392.
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The second reason for the inclusion of all those who are affected has to do
with the possibility that such individuals or groups will possess differing
perspectives on the causes of the violations and the feasibility of alternative
remedies, perspectives that can inform the formulation process and enhance the
prospects for coming up with an effective remedy.32 There is no doubt that in
any case of remedial adjudication involving environmental institutions, there
will be a great number of individuals and groups that are likely to have a
perspective on such issues, but, once again, their right to participate and offer
their perspectives should be predicated upon them coming forward and the
judge allowing them to intervene. It is important to note that even if affected
groups and individuals are not parties to the case they will, most likely, still have
opportunities to present their perspectives and influence the nature of the
remedy by participating in the formal regulatory process that takes place during
remedy implementation, e.g., participating in the EIS process.
Deference to a Point
Deference to the parties to reach agreement on a remedy cannot go on
forever, for without a remedy no progress can be made in moving the violating
institution into compliance, which is, after all, the main goal of remedial
adjudication. At some point, the court has to intervene and decide on a remedy
if the parties do not. It doesn't have the option of putting off the issue
indefinitely and letting a non-decision stand.33 Of course, there is no single span
of time, say 4 months, that represents the legitimate amount of time for the court
to defer to the parties. Determining when that point is reached must be done on
a case-by-case basis. There are, however, some criteria that can be applied in
making this determination. With respect to taking over the role of remedy
formulation, one would want the court to justify its intervention, persuasively
arguing that it had no alternative but to act in light of the inability of the parties
to reach agreement and the need to move onto the remedy implementation phase
32 Sturm, "A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies," 1393.
33 Robert H. Birkby, The Court and Public Policy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1983), 3.
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so that the violations can be stopped.34  The persuasiveness of the court's
argument can be measured against any arguments raised by the parties in
opposition to the court's action. If, for example, the parties argue that court
intervention is unwarranted or is coming too soon, does the court have
persuasive reasons as to why this isn't the case? Another way for the court to
justify intervention is to set deadlines for negotiation. The court could, for
example, give the parties five months to formulate a remedy, letting it be known
at the outset that if agreement wasn't reached by that time the court would
intervene. Here, too, the persuasiveness of the deadline can be evaluated in light
of the arguments raised against it.
The parties' inability to formulate a remedy is not the only avenue by
which the court might be drawn into the task of remedy formulation. If the
parties are able to formulate a remedy within a reasonable amount of time, the
court has a responsibility to then evaluate it to ensure that it respects the integrity
of the regulatory process, and that its requirements reflect the nature of the
violation and are likely to lead the institution back into compliance with the law.
If the court is satisfied on these counts, it should accept the remedy, and
implementation can begin. If, on the other hand, the court finds the proposed
remedy unacceptable, it is placed in the position of having to decide what
remedy is appropriate.
When the Court Steps In
Whether the court's direct involvement in remedy formulation is a
consequence of a lack of agreement on the part of the parties or the submission of
an unacceptable remedy, the court is presented with a difficult task. In
formulating a remedy, and selecting among alternative paths, the court will
34 In the constitutional context, Fletcher argues that, "[t]he only legitimate basis for a federal
judge to take over the political function in devising or choosing a remedy in an
insitutional suit is the demonstrated unwillingness or incapacity of the political body."
He also notes that there is no easy way to determine when that take over should occur.
"It will be a matter of subtle judgement in a particular case whether such a serious and
chronic default of the political entity exists." William A. Fletcher, "The Discretionary
Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy," The Yale Law Journal 91,
no. 4 (March 1982): 694-695.
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inevitably be drawn into making decisions, e.g., the schedule for remedial
measures, that have policy ramifications for the institution and its surrounding
political environment. While the concerns about the separation of powers and
democratic accountability do not disappear once the court is placed in this
position, the fact that the other parties, including those that are traditionally
politically responsible for making such decisions, have failed to do so provides
justification for the court to step in and fill the void. This perspective rejects the
"wooden notion of bounded, separated branches" in favor of a more fluid
relationship in which it is accepted that, under certain circumstances, each of the
branches must perform the functions traditionally confined to a single branch.35
Just because the court is in the position of formulating a remedy doesn't
mean that anything is legitimate. Concerns about ensuring that the remedy
reflects the violation, avoiding judicial bias, and respecting the integrity of the
regulatory process should still serve to place limits on the courts' discretion.
There are yet other constraints to judicial discretion that are applicable.
Although the failure of the parties to propose an acceptable remedy justifies the
courts' assumption of policymaking responsibility, there are reasons to keep the
courts' policymaking role limited. It is one thing for the court to make remedial
decisions about what level of pollution control is required by the law and what
schedule the institution must follow in order to acheive compliance. Indeed, a
court in the position of formulating a remedy couldn't avoid such decisions.
There are, however, other types of decisions that are likely to attend any
35 Martha Minow, Making All the Difference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990): 359.
According to Kurland: "If we take the basic arguments usually asserted that it is for the
legislature to make the rules governing conduct, for the executive to enforce those rules,
and for the judiciary to apply those rules in the resolution of justiciable contests, it soon
becomes apparent that it is necesary to government that sometimes the executive and
sometimes the judiciary has to create rules, that sometimes the legislature and sometimes
the judiciary has to enforce rules, and sometimes the legislature and sometimes the
executive has to resolve controversies over rules." 359. The Federalist no. 47 states that
"[i]f we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that, notwithstanding the
emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom [separation
of powers] has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which the several
departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct." Quoted in
Steven T. Seward, "The Boston Harbor Dispute: Judicial Strategy and Legislative
Deadlock," in Charles M. Haar, ed., Of judges. Politics and Flounders (Cambridge, Mass.:
Lincoln Land Institute, 1986): 41.
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remedial process and which also establish policy for the institution in question.
Complying with a remedial order will be expensive and most likely will require
the environmental institution to come up with new funding, hire new personnel,
alter standard operating procedures, and reorganize itself to take on its new
tasks. The court should not be making such funding and administrative
decisions. They are the types of decisions that should be made by the institution
and/or any other entities that are politically responsible for making them, e.g., a
town council or legislature.
Remedy Reformulation
The remedy is not a static document. The process of remedy formulation
will be followed by a repeated process of remedy reformulation. 36 As
circumstances change with the implementation of the remedy, there will be
opportunities to consider possible changes in or additions to the remedy for a
variety of reasons. Earlier assumptions about the time needed for
implementation might be altered in light of experience, new data on pollution
discharges may lead to a reevaluation of what control technologies are required
to achieve compliance, and the completion of facility planning and
environmental review may set the stage for the establishment of new remedial
requirements relating to the schedule for constructing the facility. The impetus
for reformulating the remedy may come from one of the parties or the court.
Either way, the most legitimate approach for the court to take in considering
such reformulations is to defer to the parties to reach agreement on what changes
are appropriate. The rationale for deference is the same here as it is in the case of
36 As Cooper notes,
"... the post decree phase of remedial decree litigation involves ... [an] interactive
relationship between remedy implementation and evaluation and remedy refinement. In
many situations the parties in the case will return to the district judge while the decree is
being carried out to ask for changes based upon implementation problems. Frequently,
these suggested changes are accepted. It is not a situation in which a judge issues an
order and, assuming it survives any appeals, never hears of the case again."
23.
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initial remedy formulation. If the parties fail to reach an acceptable agreement,
then the court must determine what remedial changes are called for.
The Review of Higher Courts and the Legislature
Regardless of whether the remedy is formulated by the parties or the
court, the ultimate arbiters of the legitimacy of the remedy are the higher courts
and the legislative branch. Any remedy imposed by a trial court can be appealed
to a higher court for review. Such appeals may ultimately make their way to a
state or the federal Supreme Court. Courts of appeal are in the position of
determining whether the trial court abused its judicial discretion or exceeded its
legal authority in ordering a specific remedy. If a higher court overturns the
remedy of the trial court, then that remedy is, by definition, illegitimate. But,
courts of appeals are not the final say when it comes to legitimacy. In
establishing controversial remedies the courts may generate political pressure for
legislative officials to review those remedies. And, the legislative branch, e.g., a
state legislature or congress, that both created the law which has been violated
and gave the courts the right to remedy those violations through the use of
injunctions, can overturn any judicially ordered remedy by amending the law or
creating an exemption in such a way as to make the remedy invalid and,
therefore, illegitimate. 37
Legitimacy and Perception
Part of the reason why legitimacy in remedy formulation is an important
issue is the belief among many legal scholars that if the court acts in an
illegitimate manner, it might put at risk its ability to implement its orders. This is
based on the premise that one of the courts most powerful sanctions is its ability
37 This concept is often referred to as a "remand to the legislature." See, for example, Joseph
Sax, Defending the Environment (New York, NY: Knopf, 1971): 175-192; Plater, "Statutory
Violations and Equitable Discretion," California Law Review 70 (1982): 583-592; and
James L. Oakes, "The Judicial Role in Environmental Law," Environmental Law (June
1977): 516.
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to compel compliance with its orders as long as its remedial formulation
activities are percieved as legitimate by, and, therefore, can command the respect
and assent of those political actors who are responsible for remedy
implementation. 38 The concern about preserving the legitimacy of the court goes
beyond the remedy formulation stage to implementation. If the court, in
attempting to ensure compliance with its orders, takes actions that are percieved
as being illegitimate by responsible political actors, it might engender resistance
from those actors. For example, if a judge were to become a political partisan in
an effort to generate support for a court order, that might be viewed as
inappropriate judicial behavior and, therefore, lead to opposition. Thus, another
question to ask in evaluating the legitimacy of the court in remedial adjudication
is whether its actions during implementation are likely to lead to a diminution of
its ability to gain compliance with remedial orders. The more a courts' actions
diminish this ability, the less legitimate they are.
The Criteria for Evaluating the Capacity to Formulate a Remedy
Assuming that the courts' role in remedy formulation is legitimate,
another equally important question is will the court have the capacity to
formulate a remedy.39 More specifically, can the court gather information
relevant to remedy formulation, and understand that information well enough to
devise remedies that are likely to be effective in leading the institution into
compliance? Questions about capacity are especially relevant, given that the
38 As Diver notes, "A judge's actions must conform to that narrow band of conduct
considered appropriate for so antimajoritarian an institution. Whenever a court appears
to manipulate the rules of litigation for the attainment of social outcomes, its authority
wanes." 104.
39 Horowitz indicates why this issue is so important:"If the separation of powers reflects a
division of labor according to expertise, then relative institutional capacity becomes
relevant to defining spheres of power and particular exercises of power. . . . Traditional
judicial review meant forbidding action, saying 'no' to the other branches. Now the
judicial function often means requiring action, and there is a difference between
foreclosing an alternative and choosing one, between constraining and commanding.
Among other things, it is this difference, and the problematic character of judicial
resources to manage the task of commanding, that make the question of capacity so
important." The Courts and Social Policy 19.
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discretionary decisions that attend remedy formulation require specialized
technical and institutional knowledge, namely an understanding of technical
issues relating to the application of the law, as well as institutional issues that are
peculiar to the case.
Simply asking whether the court has the capacity to formulate remedies,
assumes that the process of formulation will be solitary one in which the court is
responsible for the tasks of gathering the information, evaluating it, and coming
up with a remedy. This assumes too much. The capacity issue must be
evaluated in two different contexts. The first is when the remedy is a result of
the agreement of the parties, and the second is when the court takes on the
responsibility of remedy formulation.
When the Remedy Comes From the Parties
In the first context, the court, in effect, delegates the task of remedy
formulation to the parties who, arguably, have the capacity to do so. The
regulatory agency has the most expertise and experience in determining what
steps regulatees must take to come into compliance with statutory and regulatory
requirements. While the insitution in question will inevitably be unique in many
respects, the agency can still rely a great deal on what compliance actions were
required in other cases involving the application of the law to similar institutions
for guidance. And, the violating institution has the greatest understanding of its
own operations, and the institutional obstacles that will have to be overcome to
achieve compliance, information that is essential to the formulation of an
effective remedy. For example, the violating institution is able to provide
information about its administrative capacity and physical plant and the changes
that both might have to go through in order to comply with the law. As for the
other parties in the case, they might be able to provide additional insights into
the appropriateness of different remedial schemes.
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When the Remedy Comes From the Court
The other context within which to view the capacity issue is when the
courts are placed in the position of having to make remedial decisions. It is here
that the issue of the courts' capacity, as opposed to the parties' capacity, comes to
the fore. The various tasks of remedy formulation are now in the courts' hands.
Many decry the courts capacity by pointing out that judges, as well as the clerks
who work for them, are generalists who move from issue to issue in the cases
that come before the court and are rarely able to build up any expertise in a
particular area such as environmental protection. Without such expertise, the
argument continues, the court cannot make informed remedial decisions. 40
Although some may argue that a generalist judge can bring a fresh and
uncommitted perspective to the problems in question, which the specialist
cannot, as Horowitz contends, "there is a difference between a fresh perspective
and an ignorant one. That judges are generalists means, above all, that they lack
information and may also lack the experience and skill to interpret such
information as they receive." 41
It is not at all clear that a judge's background hinders their ability to make
informed remedial decisions. First, one can question the assumption that
generalist judges cannot understand the complex information that must be
evaluated in crafting a remedy. Judges are often of keen intellect, and they are
likely to lavish a great deal of highly focused attention on the specifics of the
cases before them.42 In reading the often extensive briefs as well as the
supplementary information provided to the court, and in questioning relevant
parties during hearings, the judge can become very educated about the nature of
the violation, as well as the remedies that might be applied and their potential
impacts.43 Furthermore, judges have often exhibited the capacity to deal with
40 "The generalist character of judges commends them as community representatives for
many of the duties they must perform, but it unfits them for processing specialized
information. In fact, this is one of the jobs that many judges do with the least skill and
the greatest impatience." Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 25.
41 Ibid, 31.
42 Abram Chayes, personal interview with the author, Fall 1993.
43 "Even the diffused adversarial structure of public law litigationn furnishes strong
incentives for the parties to produce information." Chayes, 1308.
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highly complex issues such as patent law, tax-codes, and business
reorganizations, raising the question of why the complex issues involved in
public law remedial adjudication are any less subject to judicial mastery. Second,
if judges feel that their lack of expertise is a hindrance, they can resort to outside
help, e.g., special masters, experts, or advisory committees, who are selected
precisely because they have the expertise the judges lack." Such adjuncts to the
court not only provide expertise, but they also can conserve one of the judiciary's
most precious resources, time, by performing tasks, e.g., synthesizing and
evaluating information, that would otherwise have to be handled by the judge.
The focus of the inquiry into capacity should not be on the judges'
background, but rather on whether, in specific instances, judges show themselves
to be capable of performing the tasks of remedial formulation, with or without
the aid of adjuncts. There are a number of questions that can be asked to
determine if this is the case. The first has to do with information. To make an
informed decision, one would want to have the best available information on the
nature of the violations and potential remedies and their strengths and
weaknesses. Did the courts have access to that information?
The next question in evaluating the courts' capacity, is how it used the
available information in making a remedial decision. The measure of the courts'
capacity is not whether it made the "right" remedial choice. As noted earlier,
there is no single correct remedy. Rather, one would want to know whether the
court made a reasonable remedial choice given the information available at the
time the choice is made. In assessing the reasonableness of the courts' decision
there are a couple of questions to ask. Did the court justify its remedial choice
showing that it considered the alternative remedies, weighed the pros and cons
of those alternatives, and selected a remedy that was likely to lead the violating
institution into compliance? Is there any evidence that the court misunderstood
the available information or made decisions based on erroneous assumptions?
Another question to ask is whether the parties viewed the courts' choice as
reasonable. While some or all of the parties may not agree with the courts'
44 Ibid, 1301; Cavanagh and Sarat, 406. Stephen L. Wasby, "Arrogation of Power or
Accountability: 'Judicial imperialism' revisited," judicature 65, no. 4 (October 1981): 215.
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remedial choice, they still might find it to be a reasonable one in the sense of
being acceptable. If some of the parties find the remedial decision unreasonable,
they have the option, as was discussed in the section on legitimacy, to appeal the
decision to a higher court which can determine whether the lower courts'
decision was reasonable with respect to its use of judicial discretion.
The final measure of the courts' capacity to formulate a remedy comes
after the fact. Whether or not the remedy is presented by the parties and adopted
by the court, it is intended to bring the institution into compliance. Thus, the
question becomes, was the remedy effective? If remedy implementation does not
lead to the elimination of the violations, capacity of the court would have to be
questioned. However, if implementation led to the desired changes, that would
positively reflect on the courts' capacity.
The Criteria for Evaluating the Capacity to Implement
As the remedy makes the shift from paper to reality, the process of
implementation begins. It is during this process that so many programs for
change, whether initiated by the court or any other public or private entity, fail to
achieve their goals. 45 There are four questions that should be asked in evaluating
whether or not the courts have the capacity to implement remedies: are the
courts able to monitor implementation, respond to changing circumstances,
enforce compliance with remedial orders by overcoming obstacles to
implementation, and, as a result of the courts' monitoring, responsiveness, and
enforcement actions, are the steps required by the remedial order actually carried
out?
45 Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkely, CA: University of
California Press, 1973); Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier, Implementation of
Public Policy (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1983); and Martin Rein and
Francine F. Rabinovitz, Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective (Cambridge, MA:
Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard University, Working Paper no. 43,
March 1977).
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Monitoring
Remedial orders will require the violating institution to take a series of
steps designed to lead it into compliance. To build a new pollution control
facility, an environmental institution will, for example, have to develop facility
plans, have them reviewed by relevant regulatory agencies, and then build the
facility in accordance with a construction schedule. To know that such steps are
taken and that the remedy is actually being implemented, the court must have
the means to monitor the implementation process. Without such a capability, the
court is, in effect, "flying blind," and will likely be put in the position of
responding to implementation problems after they occur, when one or more of
the parties comes forward to alert the court to the situation, as opposed to being
able to identify and respond to potential problems early on, in the hopes of
solving them before they have the chance to impede remedial implementation. 46
There are a variety of monitoring tools the courts can use. They can
appoint special masters, monitors, or advisory committees to track compliance
and report back to the court.47 Furthermore, the environmental institution can
be required to submit periodic compliance reports, describing what has been
done as well as the prospects for continued implementation. With respect to
assessing the courts' capacity to implement, the question is not whether the court
has the tools for monitoring, but rather do those tools work. More specifically,
one would want to know if the monitoring tools used are able to give the court
an accurate picture of the implementation process and what is, or is not
transpiring at the ground level.
46 According to Horowitz, the courts have scant ability to monitor the implementation of
their orders. "The courts are mainly dependent for their impact information on a single
feedback mechanism: the follow up lawsuit. This mechanism tends to be slow, erratic,
unsystematic. Courts have no inspectors who move out into the field to ascertain what
happened. They receive no regular reports on the implementation of their policies." The
Courts and Social Policy, 55.
Columbia Law Review, 827-830.
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Responding
Monitoring is only one element in evaluating the courts' capacity to
implement remedies. An equally important element is the courts' responsiveness
to changing circumstances. The implementation process is not static. New
information and/or factors will arise that might necessitate a reformulation of
the remedy. This is inevitable, given the polycentric nature of the situations
presented during remedy implementation. According to Fuller, a polycentric
situation is "many centered," so that an alteration at one center or location
changes the relationships among all the centers.48 As one element of the
implementation process shifts, other elements may have to be recalibrated in
order keep the process moving forward. The implementation process is, thus, a
series of incremental steps, followed by evaluation and adjustments based on
what evaluation uncovers. 49 For example, delays in regulatory reviews could
create the need to reconsider the timing of subsequent court-ordered actions that
are contingent upon those reviews, or new data may be generated about the
nature of the violation and the feasibility of the remedy in light of that data. A
remedial implementation process that doesn't respond to such changing
circumstances is too rigid and runs the risk of missing opportunities to both
improve the effectiveness of the remedy and have the latter better reflect the
realities of implementation. Thus, another question to ask regarding the courts'
capacity to implement is whether or not they are capable of responding to
changing circumstances by reformulating the remedy when appropriate.
Overcoming Obstacles
Another element of the courts' capacity to implement a remedy is their
ability to overcome obstacles to implementation. These obstacles can come from
many sources. For example, the institution might fail to devise facility plans or
to take other actions within the timeframe established by the remedy. Such
delays, if widespread, can cripple the implementation process. There may be
48 Lon L. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication," Harvard Law Review Vol. 92
(1978): 395. See also, Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy, 59.
49 Diver, 63. Pressman and Wildavsky, 87-124.
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outright opposition to the remedy, or parts of it. This could come from
legislative or executive branch officials, including the management of the
institution, who view the remedy as illegitimate and/or politically unpopular,
and are unwilling to take the actions necessary for implementation, e.g., increase
institutional funding. Citizens, too, who perceive themselves to be negatively
impacted by the remedy may rise up to oppose it, relying on their considerable
powers to halt, delay, or in some other way, undermine implementation.
The court has a variety of sanctions it can use to try to overcome obstacles
to implementation. Most environmental statutes allow the court to levy fines for
continuing violations of the law which may create an incentive for the institution
to comply with remedial requirements. Public officials, such as the head of the
violating institution, can be held in contempt of court, and possibly placed in jail,
for failure to implement the remedy. In extreme cases, the court can place the
violating institution into receivership, taking over the day to day operations of
the institution and, in affect, assuming the primary responsibility for
implementation.5 0 Furthermore, individual statutes may have unique sanctions
that the court can apply. For example, under the federal CWA, a federal court
can issue a moratorium on new sewer hookups to a treatment works that is in
violation of the laws effluent discharge requirements. Regardless of what
sanctions the court employs, the key question from the standpoint of capacity is
whether or not the sanctions used are able to overcome the obstacles that are
placed in the way of implementation.
Is the Remedy Implemented?
The final measure of the courts' capacity to implement is the degree to
which remedial actions are carried out in accordance with the court-ordered
schedule. As with any type of project that has formally established deadlines,
the primary focus of implementation is ensuring that those deadlines are
50 See, for example, Environmental Law Reporter, "Court-Created Receivership Emerging
as Remedy for Persistent Noncompliance with Environmental Laws," Environmental
Law Reporter. Vol. 10 (March 1980): 10059-10062; and United States v. City of Detroit,
476 F. Supp 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
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reached. Thus, the courts' ability to monitor, respond, and enforce is important
because it enables the court to achieve the instrumental goal of keeping the
environmental institution on track in meeting the requirements of the remedial
regime.
The Criteria for Evaluating Effectiveness
The ultimate objective of remedial adjudication is to bring the violating
institution into compliance with the law within a reasonable time and at a
reasonable cost. The degree to which court intervention acheives this objective is
a measure of its effectiveness.51 In evaluating whether the violating institution
was brought into compliance with the law, it is necessary ask if the
implementation of the remedy had its intended effect. For example, if the law
requires that certain effluent or emissions standards be met, or that certain
pollution practices be stopped, the question becomes, were those standards met
and were those practices stopped?
In determining whether compliance was achieved within a reasonable
time and at a reasonable cost, there are no generic numbers that can be applied.
Nor can one look to other pollution control projects to see how long they took or
how much they cost in the hopes that one can, through comparison, identify
what is reasonable for the situation in question. Each case of remedial
adjudication is likely to have too many unique characteristics for such
comparisons to be useful. Looking to statutory requirements is also unlikely to
yield any measures of what is reasonable in a given case. If there were timelines
for the attainment of compliance in the law, they will no longer be applicable as
guides for reasonableness because the fact that the environmental institution is
51 The first part of this criteria is relatively straightforward and finds support in the
literature. For example, according to Gelpe, "[e]ffectiveness means obtaining compliance
with the law." 81. Other studies, which focus primarily on constitutional cases, also have
equated effectiveness with obtaining compliance or "correct[ing] the substantive
violation." See, for example, Columbia Law Review, 863. As for defining what is a
reasonable time and cost, the literature on remedial adjudication provides no guideposts.
Thus, the criteria for determining reasonableness is based on the author's experience and
research.
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involved in remedial adjudication means that those statutory timelines were
violated. What is a reasonable time will have to be determined by the
circumstances surrounding the case in question. Furthermore, environmental
statutes do not indicate what is a reasonable cost for compliance. Primarily
through the use of a command-and-control system of regulation, statutes set the
goals of compliance, e.g., the use of certain technologies, not the costs. Therefore,
as is the case with time, the definition of reasonable cost has to be determined by
the circumstances of the case.
In evaluating reasonable time and cost, there are two perspectives that
should be taken into account. One is that of the court and how it structured the
search for time and cost savings. The other is that of the parties in the case and
how they percieved the issue of reasonableness.
From the perspective of the court, one would want to ask a couple of
questions. First, did the court encourage the parties to search for ways to shorten
the time to acheive the various deadlines in the court-ordered schedule,
therefore, shortening the time to come into compliance with the law? Such
encouragement is important because of its potential to help create an
environment in which the parties will actually take on the task of looking for
ways to save time. Second, if the parties offer sound proposals for shortening the
time to compliance, was the court receptive to them? The degree to which such
opportunities for saving time are capitalized upon is an indicator of
reasonableness. The more the court encourages the search for time savings and
takes advantage of them, the more reasonable is the resulting time to compliance.
In contrast, the less the court encourages the search for and takes advantage of
potential time savings, the less reasonable is the time to compliance.
Assessing the reasonableness of the cost of compliance presents a similar
dynamic. For the same reasons, one would want to ask, did the court encourage
the parties to search for cost savings wherever possible? And, if the parties offer
proposals that would enable compliance to be achieved at a lower cost, was the
court receptive to those proposals? The more the court encourages the search for
cost-effective opportunities for reformulating the remedy and takes advantage of
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them, the more reasonable is the ultimate cost of compliance. By the same token,
the less the court encourages and takes advantage of cost savings, the less
reasonable is the ultimate cost.
From the perspectives of the parties, two questions should be raised. First,
do the parties think that compliance was achieved within a reasonable time and
at a reasonable cost? Second, do they feel that advantage was taken of the
opportunities for time and cost savings?
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Chapter III
"What is Past is Prologue"*
Institutional lawsuits are usually triggered by a particular event.1 For
example, litigation might be sparked by the enactment of a statute blocking the
implementation of a desegregation plan, or by the layoff of staff necessary to
maintain the proper functioning of a mental hospital.2 Although a triggering
event spurs action, the suit itself rarely focuses solely on that event. Indeed, the
trigger is most often only the most recent instance of a long-standing series of
alleged legal violations by the institution which are brought the court's attention
during litigation. If the judge determines that the law has been broken and that
remedial action is warranted, he/she must understand the historical
circumstances that caused the legal violations. Through an understanding of
how and why those violations occurred, the judge can fashion remedies designed
to change institutional operations in a way that will ensure that legal norms are
upheld.
The lawsuit brought by the city of Quincy in 1982, against the
Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), was triggered by a particular event --
the fouling of a local beach with sewage. But as the case developed its scope
broadened, focusing on a whole variety of institutional and other problems that
had contributed to the deterioration of the Boston area's sewage system and the
water quality in the harbor. These problems were the result of historical forces,
literally hundreds of years in the making. And the court relied on this historical
information in deciding how best to remedy the legal violations uncovered by
This phrase, which is incribed on the outside of the National Archives building, in
Washington, D.C., is a slight modification of the words of William Shakespeare, in The
Tempest -- "What's past is prologue" (Act I, Scene 1, 261).
1 Cooper, 16-18.
2 Ibid, 17, 169.
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the litigation. This chapter traces the history that led up to the court's
intervention and analyzes how and why the problems facing the court
developed. In so doing, the chapter shows the causes of harbor pollution, how
the state and federal government responded to that pollution, and why those
responses did not adequately control the pollution, thereby precipitating
Quincy's legal action.
Sewers and More Sewers
Boston was settled in 1630, and sometime thereafter its residents began
digging up the land and laying sewers. The exact date of the first sewer is not
known, but it was before 1700.3 Initially, the process for building sewers was
largely unregulated, but by the early 1700s the provincial government had
passed an Act formalizing the system of laying and paying for sewers.4
According to the Act, the sewers were to be "substantially done with brick or
stock [stone]" and used "for the drainage of cellars and lands," not for the
contents of privy-vaults (out-houses) which virtually all houses had.5 For more
than a century, Boston was sewered by private enterprise, under the auspices of
this Act, and most of the waste transported by those sewers ended up in Boston
Harbor. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine the waste ending up anywhere else.
With much of the town built on hills sloping towards the sea, the laws of gravity
and hydraulics dictated the location of sewer outlets. Although the contents of
privy-vaults were excluded from the sewers, human waste, often called
"nightsoil," still managed to make its way to the harbor, either through the illegal
dumping of waste into the sewers, or through the intentional carting of it down
to the shore, where it was dumped off the end of docks.6
3 Eliot C. Clarke, Main Drainage Works of the City of Boston (Boston: Rockwell and
Churchill, City Printers, 1885): 7.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid, 8.
6 Carl Seaburg, Boston Observed (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971): 280-286.
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In 1822, Boston received a city charter and soon thereafter the city took
over control of the construction and maintenance of the sewers. 7 Over the next
eighty years a number of events laid the groundwork for the transformation of
Boston's patchwork of sewers into three large sewage systems by the turn of the
century. The most important of these were the publication of the Report of the
Sanitation Commission of Massachusetts 1850 and the increasing use of water.
The Sanitation Commission report signaled the beginning of the "sanitary
awakening" in the United States, ushering in a new era of thinking about the
relationship between organic waste and human health.8 It argued that disease
could be transmitted through the atmosphere via poisons that result from
decaying organic matter, and recommended that "Drains and Sewers should be
made to carry off water introduced in any way into cities and villages. If the
surplus be permitted to remain, it often becomes stagnant and putrid, and is then
a fruitful source of disease."9 The linkage between organic waste and health was
given added credence in the mid-1850s, when cholera was found to be a
contagious disease caused by a poison that reproduced itself in the bodies of the
afflicted. The poison was in the vomit and excrement of those with cholera, and
thus, it was argued, that the disease could be transmitted through contaminated
water supplies.10 The emerging understanding of cholera and its mode of
transmission had special significance in Boston because the city suffered through
a series of cholera outbreaks around mid-century. Although disease was the
most serious health issue related to sewage, Boston residents were also greatly
concerned about the olfactory distress and, sometimes, nausea caused by
decaying sewage at the harbor's edge.11
7 John Koren, Boston, 1822 to 1922, The Story of Its Government and Principal Activities
During One Hundred Years (Boston: City of Boston Printing Department, 1923): 9, 161.
8 Ralph E. Fuhrman, "History of water pollution control," Journal of the Water Pollution
Control Federation Vol. 56, No. 4 (April 1984): 308.
9 Lemuel Shattuck, Report of the Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts 1850 (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948 (this is a re-publication of the original report)):
160.
10 Charles E. Rosenberg, The Cholera Years (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1987): 193-194.
11 Clarke, 13-14.
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Health concerns were not the only reason for the Boston area to consider
improving its sewage system. As Boston grew, so did its appetite for water. By
1852 it was estimated that per capita water consumption in Boston was 58 gallons
per day. In 1860, it had risen to 100 gallons a day.12 Just as this water had to
make its way into the city, so too, did it have to make its way out, and the way
out was through the sewers which were in need of expansion to handle the
flow. 13 Virtually all of the sewers built during this time were combined sewers,
designed to carry both sewage, e.g., sanitary waste and washwater, and
stormwater runoff. Such sewers are quite common in older cities.14
In light of the need to address the growing health concerns and the
increased sewage flow, the Mayor appointed a commission to "report upon the
present sewerage of the city ... and to present a plan for outlets and main lines
of sewers, for the future wants of the city."15 The Commission recommended
that Boston build the type of system that had been "adopted the world over by
large cities near deep water," which would carry "the sewage out so far that its
point of discharge will be remote from the dwellings, and beyond the possibility
of doing harm."16 This recommendation led Boston, in 1876, to begin building
what would come to be known as the Main Drainage System. Completed in
1884, this system collected sewage from Boston and conveyed it through tunnels,
interceptors, and pumping facilities to storage tanks on Moon Island, from which
point it was discharged, untreated, into the harbor with the outgoing tide.17
According to one chronicler, the new sewage system immediately benefited the
12 Koren, 96; and Fern L. Nesson, Great Waters, A History of Boston's Water Supply
(Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1983): 10.
13 According to one source, in 1863 there were 87,000 Boston households that had piped-in
water, and 14,000 had water closets. Joel A. Tarr and Francis Clay McMichael, "Historic
turning points in municipal water supply and wastewater disposal, 1850-1932," Civil
Engineering ASCE (October 1977): 83.
14 James E. Krier, "Ocean Discharge of Municipal Wastes: Legal and Institutional Aspects,"
in Ocean Disposal of Municipal Wastewater: Impacts on the Coastal Environment (vol.
2), Edward P. Myers and Elizabeth T. Harding, eds. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Sea Grant
College Program, MITSG 83-33, 1983): 665.
15 Clarke, 16.
16 Ibid, 17-18.
17 Madeline Kolb, Wastewater Management Planning for Boston Harbor. A Status Report
(Boston Harbor Interagency Coordinating Committee, August 1980): 5.
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city -- "the death rate diminished; the waters at the docks were no longer
polluted; the offensive odors had disappeared; and the cellars were no longer
periodically flooded."18
Over the next twenty years, Boston built two more drainage systems.19
1894 saw the completion of the Northern Metropolitan System, which collected
sewage from communities north of the Charles River and transported it to Deer
Island where large solids were screened out before the sewage was discharged
into the harbor. In 1904, the Southern Metropolitan System began operation,
serving, as the name implies, areas generally to the south of Boston. This system
discharged screened wastes into the harbor off Nut Island. To oversee these
sewerage systems, in 1889 the city established the Metropolitan Sewerage
Commission. 20 After a series of legislative reshufflings, the responsibilities of the
Sewerage Commission were given to the newly created Metropolitan District
Commission (MDC) in 1919, which also was responsible for supplying water to
the area in and around Boston and managing the area's parks.21
While the three sewerage systems were being built, the cities and towns in
the Boston area were also adding to the labyrinth of combined sewers 22 At the
time of construction, the three part sewerage system and the combined sewers
were believed to be an acceptable way of handling Boston area sewage. In the
late nineteenth century, releasing waste with the outgoing tide was considered
an innovative approach to waste management, and combined sewers "was the
technology to use."23 But as the population grew and ever more waste was sent
18 Koren, 162.
19 Kolb, 5.
20 An Act to Provide for the Building. Maintenance and Operation of a System of Sewage
Disposal for the Mystic and Charles River Valleys. Chapter 439, Act and Resolves passed
by the General Court of Massachusetts in the years 1888-1889.
21 An Act to Organize in Departments the Executive and Administrative Functions of the
Commonwealth, Chapter 350, General Acts passed by the General Court of
Massachusetts in the year 1919.
22 Most of the combined sewers were built between 1860 and 1900. Metropolitan District
Commission, Combined Sewer Overflow Prject Summary Report on Facilities Planning
(April 1982), 1.
23 William Kane, CSO Program Manager at the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority,
personal interview by author, 3 March 1989.
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into the harbor, the problems caused by that waste became more apparent and
disturbing.
Sewers Alone are Not Enough
Between 1900 and 1939, the State Legislature conducted six investigations
of the harbor that highlighted various pollution and health problems.24 For
example, a 1939 special commission "was repeatedly told that conditions in
Boston Harbor are revolting to the esthetic sensibilities and violate all public
health requirements." 25 That report went on to say that ". . . when mothers,
physicians and health officers -- all of whom testified before us -- believe disease
can be traced to polluted water, then steps must be taken to stop pollution....
the public is entitled to correction of this nuisance."26 To correct this and other
"nuisances," the 1939 study recommended that treatment works be constructed
on Deer, Nut, and Moon Islands, the discharge points for each of the three
sewage collection systems.27
Ultimately, sewage treatment plants were built on Nut Island in 1952, and
on Deer Island in 1968. The construction plans for Moon Island, however,
remained only a recommendation. Instead, Moon Island continued to discharge
untreated sewage through 1968, when the sewers leading to it were re-routed to
Deer Island. Both plants were designed for primary treatment, broadly defined
as a level of treatment that removes nearly all settleable solids and reduces the
24 In 1900, 1917, 1929, 1930, 1936, and 1939. Charles M. Haar and Steven G. Horowitz,
Report of the Special Master regarding Findings of Fact and Proposed Remedies.
(Norfolk County Superior Court Civil Action No.138477, August 9, 1983), 26. See also,
Eric Jay Dolin, Dirty Water/Clean Water (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Sea Grant College
Program, 1990): 17-22.
25 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, House Doc. No. 2465, Report of the Special
Commission Investigating Systems of Sewerage and Sewage Disposal in the North and
South Metropolitan Sewerage Districts and the City of Boston (1939), cited in Charles A.
Maguire and Associates, Engineering Report on A Proposed Plan of Sewerage and
Sewage Disposal for the Boston Metropolitan Area, 30.
26 Ibid.
27 Haar and Horowitz, 12.
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concentration of total suspended solids (TSS) by sixty percent and biochemical
oxygen demand (BOD) by thirty to thirty-five percent.28 These pollution
indicators are important for a variety of reasons. High levels of TSS increases
turbidity, reducing the transmission of light through the water column, which
can, in turn, inhibit the growth of aquatic plants and plankton necessary for a
healthy ecosystem. BOD indicates the approximate amount of oxygen that will
be required to decompose the waste present in the treatment plant's effluent.29
The higher the BOD content of the effluent, the more dissolved oxygen (DO)
needed for decomposition, and the more DO needed for decomposition, the less
DO available to the organisms living in the water. If the levels of DO are reduced
too much, those organisms can suffocate. 30 As part of the treatment process at
the two plants, the solid materials that settled to the bottom of the sedimentation
tanks, referred to as sludge, were placed in digestion tanks and partially
decomposed by microorganisms, creating methane which, in turn, helped
generate electricity to power the plants. The sludge was then combined with the
liquid sewage, or effluent, and discharged into the harbor through a number of
submerged outfalls.
During the 1950s and through the mid-1960s the water quality in Boston
Harbor didn't improve much, if at all. Only the small primary plant on Nut
Island was operating, and it was having problems maintaining consistent levels
of treatment. Hundreds of millions of gallons of virtually raw sewage were still
being discharged into the harbor from Deer Island, and the holding tanks on
Moon Island were still doing what they were originally designed to do way back
at the turn of the century -- discharging untreated waste on the outgoing tide.
Unfortunately, when the tide came in again it brought back much of the waste.
In addition, roughly 100 combined sewer overflows (CSO) located throughout
the harbor were discharging billions of gallons of untreated urban runoff and
sewage into the harbor whenever it rained. Thus, the Nut Island facility, by
28 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Wastes in Marine Environments OTA-
0-334 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1987), 213.
29 Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., Wastewater Engineering (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1972): 241.
30 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 3, Chesapeake Bay Program: Findings
and Recommendations (September 1983): 24-25.
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itself, worked as well as a band-aid on a ruptured artery. The state of the harbor
was reflected in newspaper articles of the time. One noted that "[tihe harbor
closeup is a ... slimy, polluted body in places. Oil and sewage smear its surface .
. . [and in the air] is the unmistakable stench of man's wastes and the corrupt
odor of stagnant water."31 Another called the harbor "a floating garbage can.
Millions of gallons of raw waste are discharged into the harbor every day. And
industrial effluent, pumped into rivers and streams, eventually flows into the
harbor."32
The Federal Role Expands
The passage of the federal Water Quality Act of 1965, an amendment to
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 (FWPCA), brought with it the
promise of change for waterways around the country, including Boston
Harbor. 33 Prior to 1965, the federal government had been involved in water
pollution control, but only in a limited fashion, providing grants for sewage
treatment plants, but leaving virtually all of the pollution management decisions
in state hands.34 With the 1965 Act, the federal government not only increased it
sewage construction grants to the states, it also took on a greater management
role, requiring the states to develop and implement water quality standards.
Under this approach, states had to establish acceptable levels of water quality for
interstate, navigable waters and then devise an implementation plan, including
monitoring and enforcement actions, to ensure that industrial and municipal
polluters controlled their pollutant discharges so that water quality standards
were met.35 As one knowledgeable observer noted, "[t]here is a great deal of
31 Fred Pillsbury, "Our Filthy Harbor," Boston Sunday Herald 22 November 1964, Section
4,1.
32 John C. MacClean, "Divided Responsibilities Help Keep Harbor Dirty," Boston Herald 1
September 1966, 3.
33 Joan M. Kovalic, The Clean Water Act With Amendments (Washington, D.C.: The Water
Pollution Control Federation, 1982).
34 Cynthia Cates Colella, The Federal Role in the Federal System: The Dynamics of Growth
(Washington, D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, March 1981).
35 N. William Hines, "Controlling Industrial Water Pollution: Color the Problem Green,
Boston College Industrial & Commercial Law Review 9 (1968), 585-586.
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theoretical merit to the water quality standard approach. You establish the level
of water quality you seek in the water, and then you backtrack to the respective
sources that contribute the pollutants that are subject to that water quality
standard and then apply the necessary control."36 The 1965 act also authorized
the secretary of the newly created Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration, located within the Department of Interior (DOI), to convene
enforcement conferences if pollution was found to be adversely affecting
shellfish beds in interstate or navigable waters. The purpose of these conferences
was to recommend steps that could be taken to reduce pollution.
Massachusetts passed its own water pollution control legislation on
September 6, 1966, the Massachusetts Clean Waters Act, and roughly a year later
the state's newly created Division of Water Pollution Control (DWPC) devised
state water quality standards.37 Under the state's implementation plan, the level
of sewage treatment required in the harbor was clear. For the Nut and Deer
Island plants primary treatment was determined to be adequate to maintain
water quality.38
On paper, the harbor cleanup was moving forward, but the water told a
different story. On May 20, 1968, the Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration convened an enforcement conference on the "Pollution of the
Navigable Waters of Boston Harbor and its Tributaries."39 According to one of
the Administration representatives in attendance, the greatest source of pollution
was the 460 million gallons of raw or partially treated sewage, coming from the
MDC's two sewerage systems, that were discharging daily into the harbor (the
36 Thomas C. Jorling, quoted in "Congressional staffers take a retrospective look at P.L. 92-
500, Part 2, ournal of the Water Pollution Control Federation Vol. 53, No. 9 (September
1981): 1370.
37 Massachusetts Clean Waters Act (September 6, 1966, Massachusetts General Laws,
Chapter 21, Department of Environmental Management, Secs. 26-53, enacted by
Massachusetts Acts of 1966); Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Water Pollution
- 1968 Part I, A-32.
38 U.S. Department of Interior, Conference Pollution of the Navigable Waters of Boston
Harbor and its Tributaries (May 20, 1968): 97.
39 Ibid, 15.
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Deer Island plant had just become operational). 40 This and other pollution
entering the harbor, e.g., industrial waste and sewage from other nearby
communities, had forced the Commonwealth to restrict or prohibit shellfishing in
89 percent of the shellfish growing areas. In only 500 out of 4,492 acres of
shellfish beds was shellfishing approved without restrictions. 41 At the
conclusion of the conference, the conferees agreed to form a Technical Committee
that would further investigate pollution problems in the harbor and possible
remedial actions that should be taken.
Two more enforcement conferences were held in the following years, one
in April 1969, and the other in October 1971.42 The third conference was
particularly interesting because the debate over the need for secondary sewage
treatment in Boston Harbor.43 Four months prior to this conference, the newly
created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which had assumed
responsibility for the nation's water pollution control program, promulgated
regulations that required publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) receiving
federal grants to achieve secondary treatment. The regulations essentially
defined secondary as that treatment resulting in the complete removal of all
floatable and settleable solids and at least 85 percent of the BOD.44 There was,
however, a potential exception to this blanket requirement. The Administrator of
EPA could waive the secondary requirements for POTWs discharging to the
40 Ibid, 31.
41 Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, Report on Pollution of the Navigable
Waters of Boston Harbor (May 1968): 1, included in U.S. Department of Interior,
Conference Pollution of the Navigable Waters of Boston Harbor and its Tributaries (May
20, 1968): 87-97.
42 U.S. Department of Interior, Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, Conference
Pollution of the Navigable Waters of Boston Harbor and its Tributaries (April 30, 1969).;
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Conference In the Matter of Pollution of the
Navigable Waters of Boston Harbor and its Tributaries -- Massachusetts (October 27,
1971).
43 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Conference In the Matter of Pollution of the
Navigable Waters of Boston Harbor and its Tributaries -- Massachusetts (October 27,
1971).
44 Environmental Protection Agency, Grants for Water Pollution Control, Federal Register.
Vol. 36, No. 134 (July 13, 1971): 13029.
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open ocean waters if he determined that such discharges would not adversely
impact the ocean environment and the adjoining shores.
The waiver option was primarily the result of lobbying efforts on the part
of municipal dischargers from the west coast.45 Throughout the late 1950s and
1960s the federal government had been encouraging POTWs, most of which used
primary treatment, to install secondary treatment in order to improve water
quality. West coast dischargers, however, argued that the secondary
requirement should not apply to them because they were discharging into deep
ocean waters that, due to strong currents and mixing, had great assimilative
capacities for BOD and solids in the sewage effluent. Requiring them to upgrade
to secondary, therefore, would not result in improved water quality.
Furthermore, upgrading to secondary was very expensive, not only in capital
costs, but also operation and maintenance costs, both of which were roughly
double that of primary treatment. Thus, west coast dischargers argued that it
was both environmentally and economically unsound to require them to apply
secondary. They were aided in their argument by the conclusions of many,
primarily west coast, water quality professionals, engineers, and biologists who
agreed that the indiscriminate application of secondary to ocean discharges was
improper. Secondary levels of treatment were important for inland, freshwaters,
where assimilative capacities were limited, but the oceans are a totally different
environment and should be treated appropriately, literally and figuratively.
Reading the waiver language in EPA's regulations, the MDC assumed that
they might well qualify for an open ocean waiver and, therefore not be required
to upgrade to secondary. But during the enforcement conference, John R.
Quarles, Jr., Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and General Counsel at
EPA, made it clear, however, that EPA didn't see it that way:
The time is here I'm sure when it's necessary for the Metropolitan District
Commission and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to face up to the
45 Joe G. Moore, Jr., telephone interviews by author, 5, 21 January 1993; Charles V. Gibbs,
telephone interview by author, 8 February 1993.
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very real prospect that secondary treatment will be required in the Boston
Harbor disposal system. Around the country there are few, if any, cities
which are comparable in size to the Massachusetts situation where they do
not already have secondary treatment or, if they don't have it, are not at
least on a program to install it. In many places they are moving to much
higher levels of treatment.... We have in Boston Harbor one of the most
serious situations of urban pollution in the country - with an antiquated
system for collecting the wastes and bringing them into the treatment
plants, with primary plants, unsatisfactory sludge disposal practices, and
a lot of work that needs to be done .. . 46
John W. Sears, Commissioner of MDC, responded to Quarles, stating that
"[iut is true that the MDC has a problem with secondary treatment. For 82 years
we have assumed that we were providing open ocean disposal. And we are
startled really to learn that standards that are applied to inland [freshwater]
communities may also be applied perhaps without some sophistication to us."47
DWPC Director, McMahon, added that secondary is a low priority for the harbor
and it makes much more sense to address the most serious problem first --
CSOs. 48
These conferences resulted in the initiation of two very important studies
concerning sewage management in the Boston area. In October 1971, MDC and
DWPC reached an agreement whereby the former would prepare a sludge
management plan. And in July 1972, MDC, DWPC, and EPA signed an
agreement in which the MDC would be the lead agency for a comprehensive
study of the region's sewage system and the need for improvements over the
next fifty years.49 In the latter agreement, MDC, at the strong urging of EPA,
grudgingly put aside its aversion to secondary treatment, pledging to upgrade
46 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Conference In the Matter of Pollution of the
Navigable Waters of Boston Harbor and its Tributaries -- Massachusetts 132-135.
47 Ibid, 136.
48 Ibid, 293-299.
49 Kolb, 25-27.
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the Nut and Deer Island plants by December 31, 1980.50 MDC also agreed, under
the threat of an EPA lawsuit, to cease the discharge of sludge into the harbor's
waters by May 1, 1976.51 Later that year, Congress amended FWPCA once again.
The 1972 amendments ushered in a new era in water pollution control that
would have a profound impact on Boston Harbor.
The Split Between Planning and Reality
Before considering the impact of the 1972 amendments, it is important to
reflect on how things stood with respect to the harbor on the eve of the act's
passage. From the planning perspective there was cause for optimism. The
enforcement conferences had highlighted many of the pollution problems in the
harbor and major studies addressing those problems were getting underway.
The information provided by those studies was intended to aid the MDC in
moving forward with whatever remedial actions were deemed necessary. With
respect to the latter, the state had already consented to upgrade the two sewage
plants to secondary by 1980 and, regardless of the debate over whether
secondary was necessary, the upgrade would, at a minimum, mean less pollution
flowing into the harbor. Similarly, the State's pledge to cease the discharge of
sludge by 1976 meant that one of the worst sources of harbor pollution would be
cutoff. From another perspective, however, there was significant cause for
concern. Despite the planning efforts and the promise of future pollution
abatement actions, the harbor was still grossly polluted. The two sewage
treatment plants continued to discharge tons of sludge daily into the harbor, as
they were designed to do. During wet weather, the flow of sewage and
stormwater runoff transported through combined sewers would exceed the
capacity at Nut and Deer Islands, causing the numerous CSOs to discharge raw
sewage at various points in and around the harbor. Even during dry conditions,
some CSOs would discharge raw sewage directly into receiving waters. Many
Boston area beaches and shellfishing beds remained closed due to pollution.
50 "MDC treatment plant still pollutes harbor," The Boston Globe 29 July 1973).
51 James Ayres, "Ecology bill first step in Hub Cleanup," The Boston Globe 16 July 1972.
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And to the chagrin of those who believed that the opening of the Deer Island
plant would solve many of the harbor's pollution problems, it quickly became
apparent that the plant continued to contribute to those problems rather than
solve them.
When the Deer Island plant opened in August 1968, it looked great.
According to former Governor Francis Sargent, the plant was "as polished and
clean as the engine room of an aircraft carrier."52 Unfortunately, it didn't work
properly. The major culprit were the nine Nordberg engines, installed to pump
sewage into the treatment tanks. They were simply the wrong machines for the
job. 53 Although they were designed to run at a continuous speed, the engine's
rate had to fluctuate in response to the changing flow rates for sewage, resulting
in numerous breakdowns, and subsequent discharges of raw sewage.5 4 Repairs
were made difficult by the fact that the Nordberg Manufacturing Company was
bought out just as the Deer Island plant opened up. The new company
continued to supply replacement parts, but it often took a significant amount of
time before the new parts were delivered.55 Compounding the equipment
problems, was a lack of adequately trained staff to run the plant and deal with
the operation and maintenance problems as they arose. From day one, Deer
Island was understaffed. Finding workers proved difficult, in part because the
salaries offered were regulated by the state's civil service system and were
relatively low compared to private industry, reducing the financial incentive for
trained individuals to work for the MDC.56 And even when staff could be found,
some of those hired were unqualified. The MDC had long had a reputation as a
place for patronage jobs, and there is no doubt that some of the Deer Island
employees were there because of connections, not qualifications.57
52 Seth Rolbein, "Boston's Floating Crap Game," Boston Magazine (May 1987): 204.
53 "The Treatment", Micheal Rezendes, The Pheonix 18 August 1981).
54 Ibid.
55 Noel Barrata, personal interview by author, 7 October 1993.
56 "Despite $20 million new plant, raw sewage floods harbor," The Boston Globe (November
9, 1967).
57 Barrata interview, 7 October 1993; "MDC-Patronage Picnic, Sears: Payoff to Politicians is
Wrong," Boston Herald (March 29, 1973).
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Deer Island was not alone in having operation and maintenance problems.
Nut Island, too, suffered from poor performance. Part of this was to be expected.
In 1972, the Nut Island plant was already 20 years old and at the end of its
operational life expectancy. One of the most serious problems at the plant was
the uneven settling of the sedimentation basins which greatly reduced the plant's
efficiency. 58 As for staffing, Nut Island was as poorly staffed as Deer Island, for
the same reasons. The sewage system's problems extended beyond the plants
themselves. Many of the pipes that brought sewage to the plants were quite old,
some over 100 years, and in need of repair.
Thus, on the eve of the passage of the 1972 amendments, the divergence
between planning for future improvements in the sewage system and the status
of the existing system and the harbor resource was becoming apparent. While
planning was moving ahead, full of promise, the sewage infrastructure was
falling into disrepair and poorly treated and, in many cases, untreated sewage
continued to be discharged into the harbor. It remained to be seen how the 1972
amendments would affect the split between planning and reality, and whether
they would move the harbor cleanup forward.
The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Many observers describe the 1972 amendments in watershed-type terms.
They are viewed as "[a] major change in environmental and intergovernmental
policy;" 59 "the most sweeping environmental measure ever considered by the
Congress;"60 "a landmark of environmental legislation;"61 and "one of the most
significant bills of all time."62 Although one may disagree with the superlatives
58 Barrata interview, 7 October 1993.
59 Harvey Leiber, Federalism and Clean Waters (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1975):
1.
60 J. Clarence Davies III and Barbara S. Davies, The Politics of Pollution (Indianapolis, IN:
Pegasus, 1975), 44.
61 Kovalic, 1.
62 "Sewers, Clean Water, and Planned Growth: Restructuring the Federal Pollution
Abatement Effort," Yale Law Journal Vol. 86 (1977):733.
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chosen, the general thrust of these comments is true. The 1972 amendments did
usher in a new era of water pollution control. Detailing the changes wrought by
the amendments is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Indeed, as signed into
law on October 18, 1972, the amendments ran to 89 pages of fine print, and
included five different titles, covering many issues including toxic and pre-
treatment standards for industry, inspections and monitoring requirement, oil
and hazardous substance liability, and standards for thermal discharges.63 For
the present purposes it is sufficient to cover the main sewage-related provisions
of the act, for more than anything else, the court cases concerning the cleanup of
Boston Harbor were responses to the manner in which the Boston area managed
its sewage.
By 1971, Congress had become extremely discouraged with the lack of
progress produced by the water quality standards approach embodied in the
Water Quality Act of 1965. At the same time it was a high point for
environmental concern in the United States. 64 With Earth Day (April 20, 1970)
and the publicly supported and successful battle for the Clean Air Act (1970) still
fresh in their minds, Congress was eager to aggressively move ahead on the
water pollution issue. The main objective of the 1972 amendments is "to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."65 To achieve this objective the amendments established two national
goals. The first was to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters of the United States by 1985, usually referred to as the "zero-discharge"
goal, and the second was to "wherever attainable," achieve a level "of water
quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and
wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water" by July 1, 1983, the so-
called "fishable-swimmable" goal. 66
63 Lieber, 7; and U.S. Congress, A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 Volume 1, 3-91.
64 Robert C. Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics (Ne Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989): 13-40.
65 U.S. Congress, A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments o
1972, 3.
66 Ibid.
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To help achieve these goals the act established a wide-ranging policy
structure for sewage management. POTWs had to provide a minimum of
secondary treatment by July 1, 1977. Secondary treatment was subsequently
defined by the EPA as removing, at least, 85 percent of both BOD and suspended
solids from the POTW's effluent, and not exceeding certain levels of coliform
bacteria and pH.67
Congress imposed technology-based effluent limitations on POTWs, in
large part, because of the difficulties presented by the old water quality
standards approach. Although the standards approach had theoretical merit, in
practice they were extremely difficult to enforce. Under the Water Quality Act of
1965, before the government could institute any pollution abatement action they
had to prove that a specific polluter was causing a specific problem. Technical
expertise at the time was not sophisticated enough to infer from pollution
loadings in a particular body of water the level of control required for an
individual discharger in cases where more than one source was discharging into
the water.68 The government would thus find it impossible to prove that
discharger X was causing pollution problem Y, especially if discharger X claimed
that it wasn't them, but some other discharger that was causing the problem.
Establishing a technology-based effluent limitation made enforcement much
simpler, for one could clearly determine if a violation had occurred.
Despite the reliance on technology-based effluent limitations for POTWs,
the amendments did not eliminate water quality standards altogether. POTW's
that comply with the technology-based limitations but still violate the water
quality standards for the receiving water body are required to take steps,
including the installation of additional technologies, to ensure that such
67 Environmental Protection Agency, "Secondary Treatment Information," Federal Register
38, no. 159 (August 17, 1973): 22298.
68 "WPCF roundtable discussion -- Congressional Staffer take a retrospective look at PL 92-
500 -- Part 2," Journal of the Water Pollution Control Federation 53 (September 1981):
1370.
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violations cease.69 Thus, the amendment's technology-based limitations serve
only as a pollution floor, not a ceiling. To aid the states and localities in
constructing required facilities, the sewage construction grants program was
continued and greatly expanded to $18 billion over three years, with the federal
government covering 75 percent of the costs of sewage treatment, and the
remaining 25 percent being picked up by state and local government.70
The requirements with which POTWs had to comply are spelled out in
permits issued by the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).
The power to issue NPDES permits is vested with EPA, but can be delegated to
the states upon approval by the agency. Massachusetts does not have the
authority to run the NPDES program. Instead, the state works along with EPA in
writing permits and enforcing them.71 These permits include not only the
effluent limitations for specific pollutants, but also a schedule which details when
the discharger must comply with the limitations. If violations of the permit are
discovered, the regulating agency can take a variety of enforcement actions, e.g.,
issuing a notice of violation or an administrative order requiring that certain
remedial actions be taken, levying fines, or initiating a civil action in federal
district court. Private individuals and groups, too, can also bring a civil action,
in federal district court, under the amendment's Citizen Suits Provision.72 Such
suits can be brought against any government or private institution alleged to be
violating effluent standards/limitations or an administrative order issued by the
Administrator or delegated state agency. Suits may also be brought against the
Administrator for failing to perform non-discretionary duties under the Act.
CSOs and sludge are also regulated by the amendments, although not as
comprehensively as POTWs. The statutory language on CSOs left some
69 Robert Zener, "The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control," in Federal Envronmental
Law, ed., Erica L. Dolgin and Thomas G. P. Guilbert (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1974),
731.
70 Kovalic, 10.
71 Brian Pitt, Water Management Division, Environmental Engineer, USEPA, Region 1,
telephone interview by author, 12 April 1989.
72 U.S. Congress, A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments o
1972, 75.
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unanswered questions about how such pollution sources should be managed. In
line with subsequent EPA regulations and supporting court cases, CSOs were
defined as point sources and it was up to EPA or the delegated state agency to
establish, on a case-by-case basis, appropriate technology-based effluent
limitations in accord with the best professional judgment of the permit writer.73
Such limitations, in turn, were written into NPDES permit. As for sludge, the
amendments forbade its discharge into navigable waters except in accordance
with a NPDES permit.74
From Bad to Worse
Despite the combination of the strong directives contained in the 1972
amendments and the agreements reached prior to the passage of the
amendments on long-range sewage planning and sludge management, the
situation with respect to Boston's sewage system and water quality in the harbor
became worse not better. Indeed, by 1982, when the state court case began, the
Deer and Nut Island plants were even more dilapidated than had been the case
ten years earlier, with breakdowns, and the subsequent discharge of raw sewage,
a common occurrence. Most of the pipes leading to the plants were ten years
older and leaking more than ever. The plants remained seriously understaffed.
One hundred tons of sludge were still pumped into the harbor daily.75 With the
exception of a couple of CSOs which were receiving some form of treatment, e.g.,
chlorination, the vast majority of the CSOs emptying into the harbor and its
tributaries continued to do so without any form of treatment, during wet and, on
occasion, dry weather.76 Given this, the obvious question is why? There is no
one answer. With large and multi-faceted problems, involving numerous actors,
73 Peter Crane Anderson, "The CSO Sleeping Giant: Combined Sewer Overflow or
Congressional Stalling Objective," Virginia Environmental Law Journal 10 (1991): 381.
74 U.S. Congress, A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972,71.
75 Dianne Dumanoski, "Raw or treated, the sewage flows into Boston Harbor," The Boston
Globe, 19 December 1982, 1, 26.
76 Metropolitan District Commission, Combined Sewer Overflow Project Summary Report
on Facilities Planning (April 1982).
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there never is. Instead, one must analyze how a suite of factors contributed to
the failure to adequately address the region's sewage management needs and the
continued degradation of the harbor between 1972 and 1982.
At one level, the failure was the result of what Pressman and Wildavsky
term the complexity of joint action. 77 The implementation of a governmental
program of any consequence requires the coordination among many actors, often
with differing perspectives, and the clearance of numerous decision points. The
more decision points, the more time expended and, hence, the greater the
likelihood for delay in reaching implementation goals. As conflict among the
various actors increases the potential for delay increases as well.78 In the present
case, before planned sewage improvements could become actual improvements,
numerous administrative hurdles had to be overcome. The planning process
established by both federal and state law was extremely involved, presenting
many decision points and requiring the input of numerous actors, each of whom
had to review the plans and give approvals before the next step could be taken.
The delays inherent is such a complex situation were exacerbated by the
magnitude of the projects envisioned and controversy over some of the decisions
reached.
While the complexity of joint action is a characteristic that inevitably slows
government action, in any societal context, it is a particularly prevalent element
of government action in the United States. As Wilson notes, "America has a
paradoxical bureaucracy unlike that found in almost any other advanced nation.
The paradox is the existence in one set of institutions of two qualities ordinarily
quite separate: the multiplication of rules and the opportunity for access. We
have a system laden with rules, . . . We also have a system suffused with
participation."79 At each step of the way we stop, consider, debate, reflect,
77 Pressman and Wildavsky, 87-124.
78 According to Pressman and Wildavsky, "[o]ur normal expectation should be that new
programs will fail to get off the ground and that, at best, they will take considerable time
to get started. The cards in this world are stacked against things happening, as so much
effort is required to make them move. The remarkable thing is that new programs work
at all." 109.
79 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy (New York: Basic Books, 1989): 377.
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reformulate, and proceed. The implementation process moves along in fits and
starts because we have designed it that way.
At another level, implementation problems were the result of changing
federal law. As Mazmanian and Sabatier argue, "much of bureaucratic behavior
may be explained by the legal structure (or lack of such structure) imposed by
relevant statutes."80 A necessary corollary of this is that as that structure
changes, so too do the dynamics of the implementation process. As the
implementation of a particular program proceeds under one set of statutory
guidelines the various actors make assumptions about what actions are within
the confines of the law and, thus acceptable, and act appropriately. When the
rules change, so too do the assumptions and the actions of those involved.
Changing legal imperatives can throw into doubt the usefulness of past planning
efforts, as well as requiring additional plans and the clearance of new
administrative hurdles, each of which is a decision point that only adds to
complexity of joint action. In Boston, changing law significantly impacted the
movement towards improved sewage management. The 1977 amendments to
FWPCA presented the MDC with the opportunity to apply for a waiver from the
secondary treatment requirement and the MDC took it. This change in direction
added a significant element of uncertainty to the implementation process, for
while EPA's decision on whether or not to grant a waiver to the MDC dragged on
for years, the ultimate goal of a major part of the MDC's planning efforts, i.e. the
choice of primary or secondary treatment, remained unclear. Lacking a clear
goal, the MDC planned for both the possibility of getting a waiver and being
denied and, as long as the waiver decision was pending, planning continued to
be a substitute for action.
At still another level, movement towards improved sewage management
in the Boston area was affected by EPA's enforcement posture. In 1976, the
agency issued the MDC a NPDES permit that required the latter to comply with
various CWA requirements by certain dates. For example, the permit required
the MDC to complete a whole series of projects by July 1, 1977, including
80 Mazmanian and Sabatier, 43.
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upgrading the Nut and Deer Island plants to secondary, and constructing sludge
and CSO management facilities. In light of such requirements, one might assume
that, as those deadlines passed, EPA would have used its enforcement powers to
pressure the MDC to comply with the terms of the permit. The delays resulting
from the complexity of joint action and EPA's review of the waiver application,
however, constrained the agency's ability to enforce compliance with many of the
permit's deadlines in the years following its issuance. Instead, EPA chose to
extend deadlines and work with the MDC in moving the various projects
forward. It wasn't until 1980 that the agency decided to compel compliance with
some of these extended deadlines by issuing an administrative order (AO).
While the order was partially effective in moving projects forward, by 1982, they
were still in the planning stage.
There was one particularly important permit condition that was not
affected by the delays resulting from the complexity of joint action or the waiver
review. MDC's permit required it to properly operate and maintain its sewage
facilities. Although EPA was well aware that this condition was being grossly
violated, even before the permit was issued, the agency chose to pursue a non-
aggressive enforcement strategy, encouraging the MDC to voluntarily take action
to address its operation and maintenance problems. This approach failed and in
1981 EPA issued an AO designed to compel compliance. This order, followed by
another in 1982, however, barely touched upon the numerous infrastructure
problems that needed to be addressed.
Although EPA can be faulted for not taking stronger enforcement actions
against the MDC to get them to improve operations and maintenance at the
sewage plants, the real reason why the sewage infrastructure continued to fall
apart between 1972 and 1982 is political. Throughout the 1970s and into the early
1980s, neither the legislative and executive branches in Massachusetts, nor the
public championed the cause of sewage infrastructure, despite the fact that the
problems with the system were widely known. And since the MDC's operations
and maintenance budget was set by the Governor and the legislature who, in
turn, reacted to public cues, the budget remained woefully underfunded.
Furthermore, the MDC's position as a politically weak institution limited its
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ability to fight its own battles and, therefore, compounded its financial problems.
The following sections illustrate how these different, yet interconnected, factors
combined in a way that enabled things to go from bad to worse.
Complexities of Joint Action
The main examples of the delays resulting from the complexity of joint
action during this ten year period concern the EMMA study, CSOs, and sludge
management. These examples indicate how numerous decision points and rules
and the involvement of multiple actors delays the time when a project moves
beyond planning to construction.
The EMMA Study
The 1972 amendments required the MDC to upgrade its Deer and Nut
Island treatment plants to secondary by July, 1, 1977. Before that could be done,
however, the MDC had to prepare plans for the upgrade. That preparation was
underway even before the passage of the amendments. An outgrowth of the one
of the agreements reached after the enforcement conferences was the initiation of
a long-range study called the Boston Harbor-Eastern Massachusetts Metropolitan
Area Wastewater Management and Engineering Study, or EMMA for short.81
EMMA was intended to provide guidance for needed sewage improvements
over the next 50 years. This was an enormous task given that the MDC sewerage
system was immense, handling hundreds of millions of gallons of waste daily,
coming from 43 cities and towns, and was comprised not only of the two
treatment plants, but also thousands of miles of sewers.
The study began in late 1972, and was conducted by MDC and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers. EMMA was completed in October 1975. From its 25
volumes came 52 recommended projects which, if completed, were expected to
cost $855 million (1975 prices). These projects included: the rehabilitation,
76
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repair, and expansion of the existing sewage treatment facilities on Deer and Nut
Islands and, in accord with the 1972 Act, the upgrade of those facilities to
secondary; the construction of advanced (beyond secondary) satellite sewage
treatment facilities in the southern Metropolitan Sewerage District; and the
building of facilities designed to manage sludge through incineration and to
control pollution coming from CSOs.82
The process used to produce EMMA was extremely open. From the
moment the study began the public was asked for input and kept abreast of
developments through numerous public meetings, many of which were quite
well attended. In addition, a Citizens Advisory Committee was established and
its members included representatives from a variety of public interest groups.83
Through this form of involvement, the public became quite aware of the MDC's
planning efforts. With this public awareness came controversy. Communities
located in the Southern Metropolitan District objected to the placement of
satellite plants in their area. Concerns focused on the ultimate location as well as
the expected water quality and public health impacts.84 The citizens of Quincy
were equally angry. EMMA recommended that part of Quincy bay be filled to
make room for an expanded treatment facility.85 Opposition to this idea was
strong enough to result in the legislature passing a bill that forbade filling the bay
for that purpose.86
EMMA was not the end of the planning process, it was only the
beginning. Since EMMA was designed as a preliminary engineering report, the
projects it outlined still needed to go through formal facilities planning before
moving onto facility design and ultimate construction. The EPA determined that
82 Metropolitan District Commission, Wastewater Engineering and Management Plan for
Boston Harbor - Eastern Massachusetts Metroplitan Area EMMA Study, Main Report for
the Metropolitan District Commission (March 1976), xvi -- xviii.
83 Kolb, 31.
84 Ibid.
85 "400 Oppose MDC Bay Fill Plan," The Patriot Ledger 3 October 1975); Jerry Ackerman,
"Quincy opposes sewage phase of Boston Harbor cleanup plan," The Boston Globe 18
February 1976.
86 Kolb, 31.
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it was necessary to prepare and Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before the
MDC could proceed with facilities planning for the EMMA projects relating to
the overall upgrading of the metropolitan sewage system.87 EPA's EIS, which
began in September 1976, focused on the rehabilitation and expansion of Nut and
Deer Islands, the upgrade to secondary, the two advanced, satellite sewage
facilities, and the construction of facilities to manage sludge associated with
secondary treatment and advanced treatment.88 Like EMMA, the Draft EIS,
which came out on August 4, 1978, generated controversy. While scrapping the
satellite plant concept, to the relief of the communities in the Southern system
who had been exerting political pressure to that end, EPA called for the
consolidation of all sewage treatment facilities on Deer Island. This last change
caused an uproar in Winthrop whose residents argued that they believed their
town already had enough negative impacts, from both the current sewage
treatment plant and the prison located on Deer Island, and the noise from planes
flying overhead, in and out of Logan Airport.89
Looking back on this process, it took three years to complete EMMA and
then another two years for EPA to finish the draft EIS on the major EMMA
projects relating to the upgrade of the sewage system. This delay was due to the
normal workings of a large-scale, environmental planning and review process
that had to clear a variety of decision points, was open, provided for significant
public involvement, and generated controversy. For example, the MDC held
roughly 70 meetings during the drafting of EMMA to solicit public opinion.90
And EPA's EIS review, which involved public review opportunities, although
87 Rebecca Hanmer, "EPA Statement on NSF Boston Harbor Study," included in Urban
Systems Research and Engineering. Institutional Aspect of Wastewater Management: The
Boston Case Study (January 1, 1979): 268.
88 Kolb, Wastewater Management Planning for Boston Harbor, A Status Report 33. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, Region 1, Draft Environmental Impact
Statement on the Upgrading of the Boston Metropolitan Area Sewerage System,
Executive Summary (August 4, 1978): 3.
89 David Doneski, Cleaning up Boston Harbor: Fact or Fiction?" Boston College
Environmental Affairs Law Reveiw, 12, no. 3 (1985): 598. Jack Kendall, "EPA hears
disposal dispute," Boston Herald 21 November 1978).
90 Metropolitan District Commission, Wastwater Engineering and Management Plan for
Boston Harbor - Eastern Massachusetts Metropolitan Area. Technical Data Vol. 14
(October 1975): 17-22.
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long, was not out-of-line with the review time for other EIS's on projects of this
magnitude. Indeed, concerns about the excessive amounts of time taken to
complete EIS in the early to mid-1970s, led to a revision of the EIS regulations in
1978, to streamline the process -- too late for the EMMA review process. 91 Today,
the average EIS takes a year to complete.
The completion of the draft EIS, of course, was not the end of the planning
process for the projects relating to the overall upgrade of the sewage system.
There was still more planning to be done before the actual facilities could be
built. That planning, however, would not be completed prior to the initiation of
the Quincy law suit in 1982. As discussed in the next section, the pendancy of
MDC's waiver application up through 1982, confused planning efforts for the
upgrade of the sewage system and further delayed the construction of new
facilities.
CSOs
EPA did not require an EIS to be completed on EMMA's CSO projects
prior to the initiation of facilities planning. Therefore, the MDC applied for
federal sewage construction grant money for such planning not too long after the
EMMA project was completed. MDC received over three million dollars in
federal funding and began CSO facilities planning in June 1978.92 With roughly
100 CSOs throughout the Boston area, determining what type of facilities were
needed to comply with the CSO effluent limitations spelled out in MDC's permit
was a major task that was not finished until mid-1980. 93 The MDC's
recommended plan was then submitted to EPA and the EOEA for review,
whereupon the latter determined that the MDC should prepare an EIR on the
91 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Intergovernmental
Decisionmaking for Environmental Protection and Public Works (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, November 1992): 82.
92 Kolb, 86.
93 Metropolitan District Commission, Combined Sewer Overflow Project Summary Report
(April 1982): 11.
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plan. That EIR was completed in 1982.94 Thus, on the eve of the Quincy suit, the
MDC was still involved in planning for the construction of CSO management
facilities.
Sludge
At the same time EMMA was moving forward, the MDC was trying to
figure out how best to manage sludge. Another outgrowth of the enforcement
conferences was an agreement to study sludge disposal alternatives and,
ultimately, cease the discharge of sludge by May 1, 1976. The firm hired to do
the requisite study reported its findings on August 30, 1973. The Plan for Sludge
Management recommended the incineration of dewatered sludge by a single
facility located on Deer Island, to be accomplished in two phases, with Phase I
providing interim disposal for primary sludge production, and Phase II
expanding operations to accommodate the additional sludge created by
secondary treatment.95
Because the MDC intended to apply for federal construction grant funds,
it was required to perform an Environmental Assessment Statement (EAS) of the
plan, which would be used by EPA to determine if an EIS was needed. The EAS
was completed in October 1974.96 It recommended the "dewatering and
incineration of sludge, with resource recovery in the form of electric power
generation from waste heat, use of ash to create new land at Deer Island, and
provisions for producing soild conditioner from the processed sludge in lieu of
incinerators, if desired."97 These two documents comprised the MDC's facility
plan for sludge management.
94 Ibid.
95 Havens and Emerson, A Plan for Sludge Management (August 30, 1973); and Kolb, 44-45.
96 Havens and Emerson, Environmental Assessment Statement For A Plan for Sludge
Management (October 1974).
97 Ibid, iii.
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Predictably, when the facility plan was presented at a public hearing, in
April 1975, the plans for incineration on Deer Island were quite controversial.
"Because of the public controversy surrounding construction of incinerators on
Deer Island and EPA's own concerns about the environmental impact of the
incinerators," EPA decided that an EIS on the MDC's plans for primary sludge
management was required (MDC's plans for secondary sludge management was
to be assessed separately, as part of the EMMA EIS). 98 The draft EIS, which had
some significant differences from the MDC plan, was completed in February
1976, whereupon it went out for public review. In March the Draft EIS was
submitted to the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs for review under the
state's counterpart to NEPA, the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act
(MEPA), which requires environmental assessments of significant projects
undertaken and/or funded and permitted by the State. In May 1976, the
Secretary of EOEA determined that the Draft EIS did not comply with MEPA and
requested that additional studies be undertaken before the State sign off on any
plan for sludge management.99
Nearly three years later, in March 1979, EPA issued its final EIS on
primary sludge management, which recommended dewatering and incineration
on Deer Island. A major reason for the delay was that during that three year
period congress passed amendments to the Clean Air Act, FWPCA, the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, as well as enacting an entirely new
statute, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, all of which had something
to say about the proper management of sludge and, therefore, had to be
incorporated into EPA's EIS review process. The final EIS underwent a 30 day
public comment period, during which time two hearings were held in Winthrop
and Quincy. At both hearings there was considerable and loud public opposition
to the plan. Also, at the hearings, the Boston Harbor Interagency Coordinating
Committee, which included various environmental agencies, including EOEA
and MDC, presented a statement that expressed reservations about the EIS and
recommended further study of certain issues. Separately, the executive director
Kolb, 46.
Kolb 47.
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of EOEA, issued a statement that the final EIS did not comply with MEPA, and
that additional studies would be undertaken by EOEA during its MEPA
review. 100
Just like the situation with EMMA's major sewage system upgrade and
CSO projects, primarily sludge management facility planning went on and on.
After seven years, and four studies, more studies and planning were yet to come,
which also would not be completed prior to the Quincy law suit. The process
had been delayed by the magnitude of the task, the need for multiple reviews,
controversy over certain options, and changing laws.
The Waiver from Secondary Treatment and Boston's Response
On September 18, 1978, a little over a month after EPA issued its Draft EIS
of the EMMA study, the MDC submitted a preliminary application to receive a
waiver from the secondary treatment requirement. In applying for a waiver, the
MDC threw into question much of analysis that went into EMMA and the
associated Draft EIS, and significantly altered the nature of sewage planning for
the Boston area, delaying further the construction of any new facilities to reduce
the flow of pollution into the harbor, up through 1982 and beyond. Before
analyzing why this was the case, it is important to briefly place the waiver in its
proper national and local context.
Those who favored the ocean waiver provision included in the pre-1972
sewage treatment regulations, fought, unsuccessfully, to have it included in the
1972 amendments as well. No sooner had the amendments passed, than the
waiver supporters began amassing their strength and arguments for an assault
on Capitol Hill. The basic argument in favor of the waiver was the same as it had
been prior to 1972. Secondary makes sense for slow moving, shallow inland
waters, but not for ocean waters where strong currents and tides allow wastes to
82
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be rapidly diluted, assimilated and dispersed. To build secondary in such areas,
at great expense, would be doing "treatment for treatment's sake."
A waiver provision was included in the 1977 amendments to FWPCA.101
According to section 301(h), the administrator, with the concurrence of the state,
may issue a permit modifying the secondary sewage treatment requirements for
ocean dischargers if the applicant demonstrates to the administrator that eight
different conditions will be met. For example, an applicant must prove that the
modified permit "will not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of that
water quality which assures the protection of public water supplies and the
protection and propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish,
fish and wildlife . . . " Nor will a waiver be granted if the modified discharge
violates water quality standards specific to the pollutant for which the
modification is requested.
Shortly after the 1977 amendments passed, EPA established a 301(h) Task
Force within the Office of Water and Hazardous Materials, whose job was to
devise the regulations to implement the waiver provision. The highly
contentious rulemaking process took roughly 1.5 years to complete and the final
regulations were issued on June 15, 1979.102 The MDC's September 18, 1978,
preliminary application served as a placeholder. EPA had hoped to have the
final regulations prepared by September 24, 1978, the statutory deadline for
application submissions, but a variety of factors caused them to miss that date.
The delay in promulgation created a problem in that, if the statute were strictly
adhered to, applications would be due before the final regulations were
promulgated. EPA solved this by announcing the applicants would be required
to submit only preliminary applications by the statutory deadline. Once the final
101 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee On Environment and Public Works, Legislative History
of the Clean Water Act of 1977 95th Congress, 2nd Sess. (October 1978): 1076-1077.
102 Heidi Burgess, Dianne Hoffman, and Mary Lucci, "Negotiation in the Rulemaking
Process (The 301(h) Case)," in Lawrence Susskind, Lawrence Bacow, and Michael
Wheeler, eds., Resolving Environmental Regulatory Disputes (Cambridge, Mass.:
Schenkman Books, Inc., 1983): 222-256. Environmental Protection Agency, "Modification
of Secondary Treatment Requirements for Discharge into Marine Waters," Federal
Register (June 15, 1979): 34788.
83
Chapter III
Dolin, Remedial Adjudication
regulations were issued, the MDC could submit it final application, which it did
on September 13, 1979.103
The reasoning behind the MDC's waiver bid was straightforward. Ever
since the late 1960s, the MDC had argued that secondary treatment was not a
priority for the harbor. As John Snedeker, Commissioner of the MDC from 1975
through 1978, noted around this time, "there is no evidence that secondary
treatment will benefit the marine environment of Boston Harbor. The
construction of combined sewer facilities and the expansion of primary treatment
with extended outfalls will, in our judgment, provide ample water quality in the
harbor for at least the next two or three decades."104 But, just as with other
municipalities, water quality considerations were not the only ones that
prompted Boston-area officials to argue against an across-the-board requirement
for secondary. Upgrading to secondary cost a great deal of money.105 Even if the
MDC received federal funding of 75 percent of the project costs, the other 25
percent had to come from the state. According to the MDC it didn't make sense
to spend all that money if the benefits weren't there.106
MDC's application requested a waiver of effluent requirements for BOD
and suspended solids, and called for a cessation of sludge discharges, upgrading
the primary treatment facilities at both Deer and Nut Islands and constructing
one, combined ocean outfall to discharge the effluent from the two plants in 100
feet of water, roughly 7.5 miles out into Massachusetts Bay. The decision of
103 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Metropolitan District Commission, Application to the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for Modification of Secondary Treatment
Requirements for Discharges Into Marine Waters of Boston Harbor and Massachusetts
Bay for its Deer Island and Nut Island Wastewater Treatement Plants (September 13,
1979).
104 Ackerman, "Quincy opposes sewage phase of Boston Harbor cleanup plan."
105 "Granting a waiver can save $144 million in construction costs and about $14 million in
annual operation and maintenance costs." Metropolitan District Commission,
Application to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for Modification of Secondary
Treatment Requirements for Discharges Into Marine Waters of Boston Harbor and
Massachusetts Bay for its Deer Island and Nut Island Wastewater Treatement Plants 33,
35 (double-check).
106 John Snedecker, Commissioner of MDC from July 1975 through December 1978,
telephone interview by author, 7 April 1989.
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whether to grant the MDC a waiver was in the hands of the 301(h) Waiver Task
Force at EPA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.. Of the 225 preliminary
applicants nationwide, 70 submitted final applications by the September, 1979
deadline.
The Task Force had hoped to review the applications in relatively short
order. Indeed, in a letter from EPA's Region 1 administrator to the MDC
Commissioner, in June 1980, the former expressed the confidence that Boston
would learn the fate of its application soon. "I requested that your application be
given review as a first priority by our headquarters ocean waiver office. They
honored my request and they expect to be able to make a decision by the end of
this year."107 The decision was not made by the end of the year, nor were the
decisions on any of the applications made by that time. The Task Force found
the review process more difficult than expected. Many of the applications were
quite extensive, e.g., MDC ran to five volumes.108 None of the applications were
summarily dismissed or approved. All had pros and cons, and the Task Force
had to make very difficult scientific and technical determinations in coming to its
decisions. As an attorney on the Task Force noted, "we had a combination of
people agonizing over whether they had enough information to really know [if a
waiver should be granted], and you also had people who felt there was enough
data, agonizing over what it meant."109 The Task Force was also intent on
making well-founded decisions. With so much money on the line, the applicants
and the politicians who represented them were sure to attack any decision to
deny. The Task Force wanted to make decisions that could withstand scrutiny
and any administrative and/or judicial appeals.110 For these and a variety of
common bureaucratic reasons, e.g., scheduling meetings among 20 or more
people, some of whom had to be flown in from the regions, the Task Force made
107 Letter from William R. Adams, Jr., Regional Administrator, Region 1, to Terrence
Geohagan, Commissioner, MDC (June 24, 1980).
108 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Investigations and Oversight, Implementation of the
Clean Water Act (Concerning Waiver Provisions for Municipal Ocean Discharges) 413.
109 John Lishman, former member of the 301(h) Task Force, telephone interview with the
author, 14 January 1993.
110 Ron DeCeasare, former 301(h) Task Force Manager, telephone interview with author, 14
January 1993.
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slow progress. It wasn't until September 8, 1981, that EPA announced its first
eight waiver decisions, and Boston's was not among them.111 The decision to
deny Boston's waiver application was not made until June 30, 1983.112 The
details of that decision and the MDC's response to it are taken up in Chapter 4.
For the present purposes, what is important is that up through the filing of the
Quincy suit, the waiver decision was still pending.
The pendancy of the waiver during this period greatly impacted the
MDC's movement towards improved sewage management. First, large-scale
construction, either of the sewage upgrade envisioned in the waiver application
or secondary treatment facilities, was put on hold. 113 In order to build, one needs
to know what one is supposed to build. Second, while the MDC waited on the
results of the application, planning became more difficult. Not only were many
of the elements of past planning efforts, specifically EMMA and the Draft EIS,
now questionable, but the MDC, in preparing for the future, was also forced to
pursue double-track planning. This can be seen in the preparation of the Nut
Island Wastewater Treatment Plant Facilities Planning Project Phase 1 Site
Options Study, which was intended to determine the most environmentally
sound and cost-effective location for the MDC's sewage treatment plants.114 In
that study, which was completed in 1982, the MDC evaluated both primary and
secondary treatment options, to be located on one or more of three harbor
islands, Deer, Nut, and Long. This was done for two reasons, one practical and
one legal. First, by considering primary and secondary configurations, whatever
the outcome of the waiver, the MDC would have already thought through the
issue of where treatment facilities should be located. This, in turn, would enable
111 House Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Implementation of the Clean
Water Act (Concerning Waiver Provisions for Municipal Ocean Dischargers), 412.
112 Environmental Protection Agency, Boston Metropolitan District Commission Deer Island
and Nut Island Publicly Owned Treatment Works. Application for Secton 301(h)
Variance from the Secondary Treatment Requirements of the Clean Water Act, Tentative
Decision of the Administrator (June 30, 1983).
113 According the Jekabs Vittands, a consultant with Metcalf & Eddy, Project Manager for
the MDC's waiver application, "not making that decision for all those years caused
nothing to happen." Telephone interview with Vittands by author, 12 April 1989.
114 MDC, Nut Island Wastewater Treatment Plant Facilities Planning Project Phase 1 Site
Qptions Study, (June 29, 1982).
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the MDC to begin facility planning earlier than would have been the case had
they waited until the waiver process was completed.115 Secondly, the waiver
regulations required all applicants to continue planning for secondary while the
waiver was pending, for the same reason -- to ensure that the applicant could
quickly move forward with planning and construction, regardless of the
outcome. Such double-track planning cost the MDC in both time and money.116
Finally, in addition to making planning for sewage treatment facilities more
cumbersome, the pendancy of the waiver frustrated efforts to plan for sludge
management because of the disparity, in both tonnage and character, between
the sludge produced by secondary as opposed to primary treatment. Secondary
treatment creates roughly twice as much sludge as primary, and secondary
sludge contains higher concentrations of certain toxic materials.117 Not knowing
what type of sludge had to be managed added a great element of uncertainty to
decisionmaking, and made the MDC reluctant to commit to a specific plan of
action.118
EPA Enforcement
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the planning, reviews, and decisions for
sewage management in the Boston area were motivated and structured by the
requirements embodied in the FWPCA. Those requirements, in turn, became
part of the NPDES permit issued to the MDC on August 12, 1976.119 Along with
the permit, EPA issued an Enforcement Compliance Schedule Letter (ECSL),
which stated that:
115 Barrata interview, 14 April 1989.
116 Barrata interview, 7 October 1993.
117 Donald R.F. Harlemann, "Cutting the Waste in Wastewater Cleanups," Technology
Review (April 1990): 64. Affadavit of Noel D. Barrata, P.E., U.S. v. Metropolitan District
Commission, United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, 83-1614-MA, 85-
0489-MA (July 12, 1985): 9.
118 Barrata interview, 7 October 1993.
119 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 1 and the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Division of Water Pollution Control, Discharge Permit, Metropolitan
District Commission -- MA0102351, M180 (August 12, 1976).
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EPA and MDC concluded that it [the permitee -- MDC] cannot, despite all
reasonable best efforts, achieve the limitations from the discharge between
the final effective date of the Permit [August 12, 1976] and July 1, 1977.
The compliance schedule contained in the Permit notwithstanding, this
Agency, in the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion, will not take
[enforcement] action against the Permittee . . . with respect to the
Permittee's failure to achieve the limitations on and after July 1, 1977, until
the date specified herein for the achievement of the limitations provided
that the Permitee complies with the following conditions. 120
Those conditions extended the time that MDC had to comply with the
various deadlines established in the permit. For example, the ECSL required the
MDC to complete construction of secondary treatment at Deer Island by May 1,
1984, and at Nut Island a year later, and also to construct facilities for the
disposal of primary sludge by May 1, 1980, and for secondary sludge by May 1,
1985. The ECSL also included a variety of interim deadlines, concerning facility
planning and design that would have to be completed prior to the actual
construction of facilities.
That MDC would be unable to meet the construction deadlines in its
permit was not surprising. When the permit was issued, the EIS process for
EMMA had not begun and, thus, the potential construction of the facilities
envisioned by EMMA, was still relatively far off in the future. Similarly, sludge
management planning was still at the early stages of development, with draft EIS
having only recently come out. In issuing the ECSL, EPA was only
acknowledging the reality of the situation -- the MDC had been acting in good
faith to implement the requirements of the law and the agreements it had
formerly reached with EPA concerning sewage treatment facilities. The EPA was
one of the motivating forces behind the EMMA project and had closely
monitored its progress every step of the way. When EMMA was completed, the
120 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Enforcement Compliance Schedule
Letter (August 12, 1976).
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general feeling at both EPA and the MDC was that the tide was turning in the
fight for improved sewage treatment in the Boston area. 121 The delays in
implementation were not due to recalcitrance on MDC's part. More than
anything else, the delays were the result of the scope of the projects envisioned
and the obstacles created by the complexity of joint action.
From a national perspective, the fact that MDC would not have secondary
on line by 1977, was not at all unusual. By that date, only about thirty percent of
the POTWs in the United States had upgraded to secondary. 122 The secondary
portion of the act suffered from the twin problems of underestimation of the
magnitude of the problem and over-expectation of what could be achieved
within a relatively short timeframe. 123 The $18 billion dollar sewage construction
grant program turned out to be way too small. The 1974, EPA construction
grants national needs survey came in at $342 billion, while the 1976 survey,
based on a different accounting mechanism, dropped to $96 billion, still much
higher than envisioned in 1972.124 President Nixon's impoundment of $9 billion
of the $18 billion right after the passage of the act, and up through 1975 when the
Supreme Court overturned the impoundment, limited funds even further.125
Even if unlimited funds had been available from the start, compliance with the
1977 deadline would still have been poor. It simply took longer than five years
for regulations to be promulgated, sewage construction plans to be developed
and approved, money to be dispersed, contractors to be hired, and construction
to be completed. In the 1977 amendments to the Act, Congress took stock of
these problems and extended the deadline for achieving secondary to July 1,
1983, for those POTWs that either couldn't complete construction by July 1, 1977,
121 Barrata interview, 7 October 1993. Lance Carden, "$800 million cleanup of Boston
Harbor, rivers due," The Christian Science Monitor, 15 January 1976.
122 Kurt M. Hunicker, "The Clean Water Act of 1977 -- Modification of the Municipal
Program," Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2 (1977): 129; and Kovalic,19.
123 House Subcommittee on Investigations and Review, ( ... Addressing Messy Practical
Issues" Interim Staff Report 3.
124 Kovalic, 14.
125 Hunicker, 131.
89
Chapter III
Dolin, Remedial Adjudication
or for which the federal government had failed to make funds available in time to
meet the original deadline.126
The year following the issuance of the permit and the ECSL, sewage
planning for the Boston area progressed. By the summer of 1977, however, EPA
enforcement staff became concerned about the slippage of some of the ECSL's
deadlines and were eager to enter into a consent decree with the MDC governing
various sewage projects, thereby creating a court-enforced schedule for the
completion of those projects. 127 When the proposed consent decree was
transmitted by the EPA to the MDC, on August 18, 1977, and backed up by
threats of litigation, it provoked a sharp response. The MDC, supported by the
Secretary of the EOEA and the State's Attorney General not only refused to sign a
consent decree, they filed a suit against EPA, essentially alleging that it was
EPA's fault, not the MDCs, that certain projects were not being completed on
time.128 The MDC also prepared a script for a press conference which would pin
the blame for the delay in the harbor cleanup on the EPA.129 Wanting to avoid
open confrontation with the state, EPA agreed to reconsider its suit and the
MDC, in turn, withdrew its suit and canceled the press conference. In
reconsidering legal action, EPA determined that litigation wasn't appropriate,
especially since the main reason why many of the deadlines had been missed, or
were in danger of being missed, was due to delays in EPA's EIS work on EMMA
and primary sludge management, not recalcitrance on the part of MDC. Thus,
EPA decided to forego any legal action and, instead, work cooperatively with the
MDC in trying to complete environmental reviews quickly and move forward
with the various projects.130
126 Legislative History of the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977,22.
127 Action Memorandum: Boston Harbor (MDC); Proposed Moratorium on an Enforcement
Suit, from William R. Adams, Jr. Regional Administrator, Region 1 to Marvin B. Durning,
Assistant Administrator for Enforcement (November 11, 1977).
128 Ibid, 4-5.
129 According to Snedeker, because many of the missed deadlines were due to EPA's delay
in performing its environmental reviews (the EISs), the agency's threat o slap the MDC
with a consent decree was the "most arrogant thing I've ever seen in public life." When
they delivered the consent decree "I blew my top." Telephone interview by author, 20
October 1993.
130 Snedeker interview.
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In the following year it appeared as if the cooperative relationship
between EPA and the MDC was working. On September 27, 1978, Rebecca
Hanmer, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region 1, concluded that:
it can be stated that the cleanup of Boston Harbor's water pollution is
gathering momentum. Comprehensive facilities planning is underway to
find cost-effective solutions for combined sewer overflows, and similar
planning is about to start for the collection, treatment, and disposal of
sewered wastes. When this planning is complete, design and construction
of the necessary facilities will begin immediately. 131
At the same time these comments were made, the MDC was entering into
the waiver process. According to Richard Kotelly, Deputy Director of Water
Management at EPA, Region 1, while the waiver decision languished, planning
efforts were "knocked into a cocked hat."132  Despite this uncertainty, EPA
continued to have conversations with MDC concerning the progress of the
ongoing implementation and administrative review process and the possible
next steps that could be taken even though the waiver issue had yet to be
decided. As a result of those conversations, additional planning efforts, e.g., the
Nut Island options study, were begun.
It wasn't until late 1980 that the EPA decided that the cooperative
approach alone was not working. On August 8th of that year, EPA issued an AO
that required, among other things, that the MDC complete facilities planning for
CSO projects and primary sludge management by new deadlines that replaced
the old deadlines. The AO was partially effective, and over the next couple of
131 William R. Adams, Administrator in Region 1, echoed these sentiments:
"It is my opinion that planning for effective wastewater management in the Boston
Metropolitan area is now underway. Where necessary, the conclusions and
recommendations of past plans are being amended and improved. This is a natural
consequence of the facilities planning and environmental impact statement preparation
process that have been, and will be conducted. I am confident that cost-effective
solutions will be expeditiously implemented for the water pollution problems that now
affect Boston Harbor and its tributaries." Urban Systems Research & Engineering,
Institutional Aspects of Wastewater Management, 219.
132 Rolbein, 203.
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years, the MDC had produced some of the required plans, e.g., CSO facilities
plan. Yet, however effective the AO was, one fact remained -- on the eve of the
Quincy suit planning was still the order of the day.
The AO notwithstanding, throughout the late 1970s, and up through the
initiation of the Quincy suit, the EPA was reluctant to pursue enforcement
actions against the MDC for missing deadlines relating to the planning and
ultimate construction of new sewage-related facilities, in large part, because
many of the violations were due to delays resulting from the complexity of joint
action and EPA's review of the waiver application -- causes that were largely
outside of MDC's control. There was one permit condition, however, that was
unaffected by all of these delays. The MDC was required to properly operate
and maintain its sewage treatment facilities. 133 This was a basic requirement and
would have to be complied with regardless of what future improvements or
changes in the MDC's sewage system might be mandated by federal law. When
the EPA issued its permit to the MDC, the agency already knew that this permit
condition was being violated.
The operation and maintenance problems in evidence at the Nut and Deer
Island plants prior to the passage of the 1972 FWPCA amendments became
worse in the following years. For example, the Nordberg engines at Deer Island,
which began breaking down as soon as the plant opened in 1968, became even
less reliable. The company that had bought out Nordberg Manufacturing in
1968, discontinued supplying engine replacement parts in 1973.134 After that
point new parts were either specially fabricated at the plant, a process that was
both difficult and time-consuming, or inoperative engines were cannibalized to
keep others running.135 Equipment breakdowns were common at Nut Island as
well. To make matters worse, both plants were still significantly understaffed.
Graphic evidence of these problems came in January 1976, when all of the
generators at Nut Island broke down, resulting in the discharge of hundreds of
133 Metropolitan District Commission, Discharge Permit (August 12, 1976, MA0102351,
M180): 25.
134 Barrata Interview, 7 October 1993.
135 Doneski, 576.
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millions of gallons of raw sewage into the harbor. The EPA task force convened
in the wake of the spill to look into the plants problems, painted a disturbing
picture. Nut Island was understaffed by 21 percent, the equipment in the plant
had passed its life expectancy and was in need or repair or complete restoration,
and there was no preventive maintenance program and no spare parts for the
three major engines.136 Later that year, an EPA audit of the MDC concluded that
a "[f]ack of funds . . . was the most significant factor contributing to the
breakdown of Nut Island as well as other operational problems [at the MDC's
sewerage division] ."137
The operation and maintenance problems continued in the years following
the issuance of the permit. With respect to staffing, for example, a 1978 EPA
inspection report on the Nut Island plant noted that there were 16 staff vacancies,
8 of which were on the maintenance crew. A 1981 EPA reported that 50 million
gallons of chlorinated, raw sewage were discharged at the plant "because no
'qualified' diesel operators were available that day." The same year, the state
Department of Environmental Quality Engineering reported that the Nut Island
plant did not have "adequate, qualified, certified" staff. These last two reports
highlight the fact that the MDC's staffing deficiencies not only concerned the
quantity of staff, but also the quality. The civil service-based salaries offered by
the MDC were much less than the salaries offered for comparable work in the
private sector, therefore, the MDC often lost out in the competition for highly
trained personnel. Similar staff deficiencies were to be found at Deer Island. In
1981, for example, only 190 of the necessary 236 positions at the plant were filled,
and many of them were not well qualified. According to Noel Barrata, the
former Chief Engineer of the MDC's sewerage division, too few staff made for a
situation in which "you have a preventive maintenance program that is never
adhered to because you don't have enough men. Therefore, repairs take place on
a crisis basis."138 As for the condition of the facilities themselves, they continued
to wear out and breakdown. Indeed, the equipment problems at Nut Island were
so bad that Commissioner Snedeker stated in November 1977, that "only a
136 Dumanoski, "Raw or treated, the sewage flows into Boston Harbor."
137 Dumanoski, "The cycle: breakdowns, no money," 17.
138 Rezendes, "The Treatment."
93
Chapter III
Dolin, Remedial Adjudication
complete reconstruction of the Nut Island Facility will allow the plant to achieve
adequate capacity, reliable performance, and improved water quality."139 The
combination of inadequate staff and old and faulty equipment led to numerous
breakdowns that, in turn, meant more raw sewage was discharged into the
harbor. The problems with Deer Island's pumps provide an excellent illustration
of this. When those pumps failed, the MDC had to close the gates at the
headworks which regulates the flow of sewage into the plant. The backed up
sewage then overflowed into the harbor via CSOs and the holding facility located
on Moon Island. As a result of pump failures at Deer Island, the number of raw
sewage discharges via the Moon Island, between 1980 and 1981, rose from 12 to
144.140
After issuing the permit, EPA's response to the operation and maintenance
problems at the plants was to encourage MDC to voluntarily improve conditions.
On August 12, 1981, the agency lost its patience with MDC's lack of progress in
remedying these violations and issued an AO, ordering the commission to take
actions to ensure that at least five of the eight pumping units at Deer Island are in
good working order. 141 Roughly a year later, on June 30, 1982, EPA issued
another AO, ordering MDC to maintain the power generation equipment at Nut
Island in good working order and to improve its maintenance programs. 142
These orders resulted in some improvements, but in light of the magnitude of the
operation and maintenance problems at the plants, they were merely "band-aid
measures."143
139 "U.S. funds free to start Hub harbor cleanup," Boston Herald, 26 November 1977.
140 Dumanoski, "Raw or treated, the sewage flows into Boston Harbor."
141 Environmental Protection Agency, Region 1, "Findings of Violation and Order for
Compliance," re: NPDES Permit No. MA0102351 (August 12, 1981).
142 Haar and Horowitz, 25.
143 Pitt interview.
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Infrastructure Politics
The operation and maintenance problems that plagued the MDC were
representative of a larger problem -- infrastructure neglect. There are numerous
examples of governments building expensive public works projects and then
allowing them to fall into disrepair.144 In the present case the root cause of the
neglect of the MDC's sewage infrastructure was political. To see why, it is
necessary to understand how the MDC was funded. Annually, the MDC used a
statutorily established method to allocate the sewerage costs to the cities and
towns within the district. The cities and towns, after having the opportunity to
review and comment on their assessment, would pay the proper amount to the
general fund of the Commonwealth, not to MDC. The legislature would then
fund MDC's sewage budget out of the general fund. Thus, MDC funding was
totally dependent upon the state budgeting process, which culminated in a
legislative appropriation, and therein lies the problem.
Each year the MDC developed an in-house budget. During that process
the sewerage division competed with the other divisions in the Commission, e.g.,
the police, parks and recreation, for limited resources. Because sewerage was
not considered a "sexy" issue at the time, and there was much more of a
constituency for the MDC's other services, the sewerage division was often lost
out in the battle over limited resources. 145 The MDC's budget was next sent to
EOEA where it competed with other state agencies, e.g., DEQE (now the DEP)
and the Department of Environmental Management, for funds. Once again, the
sewerage division's piece of the MDC budget usually didn't fare well in relation
to other, more high-profile programs, e.g., air pollution and hazardous waste.146
Then, the EOEA budget would be sent to the Administration to be woven into
the overall state budget that was submitted to the legislature. More often than
not, the sewerage division's funding was cut again at one or both of these last
144 Pat Choate and Susan Walter, America In Ruins (Washington, D.C.: The Council of State
Planning Agencies, 1981); Robert Royer and Cathleen Carr, Thinking About the
Infrastructure (National Council on Public Works Improvement, 1986).
145 Barrata, interview, 7 March 1989.
146 Ibid.
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two stops of the budget process. 147 The result of all this was that the MDC's
sewerage division was chronically underfunded. The dynamics that led to this
situation are best understood by analyzing why those actors who potentially
could have helped generate the political climate necessary to improve the
sewerage division's funding situation but didn't.
The first question one can ask is "where did the public stand on the
sewage infrastructure issue?" This must be answered from the perspective of the
general public and the organized public, e.g., interest groups. Between 1972 and
1982, the average citizen knew little, if anything, about the operation and
maintenance problems besetting the MDC. The primary source of such
information was the media, especially newspapers. Based on a review of the
Boston Globe library's clipping file, which contains all the Globe's coverage of
this issue as well as coverage by selected area newspapers, it is clear what kind of
information to which the public was being exposed. Although there were
occasional articles documenting sewage infrastructure problems, the few articles
that went into any detail didn't appear until the end of that ten year period.
Instead, the vast proportion of sewage-related coverage involved the planning
efforts taking place under the auspices of the FWPCA, e.g., EMMA and the
various EIS's. The other route via which the average citizen might have become
engaged in the infrastructure debate was through personal experience. If the
problems with the plants and the pipes leading to them resulted in sewage
backing up into people's houses, there would have been a great hue and cry to do
something. But despite the problems at the plants, when you flushed the toilet it
went away, and most people at the time had an "out-of-sight-out-of-mind"
mentality when it came to sewage.148 To the extent that any citizens made the
conscious connection between the degradation of Boston Harbor and
infrastructure decay, they could still focus on the flurry of planning taking place
as an indication that those problems would be taken care of in the not too distant
147 Ibid. Snedeker interview.
148 "Out of sight, out of mind. When a bridge is stuck in the up position, there's a huge
public outcry. But when the sewage system breaks, everyone can still flush and it goes
away. The problem is out in Boston Harbor." Stephen Burgay, MDC spokesman, quoted
in Associated Press, "To MDC, sewers were 'stepchild"' The Boston Globe (December 9,
1984): 31.
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future. This is not to say that average citizens were totally disengaged from the
sewage debate. All of them didn't view the planning efforts in a detached
manner, as an indication that things would get better. As discussed earlier, when
citizens perceived planned improvements as threats to their communities' health
and well-being, they rose up in protest. Don't build an incinerator here, don't fill
in Quincy Bay for an expanded primary plant. Still, the focus was on the future,
not the current deterioration of the sewage system.
As would be expected, public interest groups were much better informed
about the operations and maintenance problems at the MDC and the resulting
infrastructure decay. They knew how bad the problems were as a result of both
formal and informal interactions with the state and federal agencies involved in
sewage planning. For example, one component of the EMMA project was the
establishment of a Citizens Advisory Committee, which was intended to act as a
conduit between the planning agencies and the public, helping to inform the
public about the planning process and the planners about public concerns.
Among the groups represented on the CAC were the Sierra Club, Charles River
Watershed Association, League of Woman Voters, Massachusetts Audubon
Society, and the Neponset Valley Conservation Association. Through their
involvement, the citizen's groups became familiar with planning efforts as well
as the current status of MDC's operations. The latter type of knowledge was
supplemented as a result of informal contacts citizen group representatives had
with the staff from various agencies and their review of agency documents.
Knowledge, however, doesn't necessarily translate into action. According to one
of the representatives on the EMMA CAC noted, "there wasn't as much
discussion as you might think" about the MDC as an institution and the
management of its existing infrastructure. "We spent much more time focusing
on planning for the large-scale, system-wide improvements . . . as opposed to
addressing current problems." 149  Other public interest groups reflected this
position. However concerned they were about infrastructure problems, these
groups never effectively used their voice to demand change. As for the
149 Madeliene Kolb, former Sierra Club representative on the CAC, interview, by author, 18
October 1993.
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Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), which would later play such a critical role
in the harbor clean-up, prior to the Quincy suit its efforts focused on the issues of
land use and offshore oil drilling, not the harbor or the sewage that flowed into
it.150
The stance of the average citizen and the organized citizens groups meant
that there was no active, public constituency in favor of improving the sewage
infrastructure. Thus, one of the major forces behind political change, public
pressure, was nowhere to be found. Elected officials didn't pick up where the
public left off. Rather, they chose not to give the MDC the resources necessary
for proper operation and maintenance. Neither the three governors elected
during this period nor the legislative officials saw fit to take stand up and fight
for increasing the MDC's budget so that these problems could be adequately
addressed. As Chester Atkins, former chairman of the state Senate Ways and
Means Committee, noted in the early 1980s, "it is a very difficult thing to
appropriate public money for the invisible infrastructure."151 Whereas public
officials often reap electoral dividends by getting highly visible public works
projects off the ground, building something new, putting people to work, and
pumping money into the local economy, such dividends are usually absent or, at
least, much reduced when those officials support improvements in the existing
infrastructure that is out of sight. As one MDC commissioner in the early 1980s
noted, "[s]ewers do not have a built-in constituency like parks, where you see
something demonstrable for what you spend, where you can sit on the
swings."15 2 Thus, it is no surprise the MDC commissioners were able to get
legislative appropriations for politically popular parks, skating rinks and pools,
while at the same time they were being squeezed on the sewage side of their
operations.153
150 Peter Shelley, lawyer at CLF, telephone interview by author, 10 May 1993.
151 Dumanoski, "The cycle: breakdowns, no money," 17.
152 Ibid, 19, quoting Richard A. Nylen.
153 "According to Bill Geary, MDC Commissioner from 1983 to 1989, it was always possible
for him to get legislative appropriations for swimming pools or skating rinks that were
not really necessary, but it was virtually impossible to get appropriations for the
"invisible" underground infrastructure that was essential to the region's health and well-
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Not only was there no political payoff in funding operations and
maintenance, there was an explicit disincentive. In the years from 1972 to 1982,
the ratepayers in the MDC service area paid among the lowest sewage rates in
the country, and for good reason. The ratepayers were, in effect, being partially
subsidized to the degree that MDC was not spending money on properly
operating and maintaining its sewage systems. If politicians increased the
MDC's budget they would have to increase assessments to the cities and towns.
Increased assessments would mean increased rates for individual users. Raising
rates, like raising taxes, would have been extremely unpopular among the voters,
especially since the politicians were receiving no signals from the electorate that
increasing MDC's budget was something they favored.
In light of this political atmosphere it was always a struggle for the MDC
to get funding. In 1980, for example, the Senate Ways and Means Committee
decided to cut $1.5 million from the revolving maintenance account for Deer
Island. Only after Atkins toured the plant and saw how bad things had become,
was the money put back. According to Barrata, "that's what it took. $1.5 million
dollars which is peanuts. If we didn't have that we wouldn't have kept the
Nordberg's running. The point is nobody cared. Nobody was out there saying I
want sewerage.... Let's be honest about it."154
Making matters worse, the MDC was poorly equipped to fight for
increased funding. It just didn't have any political clout. Between 1973 and 1983,
ten commissioners came and went at the MDC. 155 This lack of stability and
continuity hampered the MDC's ability to defend its budget requests. Before the
commissioners could get up to speed on the issues and build political support,
they were out the door. The MDC also continued to be perceived, not without
basis, as a patronage dumping ground, further reducing its credibility and clout
within the political establishment.156
being." Paul F. Levy, "Sewer Infrastructure, An Orphan of Our Times, Oceanus (Spring
1993): 57.
154 Barrata interview, 7 October 1993.
155 Associated Press, "To MDC, sewers were 'stepchild"'.
156 Barrata interview, 7 October 1993; and Rolbein, 204.
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The Stage is Set
Things could have been different. MDC planning efforts, federal and state
reviews and decisions all might have taken less time; aggressive enforcement
might have sped things up; increased public and political concern might have
resulted in improved operations and maintenance; and the combined impact of
these actions might have resulted in an upgraded sewage system and improved
water quality. But, these things didn't come to pass. As a result, the stage for the
Quincy suit was set and the judiciary began what was to become a long-standing
role in the cleanup of Boston Harbor. How the state court reacted to the Quincy
suit and the history of problems it presented is taken up in the next chapter.
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The State Court Case
In December 1982, the City of Quincy brought a legal suit in state court
alleging that the MDC had violated a series of state laws and, as a result, was
illegally polluting Boston Harbor. The Court found there to be violations of law,
and the main outcome of court intervention was the creation of a new authority,
MWRA, in December 1984, to take over the water and sewer responsibilities of
the MDC. This chapter first presents the events pertaining to the state court's
involvement in remedy formulation and implementation. The chapter ends with
an evaluation of the case in light of the criteria for legitimacy, capacity, and
effectiveness.
This chapter's conclusions present a complex and varied picture of court
intervention. Such intervention was effective in getting the authority created,
and in so doing, establishing the institutional capacity necessary to resolve the
violations of law uncovered in the litigation. While some of the court's actions
during remedy formulation and implementation were legitimate, others were
either illegitimate or of questionable legitimacy. As for the capacity to formulate
remedies, the court showed how, through the use of a special master, it has the
capacity to make informed and reasonable remedial decisions. And with respect
to implementation, there is an instance in which the court exhibited the capacity
to implement its remedies and one in which it didn't.
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The Suit
With so much partially or untreated sewage going into the harbor during
the early 1980s its not surprising that some of it was washing onto local beaches.
One of those was Wollaston Beach where William B. Golden, City Solicitor for
Quincy, was running on a summer's day in 1982. At some point he looked down
and suddenly realized that he "was running on human excrement."1 That
excrement, he surmised, probably came from one of the MDC's sewage treatment
plants. Angry about his discovery, Golden marched down to Quincy City Hall,
still clad in his running clothes, to speak with Mayor Francis X. McCauley about
the problem on the beach. McCauley asked him "what do you want to do about
it?"2 Golden's response came on December 17, 1982, when he filed a civil suit in
state Superior Court, on behalf of Quincy, against the MDC.3 Among the suit's
claims were that the MDC had violated the conditions of its joint federal/state
discharge permit by discharging partially treated and raw sewage into Boston
Harbor and also violated the state law prohibiting the discharge into coastal
waters of sewage or other substances which might be injurious to public health
or contaminate shellfish.
Quincy invited EPA to join as plaintiffs to no avail. According to Ralph
Childs, Assistant U.S. Attorney representing EPA, for the agency to become a
party to a state court suit would be "inconsistent with the whole federalist system
and would raise lots of difficult issues of jurisdiction ... We do not want to be a
party in the state court."4 Although the EPA didn't want to get involved in the
state case, they were soon thereafter brought into the legal fray by the
Conservation Law Foundation of New England (CLF). On June 7, 1983, the CLF,
1 William Golden, quoted on Rolbein, 154.
2 McCauley, quoted in Anthony Wolff, "Boston's Toilet: The True Story," Audubon
(March 1989): 28.
3 Dolin, Dirty Water/Clean Water, 63.
4 According to Ralph Childs, Assistant U.S. Attorney representing EPA, for the agency to
become a party to a state court suit would be "inconsistent with the whole federalist
system and would raise lots of difficult issues of jurisdiction. We do not want to be a
party in the state court, but we are interested in being helpful in state court proceedings .
. ."Judy Foreman, "Judge asks Reagan for harbor cleanup help," The Boston Globe 24
August 1983, 21, 28.
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"shocked" by the allegations in the Quincy suit, brought their own suit in federal
district court against the MDC and EPA, asking "for ... injunctive relief against
the state and federal officials responsible for the chronic, unauthorized, and
massive discharge of partially treated, often raw sewage into the Boston Harbor
and its adjacent waters .. . [which is] in violation of federal law [CWA], MDC's
Federal permit and even the weak administrative orders issued by EPA."5 CLF
requested the court establish a schedule requiring MDC to implement a plan
designed to remedy the violations of the CWA. Judge A. David Mazzone was
assigned to the case.
Picking the Court and the Judge
The venue of the Quincy suit was driven by an explicitly legal strategy.
As Peter Koff, an attorney hired by Golden to work on this case, noted,
The relief we were looking for was a judicial assertion of responsibility
and control over the way the MDC was operating. We thought this more
likely would happen in state court rather than federal court in light of the
reluctance of some federal judges to assert themselves in control of state
political institutions that weren't doing their job. . . . We just made a
judgment that political institutional concern would be better dealt with in
state court, where it would be a state judge dealing with a state agency, as
opposed to having to deal with the question of federal intrusion coming
into play.6
5 Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc., v. Metropolitan District
Commission, et. al. , Complaint (June 7, 1983): 1-2. According to Peter Shelley, Senior
Attorney at CLF, "we assumed that everything was working at the sewage treatment
plant, and if it wasn't, we'd be hearing a large outcry. Then, in early 1983, the Quincy suit
came to our attention. The allegations were so extraordinary that we looked at federal
and state files and, well, we were shocked into action. I mean, the shit was going into the
ocean and no one had noticed, us included. It was the damnedest thing." Quoted in
Rolbein, 202. Although Shelley is correct in pointing out that there was no "large
outcry," as Chapter 3 indicates, his assumption that "no one had noticed" is not correct.
Different groups had noticed, they just decided not the push the issue.
6 Peter Koff, personal interview by author, 12 May 1993.
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Not only did they want to stay in state court, Golden and Koff also wanted
a particular judge, so they waited until Paul Garrity rotated into the City of
Quincy's district before filing suit.7 According to Koff, "we felt Garrity would be
best because he wouldn't be afraid of asserting himself, as a judicial activist, to
take over and prod the agency."8 Certainly, Garrity's background indicated as
much. Appointed to the Superior court by Governor Dukakis in October, 1976,
Garrity, a registered democrat, was described by one commentator as being
"rumpled, walruslike behind a handlebar mustache, opinionated in a way that is
more mercurial than dogmatic . . . [and having] an activist, populist attitude
about government, courts, and, most of all, himself."9 In July 1979, after finding
that an earlier consent decree had failed to eliminate widespread violations of the
Massachusetts Sanitary Code by the Boston Housing Authority had failed,
Garrity appointed a receiver to take over the day-to-day operations of the
authority. 10 This action reflected Garrity's remedial philosophy that when other
branches of government fail to carry out their legal duties it is necessary for the
court to step in to ensure that the law is complied with.
Summer Moves
In June, 1983, Quincy amended its suit in a number of ways. Three parties
were added as defendants -- the Director of the DWPC, the Commissioner of the
DEQE, and the Secretary of EOEA. Quincy alleged that these defendants, as
representatives of the state agencies with the legal responsibility for enforcing
state law and overseeing MDC's operations, had failed to take action to remedy
the violations of law cited in the original suit. Quincy also made its request for
relief more specific by asking the court to grant preliminary injunctive relief in
the form of either 1) a moratorium on new connections to the sewage system or
7 Rolbein, 202.
8 Koff interview, 12 May 1993.
9 Rolbein, 202; and Paul Garrity, personal interview by the author, 14 December 1993.
10 Charles M. Haar and Lance Liebman, Property and Law (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1985): 447-450. The case is referred to as Perez v. Boston Housing Authority,
which was appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Court (379 Mass. 703, 400 N.E.2d
1231 (1980)).
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2) a system-wide reduction of two gallons of wastewater flow for every new
gallon added. In addition, Quincy requested that the court appoint a receiver to
manage and operate, subject to court supervision, the sewage division of the
MDC.
Garrity held a hearing on Quincy's motion for preliminary injunctive relief
in mid-June. As a result of that hearing and the submission of plaintiff and
defendant affidavits, Garrity found that
Boston Harbor is significantly and visibly polluted primarily because of
the discharge of inadequately treated and untreated sewage into it and
adjoining waters. The current and potential impact of that pollution upon
the health, welfare and safety of persons who live and work near-by
Boston Harbor and who use it for commercial, recreational and other
purposes is staggering.... Moreover, the damage to that environment and
to the creatures who live in it may very well become irreversible unless
measures are taken to control and at some point preclude the pollution
and consequent destruction of that very valuable resource.11
Garrity determined that, as a result of such discharges, conditions of the
MDC's jointly issued, state/federal permit had been violated, but he failed to
specifically indicate which conditions those were. For example, Quincy's
complaint had alleged violations of a variety of permit conditions, including the
ones prohibiting the exceedance of effluent limitations for various parameters,
e.g., BOD, and prohibiting discharges that caused visible discoloration of the
receiving waters or cause state water quality standards to be violated. Garrity's
ruling gave no clue as to which of these, or other, violations he felt had occurred.
Garrity also determined that there had been violations of the state law
prohibiting sewage discharges that threatened public health and shellfish.
Although Garrity implied that the MDC was to blame for such violations, he
stopped short of finding the agency liable.
11 City of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission and Boston Water & Sewer
Commission, (Norfolk Superior Court, C.A. no. 138477), Findings. Rulings and Orders on
Plaintiff City of Ouincy's Application for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (une 27, 1983) 4.
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Noting that "plaintiffs must not be relegated to have rights without a
remedy", Garrity further determined that Quincy was entitled to preliminary
injunctive relief. Such relief is not intended to fully remedy legal violations.
Instead, preliminary injunctions are designed to maintain the status quo until a
trial on the merits of the case can be completed and liability determined, after
which time more complete remedial relief can be decided upon.12 To support
his contention that preliminary injunctive relief was necessary, Garrity argued
that the record gave no indication that the violations of law would cease any time
in the near future if the existing situation were allowed to remain unchanged.
For example, Garrity stated that the defendants had no plan in place, the
implementation of which would result in the discontinuation of raw sewage
discharges to the harbor. Furthermore, Garrity had little confidence that things
would change by virtue of Governor Dukakis's recent appointment, in May 1983,
of a committee to establish a clean-up plan for the harbor.13 The committee's
mandate, Garrity contended, "appears to contemplate what committees do best,
i.e., study."14 Garrity decided to hold another hearing on July 6, at which time
the parties could present their arguments as to the appropriate form of
preliminary injunctive relief. Garrity indicated that he was inclined against
appointing a receiver and, instead was considering appointing a special master
and giving him thirty days to consult with all the parties and "come up with the
most effective remedy and to prepare a comprehensive order."15
The state defendants, who were collectively represented by the State
Attorney General, expressed great concern about Garrity's findings and his
tentative plan to appoint a special master. They argued, among other things, that
Garrity's conclusions were based on extremely limited and, in some case,
12 Owen M. Fiss and Doug Rendleman, Ijunctions (Mineola, NY: Foundation Press, 1984 -
2d. ed.): 331.
13 Dukakis appointed the so-called, Sargent Committee, headed by former Governor
Francis W. Sargent, on May 26, 1983. In establishing the Committee, Dukakis noted,
"[w]e have had dozens of studies. We know what the problems are. What we now need
is action, a plan and a timetable." Andrew Blake, "Dukakis names Sargent to lead harbor
cleanup," The Boston Globe 27 May 1983, 17.
14 City of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission and Boston Water & Sewer
Commission, Findings. Rulings and Orders on Plaintiff City of Quincy's Application for
Preliminary Injunctive Relief 9.
15 Ibid.
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incorrect information. Noting that the courts findings were based on only a
single hearing and on "untested affidavits and colloquies with counsel," the State
believed that before any remedial decisions were made it should have the
opportunity to more fully explore the accuracy of the plaintiff's claims and the
court's findings. 16 The State questioned the need for judicial intervention,
arguing that it did have some plans in place to improve the operation of the
sewage system and, furthermore, that it was moving ahead with the
development of more comprehensive remedies, as indicated by the Governor's
appointment of the special commission.
Instead of having the court devise a remedy, the state believed that it
should have the opportunity to develop the political consensus necessary to
develop a schedule of remedial actions and to generate the political/financial
support required to implement such a schedule. The state also worried that the
court had something else, besides preliminary injunctive relief, in mind.
Garrity's inclination to appoint a special master for thirty days and to have him
''prepare a comprehensive order," suggested to the state that the master's task
would go beyond determining preliminary relief to establishing a long-term
remedial regime, an approach the State felt was clearly unwarranted at this
juncture in the case.17
Garrity discounted the State's concerns. He was especially unconvinced
by the State's claim that the court should defer to the political branches of
government to allow them to reach political consensus on appropriate remedies.
Garrity argued that the court could not afford to wait for the other branches to
act for two reasons:
First, the history of political consensus building, leading to a rectification
of the extensive pollution of Boston Harbor which has been and is
permitted to continue and regrettably increase in violation of the law is
16 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, City of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission,
et. al., (Norfolk Superior Court, C.A. no. 138477), Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Further Consideration and Clarification (July 6, 1983)page 3 of the july 6 document.
17 Ibid, 24.
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bleak. That history has been characterized by commission after
commission and study after study which both always fade from sight
when the appropriations crunch is reached. Second, and most
significantly, any effective remedy requires federal, state and local
municipal cooperation which needs to be accomplished much more
quickly than appears to be possible voluntarily in order to address the
issues of health, welfare, safety and the environment referred to above. In
sum, there is an urgency about this that the political branches of
government just do not seem to be responding to appropriately
considering what is occurring is, again, in violation of the law.18
On July 8, Garrity appointed Charles M. Haar, the Louis D. Brandies
Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, as special master and gave him thirty
days to hear evidence, make findings of fact, and propose injunctive relief. 19
Garrity decided that the special master was necessary for two reasons. While he
didn't view the case as being scientifically complex, Garrity agreed with the
plaintiffs that it posed other legal, governmental, and political complexities. 20 A
legally and politically savvy special master could help the court develop
remedies that could address these issues. Garrity also believed that appointing a
special master would save time by enabling the court to avoid the "time
consuming and obviously delay-causing evidentiary hearings [requested by the
defendants] to resolve disputed issues of fact and their claim that much of Boston
Harbor's pollution comes from sources beyond their control."21
Haar was an experienced special master who held very similar views as
Garrity on the role of courts in remedial adjudication, especially the need for the
court to intervene, as the option of last resort, when the politically responsible
18 City of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., (Norfolk Superior Court, C.A.
no. 138477), "Further Findings, Rulings and Orders on Plaintiff City of Quincy's
Application for Preliminary Injunctive Relief' (July 8, 1983): 4.
19 Haar and Horowitz, 4.
20 "The Boston Harbor case was not a complex case scientifically at all. It was one of the
least complex cases I've ever had where institutional litigation is involved." Garrity
interview.
21 Seward, 4; Koff interview, 12 May 1993.
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branches fail to remedy legal violations on their own.22 Haar's expertise is in
urban policy and land and property law.2 3 With the courts permission Haar
appointed Steven G. Horowitz, a former student and local attorney, to assist
him.24 Haar also got permission to consult with three environmental experts and
to hire research assistants.25
During the next month, the Special Master and his staff read through
numerous documents, heard the testimony of thirteen witnesses over 2.5 days of
hearings, consulted various experts and public officials, and toured Deer, Moon,
and Nut Island as well as Wollaston Beach, accompanied by representatives from
the media, the parties to the litigation, and interested citizens. Departing from
the traditional judicial inquiry process, Haar undertook, with the consent of the
parties, ex parte contacts and reviewed documents not strictly introduced as
evidence, although the Master's findings were to be based solely on information
introduced in the record. "The purpose of this process," according to Haar, "was
to become as familiar as possible in a short time with an enormously complex
and significant problem with many ramifications -- environmental, social,
political, economic, biological, and hygienic", and then use that understanding to
establish findings of fact and propose remedies.26
The master focused on the problems associated with Deer and Nut
Island's primary treatment plants and their failure to provide adequate
22 Charles M. Haar, "What Only Courts Can Do," The National Law Journal (January 4,
1982): 13-14; and "A Helpful Judicial Tool," The National Law Journal (January 11, 1982):
11, 16.
23 Gary McMillan, "Charles Haar -- the lawyer as 'more of a mason than an architect," The
Boston Globe, 15 December 1984).
24 Timothy G. Little, "Court-Appointed Special Masters In Complex Environmental
Litigation: City of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission," Harvard Environental
Law Review 8 (1984): 445.
25 The environmental experts consulted were: E. Eric Adams, Principal Research Engineer
and Lecturer, MIT; Joseph J. Harrington, Gordon McKay Professor of Environmental
Engineering and Chairman of the Department of Environmental Science and Physiology,
School of Public Health, Harvard University; and Allan R. Robinson, Professor of
Oceanography and Chairman of the Committee on Oceanography, The Center for Earth
and Planetary Physics, Harvard University. Haar and Horowitz, footnote on page 4.
26 Ibid, 5.
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treatment.27 He did not deal with other pollution problems such as CSO's, toxics,
sludge, and the potential upgrade of the Deer and Nut Island plants to
secondary. The Master made it clear that these issues didn't fall within the
"present ambit" of the case. 28 Indeed, while the Master was conducting his
inquiry, the waiver issue was continuing to evolve. On June 30, 1983, EPA
tentatively denied the MDC's waiver application. Among the findings were that
MDC's proposed discharge would violate Massachusetts' water quality
standards for dissolved oxygen and interfere with the "protection and
propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish, fish and
wildlife."29 During the summer of 1983, MDC evaluated whether or not to take
advantage of its one-time opportunity to resolve the issues that led to the
tentative denial, and to re-apply. In September, after meeting with EPA officials,
including EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus, MDC decided that the
outstanding issues in their initial application could be addressed and began
gathering the necessary data to do so. 30 On June 30, 1984, MDC submitted its
second waiver application. 31 It wasn't until after the State court case had run its
course that EPA would decide the fate of this second application.
The Special Master's 196-page report documented the pollution problems
in the Harbor and the many ills that beset the MDC's sewage treatment system.
The Master found that "[d]ue to the age of the plant, insufficient capacity,
inadequate maintenance and breakdowns, the Nut Island Wastewater Treatment
Plant is unable to treat influent sewage to meet present-day primary standards.32
Consequently, partially treated sewage is regularly discharged into the
27 Ibid, 40.
28 Ibid, 133, footnote.
29 EPA, Region 1, Tentative Denial of the Administrator Pursuant to 40 CFR Part 125.
Subpart G (June 30, 1983): 6-7.
30 According to James Hoyte, then Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental
Affairs, the EPA officials did not discourage the MDC from reapplying. Telephone
interview by author, 8 March 1989.
31 MDC, Application For A Waiver of Secondary Treatment For the Nut Island and Deer
Island Treatment Plants (June 30, 1984).
32 At Nut Island, "preventive maintenance and scheduled equipment replacement have
been neglected by MDC administrations to the extent that nearly all maintenance is
conducted in response to emergencies. As a result of the neglect, necessary treatment
units are frequently out of service for extended periods of time." Haar and Horowitz, 69.
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surrounding waters, and in wet weather, partially treated sewage flows are
pumped out . . . closer to the shore."33 Similarly, "[a]s a result of equipment
breakdowns and staff failures at Deer Island, as well as the inability of the plant
to handle wet weather flows, Moon Island periodically discharges enormous
volumes of untreated, raw sewage into the waters off Moon Island."34 The report
recounts one of the most told stories about the failures at Deer Island. On
Mother's Day, 1983, a coupling split on one of the pumps. Two million gallons of
raw sewage flooded the building to a height of two stories. Over the next three
days, two MDC police frogmen repeatedly dove into the sewage to locate and
repair the break. During that time, 153 million gallons of raw sewage was
discharged to the Harbor via Moon Island.35
One of the main reasons why the plants' peak capacity was often exceeded
had to do with infiltration and inflow.36 Infiltration was "defined as surface or
ground water which enters a sewer system through defective pipes, joints,
connections, and manhole walls", while inflow is "the quantity of water
discharged into a sewer system from roof leaders, foundation and surface drains,
streams, catch basins, tidal overflow weirs, etc.."37 The report concluded that
infiltration/inflow (I/I) accounted for fifty to sixty percent of the average
influent to Deer Island and fifty-nine percent of the flow to Nut Island.38 The
Master highlighted the chronic staffing problems at the MDC, noting that "as of
October, 20, 1982, 441 of the 558 authorized positions were funded to be filled in
the MDC's Sewerage Division. On average, however, only 417 were actually
filled that year."39 The discharges from the sewage treatment plants were found
to contribute to objectionable odors, colors, turbidity in violation of state water
33 Ibid, ix-x. "2.1 billion gallons of influent bypassed primary treatment at the Nut Island
plant in 1982." Ibid, 51.
34 Ibid, 114. "As a result of equipment limitations and failures, as well as staff inadequacies,
the functional capacity of Deer Island is considerably below its design capacity." Ibid,
101.
35 Ibid, 102.
36 "[Blecause of large quantities of infiltration/inflow, the Nut Island plant, even when
operating at its peak capacity, does not have adequate capacity to treat wet weather
flows." Ibid, 50.
37 Ibid, 42.
38 Ibid, 47-48.
39 Ibid, 70.
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quality standards, 40 bacterial contamination,41 fin erosion in winter flounder,42
the closure of beaches and shellfishing areas, 43 and alterations in the natural state
of benthic communities.44
Having laid out the findings of fact, the Master turned to the issue of
remedies, stating that,45
After reviewing the extensive record in this case, the Master is convinced .
. . that it is both appropriate and necessary for the court to fashion judicial
remedies to clean up the Bay and the Harbor. By appropriate, it is meant
that Court is neither overstepping its authority nor improperly impinging
on the prerogatives of our other two branches of government. By
necessary, it is meant that, without judicial intervention, the problem in
this case will remain with us for the foreseeable future.46
The Master first dismissed the plaintiff's request for a sewer moratorium,
arguing that new connections to the system are not the "causes or main sources
of the environmental degradation problem," and that the growth for which
sewer connections are needed is an important element in the continued economic
revitalization of the Boston area. "[T]o stop all building," the Master stated,
"would be to cut the societal nose off to spite the face."47
40 Ibid, 91.
41 Ibid, xi.
42 Ibid, 92
43 Ibid, 95-96, 114, 116.
44 Ibid, 92.
45 Prior to the completion of the Master's Report, the court issued a ruling that affected the
Report's ultimate focus. On August 2, Garrity found that the plaintiff was not entitled to
relief against the BWSC at this time. This was due primarily to the fact that, although the
BWSC operates the Moon Island facility, the discharge of untreated sewage via that
facility is due to factors beyond its control. This is because the Moon Island facility is
essentially an "overflow valve" that is used only when the influent capacity to Deer Island
is exceeded and the BWSC "is not in a position to do anything about the overflow of
untreated sewage from defendant MDC's Deer Island plant into its Moon Island Facility."
Haar and Horowitz, 155.
46 Ibid, 125
47 Ibid, 136.
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He then went on to recommend a series of 23 remedial actions along with
a schedule for their completion. For example, it was recommended that the
MDC determine acceptable infiltration/inflow rates and design and implement
cost effective infiltration/inflow control projects, 48 and that the MDC initiate the
two-for-one influent sewage reduction system requested by the plaintiff.49 It was
also recommended that the MDC: continue ongoing efforts to upgrade Nut
Island; devise a plan and time schedule for completing those efforts; submit a
plan outlining the improvements at Deer Island necessary to reduce the
discharges of raw or partially treated sewage; and present to the court and the
legislature a plan for staffing and a supplemental budget request to cover those
staffing needs.
The master also argued that what was desperately needed was a long-
term financial plan to ensure that the MDC would be able to fund the remedial
measures called for in the master's report. To that end, the master recommended
that the MDC and the DWPC hire independent financial consultant to prepare
the plan. As part of its analysis, the consultant was to evaluate the advisability of
adopting a variety of measures designed to enable the MDC to carry out the tasks
arrayed before it. These measures included revising the current system of
charges to MDC user communities and changing the way in which the state
legislature appropriated funds for sewage treatment. The most far-reaching of
those measures was to consider whether "the sewerage division of the MDC be
spun off and responsibility placed in an independent, autonomous, self-
sustaining financial authority, with the advantages and flexibility of a public
authority."50
Garrity enthusiastically accepted the master's report. So too did the City
of Quincy, the EOEA, the AG, the MDC, all of whom agreed that the Master had
done an excellent job in establishing findings and remedies.51 For example,
48 Ibid, 137-142.
49 Ibid, 142.
50 Ibid, 165.
51 For example, a Boston Globe editorial included the following: "Not only have
Environmental Affairs Secretary James Hoyte, MDC Comr. William Geary and other
state officials publicly welcomed Haar's report, they have now proposed to go several
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although the MDC's head engineer didn't feel that the report's findings were "100
percent correct," they were, he said, "70 or 80 percent correct and that gave ...
[the report] an awful lot credibility; the experts were excellent."52 The AG's
lawyer stated that the findings were "very accurate, very well done . . . Haar
recruited very good people from Harvard and MIT."53
As for the proposed remedies, there were equally supportive sentiments,
the most important coming from the MDC, who would ultimately have the
responsibility for implementing any remedial measures. Reflecting on the
Masters remedies, the Assistant to the MDC Commissioner stated that the agency
"intends to implement the recommendations -- we think they're realistic."54
Garrity, with Quincy's support, recommended that the parties enter into a
consent decree to implement the Master's remedies.
However, while the State defendants did not challenge the
appropriateness of the masters findings of fact or proposed remedies, it had no
interest in entering into a consent decree. As Seward notes, the AG's office "felt
that other consent decrees to which [the State] ... was a party had led to judicial
meddling ... "55 This history led to the AG's "unbending" policy of avoiding
such decrees.56 More specifically the AG didn't feel that any court order, consent
decree or otherwise, was appropriate in this case. According to Assistant
Attorney General, Michael Sloman, "[olur position to date has been that, in view
of the willingness of [the] administration as a whole to address the question of
pollution in the harbor, why do you also need a court order?"57 As an alternative
steps beyond it." The Boston Globe (August 13, 1983). On August 14, the Globe reported
that "[v]irtually all experts and citizens groups concerned with the problem of sewage
pollution in Boston harbor have given kudos to the comprehensive report issued last
week by court-appointed special master Charles M. Haar." Judy Foreman, "Harbor
pollution remedies: Giant step or just stopgap?" The Boston Globe 14 August 1983).
52 Noel Barrata, quoted in Scott T. McCreary, Resolving Science-Intensive Public Policy
Disputes: Lessons From the New York Bight Initiative (Cambridge, MA: Unpublished
Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning, May 1989): 145.
Mike Sloman, quoted in McCreary, 145.
54 Foreman, "Court given plans to clean Hub harbor," The Boston Globe (August 11, 1983),
quoting Stephen Burgay.
Seward, 6.
56 Koff interview, 12 May 1993. Seward, footnote on page 6.
57 Foreman, "Court given plans to clean Hub harbor." The Boston Globe (August 11, 1983).
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the State proposed that the court retain jurisdiction in the case for six months
during which time the court could measure the State defendant's performance
against the masters remedies.58 The State also implied that if the court sought to
impose the master's remedies as a court order it would appeal such a move,
arguing, in part, that the extent of the remedies went well beyond what is called
for in a preliminary injunction which is intended to maintain the status quo, not
establish a long-term, open-ended, remedial regime.
The State's position put Garrity in a tough spot. He couldn't get
agreement on a consent decree. While the court traditionally has a great deal of
discretion in determining what to include preliminary injunctions, Garrity
himself thought the remedies went beyond what was called for in a preliminary
injunction and was concerned that an effort to unilaterally impose the remedies
would likely be appealed to and overturned by a higher court.59 There was, of
course, the option of proceeding with a trial at which time, if the defendants were
found liable for the violations, the court would be in a position to order more
complete injunctive relief. However, both the defendants and Quincy wanted to
avoid this option, the former because they felt it unnecessary given their
willingness to voluntarily implement the masters remedies, and the latter
because of the time and cost involved in continued litigation.
Garrity's solution was a compromise that satisfied the plaintiffs and the
defendants. On September 12, 1983, he issued a procedural order under which
the parties made "a voluntary moral commitment to accept and comply with the"
remedies and schedule for implementation established by the court, thereby
avoiding "further adversarial litigation" and getting on with the "massive ...
effort to clean up Boston Harbor pollution and remove its causes."60 According
to Garrity, the procedural order "was the best I could do" and the plaintiff
58 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, City of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission
(Norfolk Superior Court, C.A. no. 138477), State Defendants' Objection to the Report of
the Special Master (August 22, 1983): 2.
Garrity interview.
60 City of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., (Norfolk Superior Court, C.A.
no. 138477), Procedural Order (September 12, 1983): 1-2. Sloman (Assistant AG) said
"[t]his gets to the concerns but without a judicial order. This is essentially the same
position we have had all along." Foreman, "Boston Harbor gets 10-year plan."
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agreed. 61 As Golden recalls, "[t]he case had the potential to burgeon with
appeals and ancillary suits costing millions of dollars, and not one penny would
go to clean up Boston Harbor. We wanted to find common ground that would
lead to action, and keep the court involved. There's no question that the
procedural order was the best we could do."62
The remedies in the procedural order were essentially the same ones
offered by the Master with one important addition. The Master's report did not
address the issues of primary versus secondary treatment, CSOs, sludge and
toxics. Thus, it was argued, even if the Master's remedies were implemented,
serious harbor pollution problems would remain.63 Responding to expressed
concerns that the scope of the relief was too narrow, Garrity added, with the
parties' consent, a requirement that they develop a "supplemental schedule
addressing the pollution problems of Boston Harbor at large, including Quincy
and Hingham Bays, concerning such matters as combined sewer overflows,
sludge management, secondary treatment, and toxic wastes."64 Haar was
appointed to monitor compliance with the procedural order.
The Procedural Order
The parties, along with representatives of EPA, CLF, and local
government, met bi-weekly to discuss progress in complying with the Procedural
Order's list of remedies. Most of the meetings were attended by Haar who, in
turn, kept Garrity updated on what was happening. By all accounts the
Procedural Order process was frustrating. The parties felt there was little sense
of direction. EPA's General Counsel noted that "it was a sort of rolling ad hoc
agenda; there was no clear objective or mandate."65 The representatives from
Quincy agreed.
61 Garrity interview.
62 McCreary, 147.
63 Foreman, "Harbor pollution remedies: Giant step of just stopgap?"
64 City of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Procedural Order Exhibit A.
65 McCreary, 149.
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One of the problems was that due to the voluntary nature of the order the
court could not apply sanctions if deadlines were missed. This reduced the sense
of urgency among the parties to comply. Making matters worse was Haar's
acerbic style of running the meetings. According to an MDC representative, "no
matter what you did and how quickly you did it, he berated you because it took
so long."66 "Every two weeks it was a scolding."67 "Haar acted like he thought he
was running a Roman galley: if he pounded harder and shouted louder he
thought the boat would move faster. But the oars weren't lined up and people
rowed in seven directions at once."68
The CLF representative felt that entire process "was stupid." "The notion
that a voluntary moral commitment was going to be enough to move
metropolitan Boston to do anything that cost money was just flying in the face of
15 years of real solid history that the legislature was not going to fund the MDC
at anywhere near that level that it needed to maintain and operate its facilities."69
This lack of faith in the ability of the Procedural Order to produce results,
moved the CLF to press forward with its lawsuit in District Court. On March 27,
1984, however, Judge Mazzone complied with the state's request to stay the
proceedings of CLF's case in order to let the agreement reached in the Quincy
case run its course.70
The process did achieve some of its goals. While deadlines were often
pushed back, in the year following the signing of the Order, a number of the
required remedial actions were taken. For example, the MDC analyzed its
staffing needs, spent millions on repairs, submitted supplemental budget
requests for increased staffing and funding, held a two-day seminar on I/I for
user communities, and made plans for reducing 1/1.71
66 Barrata interview, 7 October 1993.
67 Barrata, quoted in McCreary, 150.
68 Doug MacDonald, quoted in McCreary, 150.
69 Peter Shelley, telephone interview by author, 10 May 1993.
70 United States v. Metropolitan District Commission, Nos. 85-0489, 83-1614 (D. Mass,
September 5, 1985), cited in Bureau of National Affairs, Environmental Law Reporter 16
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, July 1986): 20622.
71 Charles A. Radin, "Cleanup of Boston Harbor defies effort at tidy solution," The Boston
Globe 22 April 1984, 1, 22. Little, footnote 264 on page 468.
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However, these steps barely began to address what needed to be done to
improve the MDC's institutional capacity, reduce pollution discharges and,
therefore, remedy the violations of law illuminated by the litigation.
Furthermore, there was virtually no progress in developing a supplemental
schedule to address the issues of CSOs, sludge, toxics, and the ultimate level of
sewage treatment. It is for these reasons that, at the October 9, 1984, First Year
Compliance Hearing on the Procedural Order, Haar could report that although
the defendants had complied with a number of the Order's remedies, the MDC
sewage division was still understaffed and underfunded, the plants were still
operating poorly, and the harbor was no cleaner.72 By the time of Haar's
October report, however, little attention was being paid to the Procedural Order
and MDC's success or failure in complying with its requirements. All eyes were
on the legislature where bills were being considered that would establish an
independent water authority to take over the sewage system from the MDC. The
creation of such an authority had been advocated by the court ever since the
signing of the procedural order.
The "Ultimate Remedy"
The Procedural Order required the MDC to hire a consultant to evaluate
various options for improving MDC's financial health and, therefore, its ability to
construct, maintain and operate a sound sewage system. Since the consultant's
plan was not due until March, 1984, one might assume that the decision on which
option to pursue would not be made before then. From the court's perspective,
however, the decision was clear. Immediately after concluding the agreement on
the Procedural Order, Garrity told the press that "[t]he ultimate remedy is a
separate authority that is pay-as-you-go, with bonding and enforcement
authority."73
Haar not only agreed, it was his work on the masters report that led to this
conclusion. While preparing the report, He consulted with financial experts in
72 Seward, 7; Foreman and Andrew Blake, "MDC harbor receivership eyed," The Boston
Globe 10 October 1984.
73 Foreman, "Boston Harbor gets 10-year plan," The Boston Globe (September 7, 1983).
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New York and Massachusetts. 74 Within two weeks of beginning his job as
special master, Haar was convinced that the "MDC couldn't work" and that an
authority had to be created. 75 Simply stated, the MDC, as constituted and
funded, was incapable of operating and maintaining its existing sewage system,
much less taking on future responsibilities relating to sludge, CSOs, and the
ultimate outcome of the waiver application. Garrity and Haar had little faith that
Massachusetts' politicians would support the institutional modifications needed
to make the MDC an effective and efficient organization, e.g., significant
increases in funding and new hiring rules. The court, however, couldn't order
the creation of an authority, that would require a legislative act. Instead, Garrity
decided to use Haar as the court's representative, informally advocating the
authority option both during the procedural order meetings and in his contacts
with legislators and the public. In this way, Garrity and Haar hoped they could
help develop the political consensus needed to establish an authority.
In deciding to push the authority concept, the court was drawing on a
veritable American tradition.76 Since the creation of the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey in 1921, authorities have proliferated throughout the
country to the point where there are now tens of thousands of them, doing
everything from building highways and airports to providing water, gas, electric,
and solid waste disposal services.77 Authorities are hybrid entities, having
characteristics of both traditional government agencies and private
corporations. 78 The general characteristics of public authorities include:
74 Little, footnote 87 on page 445.
75 Charles Haar, personal interview by author, 8 November 1993.
76 For an excellent review and analysis of the authority mechanism, see Annmarie Hauck
Walsh, The Public's Business (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1978). See also, Robert G.
Smith, Ad Hoc Governments: Special Purpose Transportation Authorities in Britain and
the United States (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974).
77 According to one recent compilation, there are, for example, 2,863 Housing Authorities,
1,166 Environmental Protection Authorities, 869 Economic Development Authorities, 236
Transportation Authorities, and 108 Port Authorities. See Jerry Mitchell, "Policy
Functions and Issues for Public Authorities," in Public Authorities and Public Policy ed.
Jerry Mitchell (New York: Praeger, 1992): 6. As Walsh notes, an authority by any other
name may still be an authority -- "State and local government corporations are generally
labeled public authorities, although they ... are sometimes called agencies, commissions,
districts, corporations, trusts, or boards." 4-5.
78 Walsh,, 4.
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independent sources of funding that are not tied to political processes and
legislative control, e.g., the issuance of tax-exempt bonds that are paid off
through the collection of permit or usage fees; the right to set user rates or permit
fees; personnel hiring and pay systems that are not determined by civil service
requirements, but rather are more closely tied to the methods used by the private
sector; a bureaucratic structure with an appointed Board of Directors at its head
and an executive director at the helm; and the right to own property and the
right to sue and be sued.
The theory of public authorities places great stock in the ability of such
institutions to be more efficient and effective, and less subject to "political"
influences than traditional line agencies in running government programs,
particularly ones involving the implementation of large-scale projects over long
periods of time, requiring stable sources of funding.79 It is the promise of
efficiency, effectiveness, and autonomy, characteristics the MDC did not possess,
that led Garrity and Haar to view the an independent authority as the ultimate
remedy.
The Other Branches Consider the "Ultimate Remedy"
Political support for an independent authority came quickly. On
September 16, 1983, State Senate President William Bulger (D-Boston) created a
special commission to evaluate ways to improve MDC's water and sewer
services, including the creation of an independent agency.80 In early January,
1984, the commission submitted a bill to create an independent water and
79 "The common wisdom for much of this century has been that public authorities ... are
simply too businesslike and efficient to fall prey to the corruption and managerial
disarray that infect less businesslike, less efficient, more 'political' units of traditional
government." Diana Henriques, The Machinery of Greed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1982): 1. Walsh notes that "The corporate form of public authorities
permits jobs and projects to be completed without the clamorous debates, recurring
compromises, and delaying tactics and counterchecks that characterize the rest of
American government." 3-4.
80 Doneski, 564
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sewage authority. 81 At the same time the Senate was considering the options, so
too was the Dukakis administration. Governor Dukakis was concerned about
the Harbor and agreed that something needed to be done to alter the status quo.
Upon evaluation, the administration decided that an independent water and
sewer authority was the way to go. On January 25, 1984, James Hoyte, Secretary
of the EOEA, announced the Governor's plans to submit a bill that would create
such an authority, stating that "[wle have concluded that the current [MDC]
structure just doesn't work ... [an authority will mean] we will be able to run the
system as a self-sustaining business, not as a bureaucracy. "82
These political developments were the direct outgrowth of judicial
intervention. The Quincy litigation, especially the Master's activities, e.g., visits
to the plants, and report, and the procedural order, received widespread media
coverage and generated significant public and political pressure to take action to
improve the area's sewage system and, thereby, help clean up the Harbor.83 No
longer could these problems be ignored. When politicians began exploring the
alternatives for addressing those problems, the authority mechanism was high
on the list, in part, because Garrity's statement upon signing the procedural
order, the pending financial consultant's report, and Haar's behind-the-scenes
efforts had placed it there. As Garrity expected, Haar had been able to take the
"political temperature" or "pulse" of the legislature, and use his connections at the
State House to encourage action on the authority issue.84 Indeed, Haar met
81 Ian Menzies, "Cleaning up the harbor," The Boston Globe 9 January 1984, 11.
82 Jerry Ackerman, "MDC breakup to be urged in Dukakis budget," The Boston Globe 25
January 1984).
83 Haar addressed the impact of the special master's report as follows: "A legal proceeding,
with its attendant public fact-finding, proves to be a good way to put information before
the public. Even if the information is openly available, the court process -- especially if it
includes a special master's report -- provides a mechanism for consolidating a mass of
information from disparate sources and molding it into a coherent story that can catch
the attention of the public and the media. In this case in particular, the special master's
on-site visits to sewage plants with representatives of the press and television drew
widespread attention to the needs of the harbor." Haar, "Boston Harbor: A Case Study,"
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 19, no. 3 (1992): 647.
84 "He [Haar] was really taking the pulse of the legislature. That's what he likes to do. He's
a political junkie. I say that in a very admiring sense. He was trying to figure out what
was possible." Garrity interview.
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many times with legislative as well as executive officials and gave advice on the
drafting of the bill submitted by the legislative commission.85
The decision on the part of the commission and the administration to
propose the creation of a combined sewage and water authority was purely
pragmatic. Although the Quincy litigation focused on MDC sewage division and
its myriad of operational and institutional problems, it was equally clear that the
same types of problems affected the water division, though to differing degrees.
Much needed improvements to the water system were going to be expensive and
require long-term investment and excellent management skills. Thus, it made
sense to move both the sewage and water divisions into a new authority, so they
could both benefit from the improved institutional capacities.
History was another reason the authority mechanism was high on the list
of alternative mechanisms for addressing the problems highlighted by the court.
When Garrity stated that the "ultimate remedy" was a "pay-as-you-go" authority,
few were surprised. It wasn't the first time that this option had been discussed
by Massachusetts' politicians. The creation of an independent sewage authority
had been considered less seriously, on and off, by government officials as far
back as 1972.86 With the litigation serving as a focusing event, however, the
discussion moved from the back burner to the front. The authority concept was
now on the political agenda. 87 For an increasing number of politicians it was an
idea whose time had come.88
85 Menzies, "Cleaning up the harbor."
86 Barrata interview, 7 October 1993. Boston Harbor Associates, Boston Harbor... Who
Cares? (A summary of the June 5, 1975 Boston Harbor Conference held at the Boston
Campus of the University of Massachusetts).
87 Kingdon defines the agenda as "the list of subjects or problems to which government
officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are
paying some serious attention at any given time." John W. Kingdon, Agendas.
Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984): 3.
88 According to Victor Hugo, "Greater than the tread of mighty armies is an idea whose
time has come." Kingdon, 1.
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Bank of Boston Report
The authority approach received a strong boost on February 8, when the
Bank of Boston came out with the report on financial planning required by the
procedural order.89 To provide quality water and sewerage services to the city
and towns within MDC service area, the bank argued that the agency must be
able to raise the funds necessary to hire adequate staff, maintain and operate the
plants, finance long-term capital programs, and have the ability to develop
operating budgets that are responsive to existing and future needs.90 Like the
Senate Commission and the Administration, the bank found the MDC's current
structure seriously inadequate for achieving these goals, stating, in part, that "the
agency lacks the independent control over finances and operations which is
essential for managing the enterprise in an efficient and effective manner."91
Not only did the report disparage MDC as an institution and the means by
which it was financed, it also argued that the institution was beyond repair -- the
problems were too widespread and the modifications that would be required too
far-reaching to achieve political support, e.g., granting a line agency the authority
to independently set rates.92 Furthermore, the report cited structural constraints,
including legal restrictions, that would likely obstruct efforts to modify the MDC.
For example, the limitations on increases in public authority assessments created
by Proposition 2 1/2, could restrict the MDC's ability to generate the revenue
necessary to support needed operation and maintenance costs and capital
89 Bank of Boston, Public Finance Group, Protecting Water Resources: A
Financial Analysis (February 8, 1984).
90 Ibid, 15.
91 Ibid.
92 According to the Bank of Boston report, "[ujnder the existing structure, [MDC]
management is unable to plan expenditures with any certainty or to obtain adequate
human and material resources to support the Agency's activities. Possible solutions
include the creation of a separate dedicated fund solely under Agency control, granting
of authority to independently set rates and exemption from State Civil Service Provisions.
Any or all of these changes, however, represent a radical departure from existing policies
and procedures related to the management of State government. In our judgment,
neither the Legislature nor the Executive Branch would deem it responsible to relinquish
their respective oversight responsibilities for a single line agency. In addition, this could
set a precedent for the management and governance of other line agencies which would
be institutionally unacceptable." Ibid, 30.
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projects.93 Instead, the report recommended the creation of an independent
water and sewage authority. This approach, it was argued, would result in the
long-term system integrity needed to carry out the many extremely expensive
and complex sewer and water projects that would have to be implemented in the
coming years.94
The Administration's Bill and the Senate's Response
The actions of the legislature and the Dukakis administration's plans to
submit its own authority bill, buoyed both Garrity's and Haar's hopes that the
"ultimate remedy" would become a reality. Yet, by the beginning of April little
action had been taken on the commission's bill and the administration had yet to
submit its own. Haar publicly expressed his concern about this state of affairs at
a Boston Citizens Seminar on April 12. In response to Secretary Hoyte's
statement to the same seminar that the administration would be filing its
authority bill soon, Haar responded, with some exasperation, "[mly question is:
where is it?" He added that "I think the plaintiffs will come back to court . .. a
year has passed . . . more steps have to be taken."95
On April 19, Dukakis officially submitted his water and sewage authority
bill to the House of Representatives. 96 It was drafted on a pro-bono basis by the
law firm of Palmer & Dodge, and drew much of its inspiration from the
organizational structures of two other authorities, the Massachusetts Port
Authority (Massport) and the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
(MBTA).97 These two Massachusetts-based authorities were hardly the only ones
the administration could have used as examples. Authorities are extremely
93 Ibid, 15, 31.
94 For an extended and more critical review of the Bank of Boston report, see Greg D.
Peterson, "After the Deluge: A Critical Evaluation of the Governance Structures of the
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority," in Haar, Of Judges. Politics and Flounder
77-83.
95 Ibid.
96 Norman Lockman, "Dukakis proposes sewer authority as new MDC unit," The Boston
Globe, 20 April 1984.
Peterson, 93-114.
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common in the state. A 1989 article indicated that there were an estimated 506 of
them.98 While various observers have expressed concerns about the sweeping
powers of this, so-called, "shadow government" or "fourth branch of
government," as is indicated by the numbers, Massachusetts government has not
been shy about going the authority route.99
With the introduction of the administration bill, legislative activity picked
up and, as a result, Quincy did not go back to court. Instead, the plaintiffs and
the court waited to see what the legislature would do. That Spring there were
clear signs that the harbor issue had moved higher on the legislative agenda. For
example, the Senate Ways and Means Committee's proposed fiscal 1985 budget
recommended only a half-year's budget for the MDC's sewer and water
divisions, and also included $250,000 for the MDC to be used by the agency as
planning and startup costs for a new authority. According to Committee
Chairman, Chet Atkins, this was a clear indication that the Senate leadership
expects to have the new authority in operation by January 1, 1985.100 On June 19,
Dukakis told a packed hearing before the Joint Committee on Urban Affairs, that
"[w]e are now faced with the reality of a harbor that is outrageously polluted.
The sense of urgency is very high. We've got to act soon and we've got to act
decisively." 101
98 John Strahinich and J. William Semich, "Inside the Shadow Government," Boston
Magazine. (November 1989): 131. Other authorities include the Massachusetts
Convention Center Authority, State College Building Authority, Massachusetts State
Lottery Commission, an the Boston Water and Sewer Commission. The 506 number is
subject to question. According to a 1990 survey by Mitchell, Massachusetts doesn't even
make it onto the list of the fifteen states with the most public authorities, and the last state
on that list, Wisconsin, has only 100 such entities. The divergences are probably due to
different assumptions as to what constitutes an state or local authority. Whatever the
number actually is, there is no disputing that Massachusetts has quite a few authorities.
Jerry Mitchell, "The Policy Activities of Public Authorities," Policy Studies Journal, Vol.
18, No. 4 (Summer 1990): 931.
99 See, for example, Massachusetts, Senate Ways and Means Committee, State Authorities:
The Fourth Branch of Government? (1985); Donald Axelrod, Shadow Government (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1992): 9.
100 The Boston Globe "Sewers on the legislative agenda," 15 June 1984.
101 Blake, "Dukakis pushes bill for a sewer authority," The Boston Globe 20 June 1984). At
the hearing, Dukakis held aloft a jar of water from the harbor, stating that "[tihis is not a
urine sample, but it comes awfully close."
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A few weeks after Dukakis's impassioned speech, consideration of the
various bills was put on hold as the Legislature went into recess until after the
September primaries. 102 While the legislature was out, the Dukakis
administration continued to lobby for the creation of a water and sewage
authority. 103 Once the legislature reconvened, Bulger submitted his own
authority bill, but unlike the Dukakis bill, Bulger's would create a sewage
authority, leaving the water division at MDC. 104 Bulger's rationale for only
splitting off the sewage division was political. The drinking water for cities and
towns serviced by the MDC is piped in from the Quabbin Reservoir in the
western part of the state. 105 The area around the Quabbin is used for recreation
and Western legislator's were concerned about removing it from public control.
Those same legislators were also concerned about the potential that the new
authority might have the power to draw down the Quabbin and divert the
Connecticut River. 106 Bulger felt that by leaving the water division where it was,
the bill would be more "politically palatable," increasing its chances of passing.107
In a partial test of Bulger's theory, his bill passed the Senate on October 4.108
The Court Raises the Stakes
Despite a growing number of bills and increased legislative activity, Haar
and Garrity were concerned about what they perceived to be the slow rate of
movement towards the ultimate remedy. As they saw it, the court had given the
politicians a year to build a consensus and pull the various constituencies
together, but the legislature still had yet to pass a bill for the Governor to sign.
At the October 9th Compliance hearing, therefore, Garrity decided to accept
Haar's recommendation that the court exert some pressure on the legislature to
102 Blake, "Time is with Dukakis in push for programs," The Boston Globe 15 July 1984).
103 Ibid.
104 The Boston Globe "Sen. Bulger's sewer coup," 10 October 1984, 20.
105 For an excellent review of the water side of the MDC's operations, and its fascinating
history, see Nesson.
106 Seward, 8. Neil O'Brien, Director of Research, House Committee on Natural Resources,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, telephone interview by author, 8 October 1993.
107 Peterson, 58; and Foreman and Blake, "MDC harbor receivership eyed."
108 Peterson, 58.
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act.109 Specifically, Garrity stated that if the legislature had failed to pass a
sewage authority or a combined sewage and water authority bill by November
15, he would consider issuing a moratorium on sewer hookups and placing the
MDC in receivership. 110 Clearly, Garrity preferred that the legislature act, but his
past experience steeled him against letting inaction go on too long:
"It's a shame that the court has to get involved in situations that are the
functions of government. But I probably made a terrible mistake in
waiting four years with the Boston Housing Authority before I took it
over. We have to make a fresh start, and it has to be made in the next
month or so. This case is my highest priority, and I won't leave it."111
It is important to note that in attempting to hasten the creation of a sewage
authority, Garrity was not bucking the political tide. Ever since the Quincy suit
raised the MDC's and the Harbor's problems to a high place on the public
agenda, a political consensus in support of a sewage authority had been building.
By the Fall of 1984, that consensus was both broad and deep. It included the
administration, with the head of the MDC actively urging the diminution of his
own agency, and a majority of legislators on Beacon Hill.112
Some argued that this desire to create a new authority was a symptom of
a larger political disease. It would be just another example of Massachusetts
government failing to face up to its responsibilities and, instead, passing a
problem to the "fourth branch of government."1 13 As Robert Turner, a Boston
Globe columnist remarked at the time, "[o]nce again the politicians are trying to
give some faceless 'authority' with little accountability a job they should be doing
themselves."114 Despite the argument that administration and the legislature
109 Seward, 8.
110 Foreman and Blake, "MDC harbor receivership eyed."
111 Ibid.
112 Jerry Ackerman, "MDC says it's overwhelmed by harbor cleanup," The Boston Globe 31
October 1984).
113 Steve Angelo, one of the 11 house members who voted against the MWRA bill, personal
interview by author, August 1993.
114 Robert L. Turner, "Legislature again passing the buck?" The Boston Globe 12 December
1984).
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should have worked harder to modify the MDC rather than "re-organize" above
it, there were two powerful arguments against modification that, in turn,
cemented the political consensus on the need for an authority.
As the Bank of Boston report made clear, the authority mechanism was
likely to be an effective and efficient means of overcoming the institutional and
financial problems of the MDC and implementing necessary short- and long-
term cleanup efforts. Indeed, there were numerous examples here in
Massachusetts and throughout the country of successful authorities delivering a
variety of public services. Thus, the politicians supporting the authority concept
could claim, with some conviction, that their solution was not one of shrinking
from responsibility but rather a sound and responsible reaction to a serious
problem. It made no difference that the problem was largely of the politician's
making. The issue was "what do we do know?"
However much politicians wanted to paint their support of the authority
concept as being primarily based on the institution's virtues, there was another,
less discussed, but more persuasive reason why such support ran high -- they
didn't want to be held directly accountable by the voters for the huge increases in
sewer rates that would undoubtedly be necessary to bring the MDC's sewage
system into compliance with state and federal law.115 Everyone knew that the
costs of compliance would be enormous, whether or not the waiver was
ultimately denied. 116
Although there were hopes that a significant percentage of the cost would
be borne by the federal government, the most recent amendments to the CWA
had slashed the federal share to 55% and there were strong signs that the next
round of amendments would see that share go lower or disappear altogether.117
115 O'Brien interview.
116 For example, at the same time the Dukakis administration announced its plans to create a
sewage and water authority, MDC Sewer Division Director, Noel Barrata stated that
necessary improvements to the MDC sewage system would cost between $1.2 and $1.6
billion dollars (1983), and could reach $2 billion accounting for inflation. Ackerman,
"MDC breakup to be urged in Dukakis budget."
117 Kovalic, 24-30; and Deegan, 772-773.
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This meant that much, if not all of the costs would have to be paid by state and
local government and, ultimately be reflected in sewer rates.118 If the MDC were
modified so that it could be properly funded, yet remained under the control of
the administration and the legislature, the politicians would be perceived by the
voters as being responsible for rising rates. Given the huge rate hikes that were
anticipated, such perceptions might be enough to drive politicians out of office.
By creating an authority, the politicians could displace the voters' wrath.119 After
all, it would be the authority, not the politicians who were raising rates. Specious
though this argument is, it was likely to be effective.
Politicians, of course, weren't the only supporters of the sewage authority
concept by this time. Added to the ranks were the City of Quincy, many
environmental and citizens groups,120 and area media, including The Boston Globe
. With such widespread support for a sewage authority, why hadn't an authority
bill already been passed by the legislature and signed into law by the Governor?
The reason hinges on the difference between a concept and its operationalization.
While virtually no voices argued against the need for an independent sewage
authority, there was significant disagreement over how the authority should
actually be structured. Issues that needed resolution before any bill could make
it out of the legislature included specifics on the composition of the Board of
Directors and, thus the balance of power at the Authority, the exact method of
funding and how the costs would be allocated among users, management rights,
the extent of police powers. Further complicating the debate was the question of
water -- should the authority take over the sewer division's responsibilities or
both the sewage and the water divisions'? Many of those who supported the
creation of an independent sewage authority also wanted to include water; But
some didn't, especially western legislators concerned about control over their
region's water supply.
118 In early 1984, Barrata estimated that with a 55 percent federal share, sewer rates would
need to rise five time there present level. Without federal assistance the rise would be
nine times their current level. Ackerman, "MDC breakup to be urged in Dukakis
budget,"
119 O'Brien interview.
120 This list included the Environmental Lobby, the New England Chapter of the Sierra Club,
the CLF, and the Massachusetts Taxpayers Association. Peterson, 83-86. Blake, "Dukakis
pushes bill for a sewer authority."
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The Stakes are Raised Again
The November 15th deadline came and went without any appreciable
action having been taken. Haar recommended that the court give the legislature
five more working days to pass an authority bill, and if they failed to act,
receivership proceedings should commence, Haar said.
Judge Garrity cannot afford to wait any longer. "The long-promised
deadline for action has arrived.... The administration and the legislature
have had ample time to study the . . . legislation, to air their differences
and to negotiate an acceptable compromise. I can assure you that Judge
Garrity, however reluctant, is prepared to act.121
On this point, Haar was right.122 Calling the harbor "unsafe, unsanitary,
indecent, in violation of the law and a danger to the health and welfare of the
people," Garrity issued another ultimatum. 123 The parties to the suit were to
report back to him on legislative progress on November 29, at 2 p.m.. If the
legislature had failed to create a sewage authority or a combined water and
sewage authority by that time, or if "there is no hope" of a bill passing, Garrity
would begin a receivership trial.124 While reiterating his reluctance to place the
MDC in receivership, noting that is an "inappropriate remedy ... [t]he only way
is to go through the political branches," Garrity made it clear that he was willing
to go this route if no action was forthcoming. 125
Garrity wasn't the only one who wanted to avoid receivership. A
spokesman for the Dukakis administration stated that "[r]eceivership is
something we want to avoid at all costs ... .we are confident that because of the
121 Ackerman, "Legislature faces deadline for harbor cleanup vote," The Boston Globe 15
November 1984,27.
122 When Haar made these statements at Boston Citizen Seminar, he knew Garrity would act
because Garrity had approved Haar's remarks in advance. Ackerman, "Legislature faces
deadline for harbor cleanup vote."
123 Foreman, "Receivership threat for harbor cleanup," The Boston Globe 16 November
1984).
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
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progress, and the commitment of House Speaker Thomas McGee and Senate
President William M. Bulger to take legislative action ... receivership will not be
the ultimate outcome." 126 Similarly, Representative John F. Cusack (D-
Arlington), an author of one of the pending bills, stated that "We are extremely
close to working out a version of the water and sewer bill. It will absolutely not
come to [receivership]." 127
Garrity's deadline didn't leave much time. Although the Senate had
passed its bill, the House had yet to act, and then there would have to be a
House-Senate conference to hammer out the likely differences between the
House and Senate bills. Nevertheless, the House was close, though not
"extremely close," to working out a bill of its own.128 Any thoughts of meeting
the November 29 deadline vanished on November 28, when the Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, Representative Michael Creedon (D-
Brockton), postponed committee action on a new authority, stating that "I have a
belief about court orders, I ignore them."129 In addition to disliking court orders,
Creedon decided to postpone action because of his concerns about the authority's
potential control over the development in the Quabbin region. Creedon's
decision to postpone action, however, was not supported by the majority of
representatives who believed that the House should have already passed a bill.
According to Representative Steven Pierce (R-Westfield), "we should have the
bill out here now. Creedon is way off base on this one."130 John Flood (D-
Canton), added that "[w]e have to address this question, regardless of Judge
Garrity. It is absolutely of paramount importance that we stop fouling the
harbor."131
126 John DeVillars, Dukakis's Chief of Operations, quoted in Foreman, "Receivership threat
for harbor cleanup."
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Laurence Collins, "The Politics behind the stalled bill," The Boston Globe 30 November
1984.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
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The Moratorium
Garrity didn't ignore the deadline. He was visibly angered by the
legislature's inaction, and on the 29th he issued an injunction imposing a
moratorium on all commercial sewer hookups and scheduled the receivership
trial to begin the next week.132 The court's rationale behind halting sewer
hookups, is that each one will just increase the amount of illegal pollution.
Garrity re-iterated the court's preference to avoid receivership, stating that he
would "back off with pleasure" once the legislature acts. But he warned that if
forced to appoint a receiver he would not relinquish the court's control of the
cleanup for several years. 133 Garrity's move mobilized the business community,
as he hoped it would. 134 The President of the Greater Boston Chamber of
Commerce estimated that the moratorium could affect $2.3 billion of construction
in Boston alone.135 As Shelley recalls, the developers "swarmed Beacon Hill,"
generating pressure on the legislature to pass a bill so the Judge would lift the
moratorium.136
The moratorium was short-lived. The AG appealed it and, on December
5, Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Joseph R. Noland, overturned it without
comment.137 Shortly after Noland's decision, however, the House voted 92-52 to
postpone a scheduled debate on the authority bill. According to Representative
Cusack, the Supreme Court decision "took the pressure off the legislators." 138 But
the showdown was far from over. A couple of hours after Noland's decision,
EPA Region 1, Administrator, Michael Deland, announced that, come January,
his agency was going to sue the MDC, in U.S. District Court in order to place the
132 Foreman, "Court bans tie-ins to MDC Sewers, sets receivership trial," The Boston Globe
30 November 1984). Lynda Gorov and Jan Wong, "Businessman call the decision a ploy
and say it could cripple development," The Boston Globe 1 December 1984, 1-2.
133 Foreman, "Court bans tie-ins to MDC Sewers, sets receivership trial."
134 Haar interview.
135 Ibid.
136 Quoted in Rolbein, 207.
137 Foreman, "Sewer tie-in ban is lifted," The Boston Globe 6 December 1984; and Collins,
"Attorney general's office to ask court to lift ban on MDC sewer hookup," The Boston
Globe 1 December 1984, 1-2.
138 Foreman, "Sewer tie-in ban is lifted."
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harbor cleanup under federal supervision. Deland added that, if the legislature
hadn't acted to create a sewer authority by then, he would ask the District Court
judge to impose a moratorium on hookups, labeling that "an entirely appropriate
remedy."139
The Receivership Trial and the Photograph
Garrity was undaunted by the Supreme Court's decision and happy to
have EPA's support. On December 6, Garrity moved forward with the
receivership trial and, on December 7, he threatened a new ban on commercial
sewer hookups.140 Two days later, Garrity posed for an exceptionally unusual
photograph that had him standing in his judicial robes, arms-crossed, wearing a
serious countenance, with the Harbor and the Boston skyline at his back.141 The
photograph first ran in the Washington Post, on Sunday, December 9, then was
reprinted, with accompanying articles in The Boston Globe on Tuesday and
Thursday of that week.142 This very public stance, literally, reflected a relatively
recent change in Garrity's involvement in the case.
Ever since he decided to turn up the heat on the legislature in October,
Garrity had been making numerous public statements to the media about his
feelings on the legislature's progress, or lack thereof. The photograph was just
another public statement, albeit pictorial rather than verbal. This change in
behavior was a break from Garrity's earlier decision to let Haar be the court's
point man outside of the courtroom. It was, nevertheless, a natural outgrowth of
Garrity's judicial philosophy:
139 Ibid.
140 Foreman, "Garrity vows a new ban on tie-ins to sewer system," The Boston Globe 8
December 1984.
141 "The Subject is Boston Harbor," picture on the front page of The Boston Globe, 11
December 1984).
142 Peter Mancusi, "Objection, Your Honor, say some," The Boston Globe 13 December
1984).
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It's absolutely essential to win the hearts and minds of the local media,
both print and electronic, in order to deal effectively with the
organizations that are involved in a particular case. A front-page horror
story will position a judge in his or her reaction to the parties in that
particular case on that particular day.143
The receivership trial, the threatened moratorium, EPA's response, and the
public reaction to Garrity's public statements and actions (e.g., the photograph)
all combined to place extreme pressure on the legislature. The House resumed
debate on December 10, and Garrity stayed the moratorium for "24 to 48" hours
to give the legislature time to act, and he asked Haar to stay on Beacon Hill to
answer legislator's questions. As would be expected with such a complex and
important bill, amendments were being offered left and right -- more than 50 in
total.144 It took two days to debate the proposed changes, and on December 12,
the House passed its water and sewer authority bill by a vote of 133-12.145
As the House was passing its bill, Garrity stepped up his highly visible
efforts to generate public support for the authority bills wending their way
through the legislative process. On the day of the House vote, he led reporters
on a tour of Deer Island, greeting the plant's supervisor with a jocular "Hi, I'm
the sludge judge, thanks for laying this on."146 That night, Garrity appeared on a
local T.V. news show alongside Representative Creedon to discuss the case. He
told the anchor what everybody already knew, that he was planning to leave the
bench at the conclusion of the case.
The Final Threat
The House-Senate conference committee began hammering out a
compromise bill immediately after the House action. The biggest point of
143 Robert C. Wood, ed., Remedial Law (Amherst, MA: The University of Massachusetts
Press, 1990):, 74.
144 Blake, "House begins debate on sewer authority bill," The Boston Globe 11 December
1984).
145 Collins, "House approves sewer authority," The Boston Globe 13 December 1984.
146 Mancusi, "Objection, Your Honor, say some."
134
Chapter IV
Dolin, Remedial Adjudication
disagreement centered on whether the authority would have both sewage and
water responsibilities. Senate President Bulger, who, in an unusual move,
appointed himself to the committee, argued for keeping the water division in the
MDC. "I agree reluctantly that an authority is necessary but it should be limited
to what has to be done right now," Bulger said. "There is no question that water
is a serious concern but the question is do we have to do it now?"147 House
members speaking before the committee disagreed, arguing, among other things,
that "if we just do sewers" the bill won't pass, that "we are fast approaching the
same problems with water as we now have with sewers," and, furthermore, it
would be difficult to expand a sewer authority to include water at a later date.148
Before the conference committee could iron out its differences, the House
Speaker announced plans to recess for Christmas, leaving the fate of the bill
undecided. 149 Garrity immediately responded by upping the ante. If the
legislature didn't have an authority bill on the Governor's desk for signature by
December 20, Garrity would place the MDC in receivership. 150 In making this
ultimatum, Garrity stated that:
I am not frustrated but I am concerned as a citizen that the harbor has
become more polluted during these proceedings. The sad part is that the
focus has been on what occurs politically and not on the continued
pollution of the harbor. I'm not in a confrontation with them [the
Legislature]. They have to do their legislative thing and I have to do my
judicial thing.151
147 Blake, "House-Senate panel agrees on state water authority," The Boston Globe 14
December 1984.
148 The comments of Representatives Peter C. Webber (R-Pittsfield), William G. Robinson (R-
Melrose), and John Cusack (D-Arlington), cited in Blake, "House-Senate panel agrees on
state water authority."
149 Blake, "Ultimatum given on harbor bill," The Boston Globe 15 December 1984.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
135
Chapter IV
Dolin, Remedial Adjudication
Resolution
Of course Garrity's distinction is more apparent than real. He was in
confrontation with the legislature, using the Court's powers, e.g., threatening
sanctions, to prod that branch into action. Garrity's strategy worked. While the
House went into recess, the committee continued meeting. On December 17, a
compromise was reached that would create a combined water and sewage
authority.152 House arguments in favor of combination won the day. Two days
later the House reconvened, voting 120-11 to pass the measure. The Senate
followed suit with a vote of 29-1.153 Upon witnessing the votes, Garrity said "it
may be a bit injudicious but ... whoopee!"154 Calling it "one of the most far-
reaching and important pieces of environmental legislation in this state in the last
century," Dukakis signed it into law on December 19, creating the MWRA. 155 At
the same time, he noted, this is only a "first step, just a beginning in the larger
effort to clean up the harbor."156
MWRA was structured like many other authorities. Unlike MDC, MWRA
has the ability to raise money by issuing tax-exempt municipal bonds, which are
paid off through the collection of sewage and water payments from user
communities; the right to set rates; personnel hiring and pay systems that are not
determined by state civil service requirements; and an organizational structure
with a board of directors at the top and an executive director who handles day-
to-day operations.
The Judge Steps Down
Garrity had vowed to stay with case until it was resolved, one way or
another -- with the creation of a new authority or placing MDC in receivership.
Now that the ultimate remedy was in place, Garrity stepped down from the
152 Blake, "Panel OK's harbor bill; voting due tomorrow," The Boston Globe 18 December
1984, 1, 10.
153 Blake, "Harbor bill OK'd, signed into law," The Boston Globe 20 December 1984, 1, 18.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
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bench. 157 In his last act as judge, he ordered court supervision of efforts to
address the areas sewage problems and appointed Haar as court monitor.158
Although this arrangement was to continue for three years, there were already
clear indications that the cleanup of Boston Harbor was likely to become a
concern of the federal District Court. CLF was intent on having District Court
Judge Mazzone lift the stay on their lawsuit, and EPA was planning a federal
lawsuit of its own. And on the day state court supervision was put into place,
Koff noted that while the creation of the authority "has been a substantial step
forward," Quincy intended to join in the efforts to have the issue moved to
federal court.159 The outcome of these efforts is taken up in the next chapter.
The State Case, Legitimacy, Capacity, and Effectiveness
There are three parts to the state case. The first part covers the court's
actions up through the signing of the voluntary procedural order. The second
part details the implementation of the procedural order, while the third part
deals with the court's efforts to realize the "ultimate remedy." Each part of the
case offers different insights into the issues of legitimacy, capacity, and
effectiveness. The following sections use the specifics of the case to cover each of
these issues in turn.
Legitimacy of Remedy Formulation and Implementation
Garrity has argued that "[t]he sine qua non for a judge is not to be political
but to be a good politician, and you have to walk that fine line between blowing
your legitimacy as a judge and being political enough to affect the environment
in which the organization exists."160 In this case there are a number of instances
in which Garrity stepped over the line, both during the process leading up the
157 Ackerman, "Garrity, in last move as judge, orders 3-year harbor supervision," The Boston
Globe (December 22, 1984).
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 Wood, 72.
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creation of the procedural order and in the court's efforts to realize the ultimate
remedy.
Upon determining that state law was violated, Garrity decided that it was
up to the court, through the offices of the special master, to formulate a remedy.
To evaluate the legitimacy of this approach it is necessary to first determine
whether Garrity's justification for assuming the remedial role was persuasive.
The alternative to the court to proceeding with remedy formulation was to put
off direct court involvement and defer to the state defendants to allow them to
proceed with their voluntary efforts to come up with a plan to improve the
sewage system.
There were arguments in favor of deferring to the state defendants. The
litigation raised the issue of sewage treatment higher on the political agenda and
led to the creation of a Governor's commission which held out the potential
promise of addressing the region's sewage problems. Furthermore, if such
deference had been successful it would have eliminated concerns about judicial
legitimacy and the court overstepping its bounds, for the court would have
disengaged itself from the remedial process by leaving all remedial decisions in
the hands of the MDC, the larger executive branch of which it was a part, and the
legislature who held the purse strings -- in other words, the politically
responsible entities.
There were, however, reasons to favor court intervention in remedy
formulation. In arguing that voluntary efforts were unlikely to be successful in
the foreseeable future, Garrity pointed to a long history of failed efforts and/or
inability on the part of the "political branches" to take action to address the
violations of state law resulting from the discharge of sewage that was not
receiving adequate primary treatment. And while the appointment of a special
commission to look into the problem was a positive sign, Garrity had good
reason, in light of history, to be skeptical of its ability to move beyond rhetoric to
action. Given this, Garrity's justification for taking over the task of remedy
formulation was, on balance, persuasive and, therefore, this action was
legitimate.
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While the court acted legitimately in assuming the remedial role, the
remedies proposed by the master and supported by Garrity represented an abuse
of judicial discretion and, therefore, in devising them the court acted
illegitimately. To see why it is necessary to reflect on nature of the remedial task
presented to the court. Chapter two indicated the broad discretion statutes
afford the courts in fashioning the terms of injunctive relief so that violating
institutions are brought into compliance. In this case, however, that discretion
was somewhat constrained by the fact that the court was faced with the task of
determining appropriate preliminary injunctive relief. Rather than establish final
remedies that would lead the MDC into compliance, under the terms of
preliminary relief the court was charged with devising measures that would
maintain the status-quo until a trial on the merits was completed.
It is clear from both Garrity and Haar's statements and actions that they
viewed their task as being much broader. State defendants had good reason to
believe that the master's remedies would go beyond what is called for in a
preliminary injunction. Garrity had instructed Haar to come up with a
"comprehensive order," and the tenor of the master's report as well as the
proposed remedies were anything but preliminary in nature. They were the first
steps in what promised to be a long-term, remedial regime. It is clear, as well,
from Garrity's comments about the likelihood that a remedial order in the form
of the master's remedies would be overturned on appeal, that the knew those
remedies exceeded the bounds of a preliminary injunction.
In shifting the focus to the later stages of the case, there are number of the
actions taken by the court on the path to getting the ultimate remedy in place that
are either illegitimate or of questionable legitimacy. One example of the former
has to do with Garrity's announcement of the ultimate remedy. By making that
announcement Garrity stepped out of the role of an impartial judge, applying the
law, and, in effect, became a biased political actor arguing in favor of his
preferred solution to the problem. Nothing in the laws that had been violated
indicated that the establishment of an authority was either the only or the most
appropriate remedy. What was necessary to remedy those violations was the
upgrading the MDC's sewage treatment facilities. While such upgrades
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obviously would require significant amounts of money and improved staffing at
the MDC, creating an authority was not the only option for getting those funds
and staff. Indeed, the purpose of the Bank of Boston Report was to explore the
various options available, including not only the authority route but also, for
example, modifying the MDC's structure and the way the legislature funded it.161
It makes no difference that Garrity and Haar "knew" that the authority was the
only way to go, that was not a decision for the court to make. Instead, it is the
kind of remedial decision that should be made by the responsible political
entities, in this case the executive and legislative branches.
Garrity's use of Haar as point man for the court in the political arena was
of questionable legitimacy. According to Fiss,
The special master . . . can . . . be used as an intermediate structure,
standing, if you will, . . . between the judge and the body politic.. . . The
special master is the judges appointee, but the hope is that once the
authority is infused, the judge will be able to stand in the background,
return to his position of independence, judging rather than wheeling-and-
dealing. 162
From the point of announcing the ultimate remedy up through the
issuance of his first threat to the legislature in October, 1984, Garrity did indeed
stand in the background and left the political wheeling-and-dealing to Haar. But
one can question whether the use of a master in this way really protects the
judge's independence and impartiality. Everyone knew that Haar was acting as
an advocate for the judge's position, therefore it becomes debatable as to whether
one can view Haar's highly political actions as having no bearing on the position
of the court. It may be that such use of a master preserves the appearance of
judicial independence and impartiality, but in reality it brings the court squarely
into the political fray.
161 Peterson, 77-83.
162 Fiss, "Foreword: The Forms of Justice," 56.
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Garrity's action in the Fall and Winter of 1984 provide the most significant
examples of illegitimate behavior. While Garrity stayed in the background
during much of the case, letting Haar serve as the court's advocate for
institutional change, as soon as the court began applying more pressure in late
1984, Garrity came out of the courtroom and into the public eye with increasing
frequency. It is during this period that he posed for a Washington Post
photographer at the edge of the harbor and often spoke to the media about the
case. These efforts to galvanize public opinion and pressure the legislature into
taking action violated the judicial cannon of legitimacy that states that judges are
not supposed to publicly comment on pending cases. Beyond that, such actions
also, once again, positioned the court, and specifically the judge, in the role of
political actor as opposed to impartial arbiter of the law.
The illegitimacy of Garrity's public actions is confirmed by the reactions of
members of the legal community. Many area lawyers were "stunned" by the
photograph, finding it an inappropriate judicial action.163 As for Garrity's media
campaign, one lawyer commented "I have a problem with a judge who is using
publicity to put pressure on the Legislature to act. You're not supposed to use
publicity to determine what happens in the courtroom."164 Indeed, even Haar
felt that Garrity had "overstepped judicial bounds" in taking the public actions he
did.165
Most telling, however, are Garrity's own reflections on his behavior:
My being ready to step down affected my decision to go to the people. I
was interviewed a lot on television. I figured, what I'm doing now
ultimately the Supreme Judicial Court is going to have my head if I'm still
a judge, but I'm not going to be a judge anymore. I planned to get off by
the end of the year or as soon as the legislation was adopted. I did a lot of
reasonably risky things that I never would have done had I had an interest
in staying on the court. Because you're not supposed to talk about a
163 Mancusi, "Objection, Your Honor, say some."
164 Ibid.
165 Haar interview.
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pending case with the media if you're a sitting judge and that was a
pending case. Once I left the bench the SJC had no interest in going after
me, especially because of the results.166
Another instance of the court acting illegitimately concerns the
moratorium. The fact that the moratorium was overturned on appeal is prima
facie evidence that it was an illegitimate action. In ordering such an action, the
SJC determined that Garrity had abused his judicial discretion. Despite the
rebuke of the SJC, Garrity threatened to impose another, arguably illegal
moratorium. While Garrity didn't carry through on his threat, the fact that he
made it raises additional questions about the legitimacy of his behavior. Indeed,
the legitimacy of Garrity's second moratorium threat can be questioned in light
of his desire to step down from the bench as soon as possible. The threat appears
to have been borne as much by personal considerations as it was by legal
considerations of what type of judicial response was legitimate in light of the
circumstances.
The issue of legitimacy also comes up in relation to Garrity's threats to
impose receivership if the legislature didn't get a bill to the Governor to sign by a
certain date. Of course it is within a courts' power to place a public institution
into receivership. And the legitimacy of actually placing the MDC into
receivership was never tested because Garrity didn't need to follow through on
his threat. Nevertheless, here, as was the case with the moratorium threat, it
appears that Garrity's actions were motivated more by personal than legal
considerations.
The Perceptions of the Parties
With respect to the court's actions prior to the signing of the procedural
order, Quincy felt they were legitimate, while the state defendants did not. This
is why the former supported the court's assumption of the remedial role and the
142
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adoption of the master's remedies as an enforceable order, and the latter opposed
those actions. None of the parties, however, perceived the adoption of the
"voluntary" order as being an illegitimate judicial action. Indeed, all the parties
supported that outcome.
As for the court's behavior following the signing of the procedural order,
the Dukakis administration viewed the courts actions in two ways. With respect
to the moratorium the administration felt it was illegitimate for the court to use
that as a means to forcing the legislature to take action. That is why the
administration sued to have it overturned. As the Assistant Attorney General on
the case said, "we felt that the "judge was engaging in lawless behavior to reach
a particular end."167 At the same time, however, the administration viewed the
court as a strategic ally in the fight to get an authority bill passed. Thus to the
extent that the court could pressure the legislature to pass an authority bill by
going public, and threatening to take action, it aided the administration's cause,
giving the latter little incentive to decry those aspects of judicial behavior. That is
why the lawyer for the commonwealth could add, that "we were generally
satisfied with the course of events and the creation of the authority, but
dissatisfied with some of the particulars including the moratorium."
While Quincy had not originally argued for the creation of a new
authority, by the time the court began its active campaign of coercion in the Fall,
the city supported that end.168  If the city had any misgivings about the
legitimacy of the court's actions it didn't voice them. As for the legislators, there
was little outcry over the court's behavior. 169 By the time the court began to
pressure the legislature to pass a bill, there was widespread consensus that
sewage authority had to be created, the remaining debate was over how to
167 Michael Sloman, former Assistant Attorney General, Massachusetts, telephone interview
with author, 16 November 1994.
168 Koff interview, 12 November 1993.
169 One exception is the comment by House Speaker, Thomas McGee, who after the
authority bill was signed criticized Garrity, saying "I don't know if he's going to come up
here in his robes to tell us what to do, but I think he's a lunatic." After meeting Garrity,
for the first time, shortly after making his lunatic comment, McGee said "well, I guess you
don't look as though you ought to be locked up." Blake, "Harbor bill OK'd, signed into
law."
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structure it and whether to give the authority control over water supplies as well.
According to a House Staffer, "none of the legislators jumped up on a soap box
and said we can't create an authority, the question was how do we do it?"170 The
legislators reacted to the court's pressure tactics, not by digging in their heels and
opposing the court's actions, but by working harder to resolve their differences
over the nature of the authority and passing a bill for the Governor to sign.
Capacity and Remedy Formulation
The issue of judicial capacity and remedy formulation can be explored by
evaluating Garrity's use of the special master mechanism. Special masters have
long been used in a variety of ways in the judicial process. They have served as,
among other things, factfinders with respect to the existence of legal violations
and their causes, proposers of remedial relief, and monitors of the remedial
implementation process. 171 Garrity looked to Haar to determine the causes of the
violations the judge had identified and to prepare a "comprehensive" set of
remedial measures. Assessing how well Haar performed these tasks is made
difficult by the fact that Garrity didn't clearly identify exactly what violations had
taken place with respect to Quincy's main allegation concerning the MDC's
failure to comply with the terms of its permit. Nevertheless, assuming, as did
Haar, that the his task was limited to figuring out the causes of and remedies for
the continued discharges of raw and/or partially treated sewage, one can assess
the job that the special master performed. Upon doing so it becomes clear that
the special master in this case was an effective means of leveraging the courts
capacity to make informed remedial decisions.
The first question to ask is if the master was able to gather the best
available information on the causes of the violations and potential remedies. The
170 O'Neil interview, 11 November 1994.
171 Francis E. McGovern, "Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation,
University of Chicago Law Review 53 (1986): 441-493; Wayne D. Brazil, Geoffrey C.
Hazard, and Paul R. Rice, Managing Complex Litigation (Chicago, IL: American Bar
Foundation, 1983): and Lawrence Susskind, "Special Masters as Mediators," Negotitaion
Journal 1, no. 3 (1985): 295-300.
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answer is clearly yes. As to determining the causes of the violations, the master's
task was made relatively easy by virtue of the resources available to him. Prior
to the initiation of the Quincy suit, tens, if not hundreds of major reports had
been completed by EPA, MDC, and others documenting the harbor's pollution
problems and causes. 172 The Master had access to all of these materials. Not
only was the master able to draw from a voluminous written record, he also had
access, as a result of affidavits, direct testimony, and ex-parte discussions, to
those individuals, e.g., regulators and MDC personnel, who had the greatest
understanding of the sewage system and its problems. In using this written and
oral record, the master avoided the potential weaknesses of relying on the
"filtered" knowledge of outside experts who had only a theoretical, as opposed to
a practical, understanding of the situation.
Access to all this information alone is not the only factor that made the
master's task relatively easy. There might have been great disagreements among
the experts as to the causes of the violations. If that had been the case, the master
would have been placed in the potentially difficult position of having to decide
among competing claims. As it was, however, there were no such
disagreements. Indeed, the written and oral record evinced a near unanimity on
the nature of the problems besetting the MDC. All the major parties knew that
the sewage systems were in great disrepair, that staffing and funding was too
low to properly maintain adequate primary treatment levels, and that pollution
was negatively impacting the harbor. That is why nobody blinked when this
information was presented in the master's report. Thus, rather than having to
develop findings from scratch, a research task that, of course, would have been
impossible given time constraints, the Master had them supplied to him in
abundance. What the Master did, and did so well, was pull the relevant data
from these many sources and present it in a coherent manner, a task that was
made easier because of the skilled team Haar had assembled. The master's role
was more synthesizer and collator rather than creator of information.
172 Dolin, Dirty Water /Clean Water.
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A similar story can be told for the proposed remedies. For the most part,
the steps required to remedy the legal violations uncovered were not a mystery.
The reports, affidavits, administrative orders, and testimony supplied to the
Master not only provided data on the causes of those violations, they also
discussed appropriate remedies. And, just as was the case with the findings of
fact, there was significant agreement among the various parties on what
remedies were required. The master used these sources of information, in turn,
as the basis for his remedies and, as a result, served to justify the reasonableness
of his remedial choices. He considered the various remedies available and chose
those that it was generally agreed would likely begin the process of leading the
MDC into compliance. The Master's role was, once again, more synthesizer and
collator than creator. That is why the master's remedies were perceived as
reasonable by the various parties to the case -- they had been established goals
for years. 173 Both on their own, and at the urging of the EPA, the MDC had, for
instance, been planning for a long time to upgrade Nut and Deer Island and
reduce infiltration and inflow. Similarly, the MDC had been asking the governor
and the legislature for adequate funding and staff for over a decade to no avail.
Potential concerns about capacity are further dampened when one looks at
the specificity of the remedies themselves. Rather than lay out detailed
requirements with which MDC had to comply, many of the remedies simply
instruct the MDC to prepare plans by certain dates. For example, the MDC was
to present to the Court by January 1, 1984, a plan indicating the improvements
needed at Deer Island in order to reduce raw sewage discharges from Moon
Island. 174 If, on the other hand, the Master had decided to spell out what those
improvements should be, then the capacity of the Master to do so would need to
be more fully questioned. Instead, the remedies largely avoid such scrutiny by
leaving so much discretion to the MDC, which it would exercise within the
173 As a Boston Globe editorial noted, "Haar has asked for a court-enforced timetable to
ensure enactment of a number of steps. Most of them -- upgrading and maintenance of
the Deer Island and Nut Island treatment plants, and repair of aging, leaking sewer lines
-- have been sitting unimplemented on planners' desks for several years." The Boston
Globe. 13 August 1983).
174 Haar and Horowitz, 169
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context of the close regulatory oversight of state and federal environmental
agencies.
Capacity to Implement
The state case affords two opportunities to evaluate the capacity of the
court to implement its remedies. The first has to do with the implementation of
the procedural order, and the second with the implementation of the ultimate
remedy. With respect to the former, the court exhibited a distinct lack of
capacity. While some of the remedial measures included in the procedural order
were completed, more were not.
As the court's eyes and ears, Haar was able to monitor the degree of
compliance with the order's deadlines, but without the threat of judicial
sanctions for failure to meet those deadlines the parties had a reduced incentive
to comply. 175 Furthermore, the ability of the court, through the offices of special
master, to move the process forward appears to have been hampered by Haar's
acerbic style. According to one of the participants in the process, "Haar was the
last person in the world to convey encouragement; he was badgering and
critical."176 Another commented that "Haar's berating people built up resistance
to the special master; they were waiting for the boom to fall."177
The court's lack of capacity to implement the procedural order was not
only a reflection of these limitations. While the procedural order meetings were
taking place, administration and legislative efforts to create a new authority were
ongoing. The progress of those efforts were often discussed at the procedural
order meetings. As the support behind the authority concept grew, the push to
implement the remedial measures included in the procedural order waned. This
can be seen in the failure of the parties to the order to come up with a long-term
plan for other remedial measures dealing with such issues as sludge
175 Barrata interview, 7 October 1993; Shelley interview, 10 May 1993.
176 William Lahey, quoted in McCreary, 150.
177 Koff, quoted in McCreary, 150.
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management and CSO control. As Koff commented, "we were in a transition
from making a plan and getting someone to implement it."178
The court was much more successful in getting the ultimate remedy
implemented. Garrity's announcement of the ultimate remedy and Haar's
behind the scenes efforts on behalf of that remedy helped raise the authority
concept on the political agenda. Garrity's threats of receivership, his imposition
of the moratorium, and his public efforts to generate support for an authority
bill, all designed to overcome the political obstacles to implementing the ultimate
remedy, certainly had their intended effect.
The efficacy of the court's actions is reflected in the comments of various
participants in the process. According to Koff, "there is no question in my mind
that without Garrity's involvement and the pressure the court placed on the
legislature the authority would not have been created. It would not have
happened voluntarily."1 79  A key staff member in the state House of
Representatives, stated that "the judge shook a lot of people up. The creation of
the authority might not have happened without the court bringing pressure to
bear."180 The lawyer for CLF, adds that "the MWRA was created at the end of a
gun. It wasn't a free political act. Haar decided that this is what needed to be
done, Garrity cocked the trigger and pulled it a couple of times and got everyone
so gun-shy that they decided to create the authority."181 And according to an
EPA representative, "Garrity was the right person, in the right place, at the right
time."182
It is important, however, to place these comments and the role of the court
in the proper context, and not give the court more credit than it deserves for
leading to the implementation of the ultimate remedy. The court's ability to
successfully pressure the politicians to act was, in part, due to way in which the
178 Koff, quoted in McCreary, 152.
179 Koff interview, 12 May 1993.
180 O'Brien interview.
181 Shelley interview, 10 May 1993.
182 Jeffrey Fowley, Chief of the Water Office in the Office of Regional Counsel, U.S. EPA,
Region 1, personal interview with the author, 23 November 1993.
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authority concept was received by the administration, the legislature, and the
public. While the court helped to raise consideration of the authority concept on
the political agenda, once it was raised both administration and the majority of
legislators embraced it, prior to the Fall of 1984 when the court began pressuring
the legislature to act. It was not simply a case of those political actors saying we
have to support the creation of an authority because the court says we do.
Rather, they had evaluated the alternatives and found the authority mechanism
to be the most attractive one. The politicians were well aware of the costs
entailed in upgrading the sewage system and they had no interest in being held
accountable to ratepayers/voters for those rising costs. The authority
mechanism provided an alternative with a proven record of performance, in
Massachusetts and elsewhere. The anti-authority sentiment that would
characterize state politics in later years was not yet in evidence. 183 Furthermore,
there was widespread public support for the creation of an authority.
The court's ability to pressure the politicians into passing the authority bill
also was due, in part, to the nature of the legal violations uncovered and pending
litigation. The permit, conditions of which had been violated, was issued jointly
by the state and federal government in accord with both the Massachusetts Clean
Waters Act and the Federal Clean Water Act. Therefore, the requirements of the
permit couldn't be erased by state legislative action alone. The politicians had to
find a way to comply with the law because the option of changing state law so as
to remove the need to resolve the violations was not available. The pending
federal court case, lodged by CLF, combined with EPA's threat to file suit against
the state, only added to the pressure on the politicians to figure out a way to
create the institutional means necessary to comply with the law.
The situation facing the court in the Fall of 1984, therefore, was one in
which the administration, the majority of legislators, and the public supported
the creation of an authority, and the only real issue left on the table was how the
authority would be structured and whether it would be a sewer authority or a
combined water and sewer authority. Thus, instead of being in the position of
149
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trying to pressure a reluctant executive and legislative branch to create an
authority, the court really was only in the position of having to pressure the
legislature to resolve the issue of what the authority would look like. As events
turned out this was not easy, but the point is that it most likely would have been
much more difficult for the court to have overcome political obstacles to the
implementation of the ultimate remedy if there hadn't been strong political
support for an authority in the first place.
Effectiveness
The procedural order was clearly ineffective in leading to a cessation of
violations. The few actions that resulted from the implementation of the
procedural order were only preliminary steps which had little or no impact on
improving the operation of the area's sewage treatment system and bringing it
into accord with legal requirements. As for the court's actions in relation to the
ultimate remedy, there is no doubt that the court was a politically effective force
in getting the authority created. 1s4 The court was also effective in the light of the
criteria in that with the signing of the authority bill into law an institution was
created that had the capacity to move forward with the actions that were
necessary to bring the sewage system into compliance with the law. Thus, while
the creation of the authority didn't lead to a cessation of the violations, the
ultimate measure of effectiveness, it was clearly a positive first step in that
direction.
184 For spirited support of this contention, see Seward.
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The Federal Court Case
The creation of the MWRA opened a new chapter in the ongoing story of
the cleanup of Boston Harbor. It wasn't, however, going to be a chapter written
by the authority alone. In July, 1985, MWRA officially took over the water and
sewer responsibilities of the MDC. Three months later, a federal district court
judge handed down an opinion that held the MWRA liable for a variety of
violations of the CWA. Three months after that, the judge issued the first of
many court-ordered and enforced schedules, which established deadlines the
authority was to meet in order to comply with the CWA's requirements and, as a
result, help to restore the environmental integrity of Boston Harbor, e.g.,
constructing what will be the second largest secondary sewage treatment plant in
the country. 1 The schedules, therefore, embody the court's determination of
what remedies are necessary to adequately address the violations of federal
environmental law uncovered through litigation. From the moment the first
schedule was issued, up through the present, the MWRA has been operating
with the court looking over its shoulder and overseeing the implementation of its
remedies. Such oversight is expected to continue on through the end of this
century, at least, when the last of the currently scheduled deadlines, the
completion of the new secondary plant on Deer Island, is to be met.
The federal court's involvement provides a second opportunity to analyze
judicial legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness within the context of
environmental, remedial adjudication. In many ways, federal court involvement
provides a richer case study than the state court case because the breadth, detail,
and impact of the remedies is far greater in the federal case. For example, in the
1 Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, The State of the Boston Harbor 1992 (March
1993): 34.
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nearly ten years since the federal court intervened, Judge Mazzone has issued
over 100 memorandum and orders pertaining to all aspects of the case, as many,
if not more, court-ordered deadlines have come and gone, and billions of dollars
have been spent or obligated by the authority in complying with those deadlines.
Given the richness of this case it is impossible to detail all, or even most of the
actions taken by the court and their ramifications. Instead, this chapter focuses
on key events in the case that provide material for analyzing legitimacy, capacity,
and effectiveness. The chapter first presents the details of the case, and then
analyzes the case in light of the criteria.
The chapter's conclusions reflect favorably on court intervention as it has
played out thus far. The court's role in remedy formulation and implementation
has not only been legitimate, but it also offers evidence that the courts have the
capacity to make informed remedial decisions and to ensure that its orders are
implemented. As for the effectiveness of the remedial regime, it is clear that the
court has been instrumental in leading the authority into compliance with the
law within a reasonable amount of time and at a reasonable cost.
The Federal Case Begins
The lawsuit EPA, Region 1, had promised in December 1984, became a
reality on January 31, 1985, when the agency brought a civil action in
Massachusetts District Court against the MDC, the MWRA (as a successor
agency to the MDC), the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the BWSC,
requesting "injunctive relief and civil penalties for repeated and continuing
violations of the Clean Water Act. . . . which have resulted in the unlawful
discharge of massive quantities of raw and partially treated sewage and other
pollutants into Boston Harbor and its adjacent waters."2 The agency wanted the
court, among other things, to order the MWRA to submit plans and schedules for
coming into compliance with the CWA and for the court, in turn, to approve
those plans and schedules and insure that they are implemented. 3 One of
Region One's motivations in filing suit and asking for federal court involvement
2 U.S. EPA v. MDC, BWSC, Complaint (D. Mass, C.A. no. 85-0489-MA): 1.
3 Ibid, 37.
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was the national compliance policy for POTWs, which EPA headquarters issued
in early 1984.4
The national compliance policy was born of frustration. In 1977, when the
CWA amendments passed, less than thirty percent of the POTWs' had achieved
the CWA goal of secondary treatment. Congress responded by extending the
secondary deadline to July 1, 1983. Then in the 1981 CWA amendments, in the
face of continued, widespread noncompliance, Congress again extended the
deadline to July 1, 1988.5 There were various reasons for such noncompliance.
Some municipalities were waiting for federal funding before building their
plants, others were still in the construction phase, while still others had finished
construction but were not meeting the secondary effluent limitations in their
permits. And some POTWs, like the MDC, were out of compliance as a result of
a whole suite of reasons, political, bureaucratic, and financial. Whatever the
reason, as the years passed, EPA grew more concerned about the large number of
facilities that had yet to go to secondary. The national compliance policy
responded to this concern by encouraging the regions and states to place those
POTWs that were not likely to the meet the 1988 deadline on court-enforced,
compliance schedules. The MWRA's sewage system certainly fell into this
category.
In 1983 Ronald Reagan appointed William Ruckelshaus as EPA
Administrator to replace Anne Burford and to repair the damaged agency she
had left in her wake. Ruckelshaus quickly appointed Deland, a well respected
administrator, to head up Region 1. Region One's aggressive stance in the
lawsuit also was a reflection of the Administrator's priorities. Deland had
signed on at EPA Region 1 as a lawyer back in 1971, and by 1973 was in charge of
4 Bureau of National Affairs, "Final EPA Enforcement, Compliance Policy for Publicly
Owned Sewage Treatment Plants Under Clean Water Act (January 23, 1984),"
Environment Reporter 27 January 1984, 1706-1712; and Bureau of National Affairs,
"Thomas Says Suits Against Cities Will Spur Construction of Secondary Treatment
Plants," Environment Reporter, 11 October 1985, 1026.
5 Kovalic, 24-26. Neither deadline extension was universal. There were certain
restrictions, e.g., to get the deadline extended to 1988, the POTW had to request an
extension and show that federal funds will not be available in time to meet the earlier
1983 deadline.
153
Chapter V
Dolin, Remedial Adjudication
enforcement, a job he left in 1976 to do private consulting. 6 Ever since taking
office, on June 30, 1983, Deland had made the cleanup of Boston Harbor one of
his top priorities.7 There were two reasons Deland felt so strongly about this
problem:
First, it was clear to me that the EPA should have filed a suit about Boston
Harbor years ago. I mean, I was embarrassed. When I returned in 1983, 1
found that the EPA had made little, if any, progress on the harbor since
1976, when I left. I was amazed, to put it mildly. The agency should have
long since been the plaintiff in this case. I also recognized that the EPA
itself was in a deplorable state, racked by the scandal of the Burford days.
I needed a visible cause to rally people, and Boston Harbor was a natural. 8
Another motivation for the lawsuit was the belief that the ongoing state
case was severely limited in its ability to move the long-delayed cleanup process
forward. According to Deland:
[The state proceeding] is an insufficient substitute for enforcement of
federal requirements through this federal court action. The Ouincy
proceeding was instrumental in obtaining the establishment of the new
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA). The Procedural
Orders entered therein, however, have not provided the binding
commitments or long-term assurance of compliance sought through this
action. In particular, there is no mechanism in the Ouincy proceeding for
the EPA to obtain resolution on issues about which defendants and it
disagree and no way for EPA to seek sanctions or other relief when
voluntary orders are violated....
EPA is not satisfied with the slow pace that has characterized the Boston
Harbor cleanup. While secondary treatment plants are in operation or
6 Rolbein, 204.
7 Michael R. Deland, Affidavit, 12 April 1985, U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District
Commission, et. al. (D. Mass, C.A. no. 85-0489-MA), 1.
8 Deland quoted in Rolbein, 206.
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under construction in virtually every other major metropolitan area, the
Boston metropolitan area has yet to begin construction of even modern
primary treatment plants. Moreover, the MDC continues to discharge
unlawfully into Boston Harbor each day the sludge collected by its
treatment plants, with no date set as to when this will stop. Such sludge
discharges have been stopped in every other major metropolitan area in
the country, except Los Angeles, which is under federal court order to
cease its sludge discharges. In my opinion, the MDC system currently is
the worst violator of the Clean Water Act in New England and one of the
worst in the country.9
Deland's concerns about the state proceedings were well-founded.
Garrity's departure from the bench took away the driving force behind the
court's involvement. The case was placed in the hands of Chief Judge Thomas R.
Morse, Jr., who had neither Garrity's grasp of the issues nor his intense
commitment to the case. There were also indications that Morse was beginning
to become incapacitated by an illness that would soon end his life. 10
Of course Haar was still involved in the case, providing an intellectual and
institutional bridge between the past and the present. But the value of such a
bridge is predicated upon the potential for the voluntary moral commitment
among the parties to progress beyond discussing and planning to making the
hard decisions and implementing plans. EPA didn't believe that potential was
there. The procedural order had faltered during Garrity's tenure and there were
reasons to believe it would continue to do so without his presence, despite the
entry of a new and more powerful player -- the MWRA. According to the lead
EPA lawyer on the Boston Harbor case,
Even with the best of intentions, the MWRA would be subject to a lot of
the same political pressure and alot of the same constraints as the state,
and you needed cooperation from lots of other people. We were
convinced you needed a combination of the MWRA and the court order to
9 Deland Affidavit, 2, 3.
10 Haar interview.
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do the trick. The state case worked great in terms of laying the
groundwork for creating the MWRA, but it did not work great in terms of
actual follow through and getting things done. 11
Not only did EPA look disparagingly upon the implementation value of
the procedural order, but it also presented federal court involvement as an
enforcement tool with a proven track record. For example, in his affidavit,
Deland noted that:
Resorting to the federal courts for enforcement of the Clean Water Act has,
in EPA's experience, typically been an appropriate and required step to
obtain speedy compliance with federal law. Federal lawsuits by EPA have
helped speed progress in New York City, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C.,
and Providence, Rhode Island, among many other examples. The filing of
these lawsuits [which led to consent decrees being signed] has not ended
cooperation between EPA and the defendants in those actions. Rather, it
has helped ensure that cooperative efforts lead to firm decisions and real
progress rather than the stalling, indecision, and continuous studies which
have characterized the Boston Harbor cleanup effort until now.12
CLF agreed with EPA on the need for federal court involvement in this
case and the environmental group was pleased to drop EPA as a defendant in its
lawsuit and, in effect, join forces with the agency in its efforts to move the harbor
clean-up forward. 13 Fearing that a continuation of the procedural order would
go nowhere, CLF asked District Court Judge Mazzone to lift the stay on its case.
Here, the environmental group ran into some opposition. The state
argued that the case should remain in the state court system and that the MWRA
be given a chance to prove that it is not only willing but able to move forward,
under the auspices of the procedural order, in a way that will ensure quick and
11 Fowley interview, 23 November 1993.
12 Deland affidavit.
13 Shelley interview, 10 May 1993.
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effective compliance with the CWA.14 After all, the authority was designed to
solve the institutional problems that plagued the MDC -- shouldn't the MWRA
be given a chance? Since it wasn't until July 1, 1985, that the MWRA would
assume "ownership, possession, and control" of the water and sewerage system
formerly run by the MDC, shouldn't judgment be postponed to a later date so
that the MWRA could be judged on its own merits? The state used the same
argument in its request to Mazzone that he place a stay on EPA's suit.15
Mazzone agreed with EPA that "time was of the essence" and that further
delays would result in additional environmental harm. He also believed that the
non-enforceable, "voluntary agreement" developed through the state process had
been relatively unsuccessful in moving the cleanup forward. 16 Part of the
problem, as he saw it, was that EPA, which had an integral role to play in the
clean-up, was not an official party. As for the notion of giving the MWRA a
chance to succeed on its own, Mazzone felt that while the authority had
significant powers it would still face many serious obstacles that could stand in
the way of complying with the law, e.g., the need to dramatically raise rates
leading to a political backlash and public opposition to the siting of sewage-
related facilities.
Every day that passed, the CWA was being violated, and Mazzone
"couldn't ignore that any longer based only on a promise of good faith."17 Once
liability was determined, the court would be able to more effectively use its
powers, e.g., sanctions, to enforce compliance. As a result, on May 22, 1985,
Mazzone lifted the stay on the CLF suit, denied the stay on the EPA suit,
consolidated the two suits and granted Quincy the right to intervene (on July 10,
the town of Winthrop, which abuts Deer Island, was allowed to intervene). 18
This joined four parties, along with the Commonwealth and the BWSC in a single
14 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Motions for Partial Summary udgment (July 12, 1985) (D. Mass., C.A., no.s 85-0489-MA
and 83-1614-MA).
15 Dumanoski, "Boston Harbor pollution case will be in federal jurisdiction," The Boston
Globe. 23 May 1985,49.
16 Ibid.
17 A. David Mazzone, personal interview by author, 6 December 1993.
18 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission (23 ERC 1350, September 5, 1985):1351.
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action in federal court. Deland was delighted. "Another big step forward in the
clean up of Boston Harbor. We now have an entity which has jurisdiction over
all the parties, EPA included."19
The Judge
The court heard oral arguments on the consolidated cases on August 8,
1985.20 Before discussing Mazzone's decision it is important to reflect on
Mazzone himself. He was appointed to the federal bench in 1978, at age 49, by
President Jimmy Carter.21 Prior to his appointment he had been in private
practice and, in the early 1960s, was an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Mazzone is a
well-liked judge and many litigants say they enjoy appearing before him. One
lawyer noted that "he's a wonderful judge. . . . compassionate, thoughtful,
flexible -- yet firm ... a sensible sort of judge you can reason with."22 As for his
legal ability, the reviews are mixed, but generally quite favorable. 23 Like Garrity,
he is a generalist. His prior experience in environmental cases was limited to two
decisions concerning oil drilling/leasing off of Georges Bank, and a case on
mercury in Swordfish.24  His self-described approach to cases involving
remedial adjudication is straightforward, pragmatic, and traditional. "In all of
these cases I step in and say why? And then I judge what should be done."25 "I
make decisions based on the facts and law and nothing else, not personal
philosophy or political considerations, except those that flow from the statute
being enforced."26
19 Dumanoski, "Boston Harbor pollution case will be in federal jurisdiction."
20 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, 1351.
21 Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, Volume 1 (1993): 8 - 1st Circuit.
22 Ibid, 9.
23 Comments from lawyers that have appeared before him include: "He's a nice guy, but
he's not intellectually the most brilliant man on the bench"; "He's on the upper end of
good"; "His legal ability is average"; "He's not a rocket scientist, but he's more than
adequate. He handles complicated cases quite well"; "He's very competent. He's now a
very experienced judge who moves his caseload as well as anybody up there." Ibid, 9.
24 Mazzone interview, 6 December 1993. Also, See CLF v. Watt, 586 F. supp 1238 and 654 F.
supp 706.
25 Mazzone interview, 4 May 1993.
26 Mazzone interview, December 6, 1993.
158
Chapter V
Dolin, Remedial Adjudication
The Decision
Mazzone handed down his decision on September 5, 1985.27 In it he
determined that the MDC had violated the CWA by failing to comply with the
requirements specified in its permit requiring the Deer and Nut Island plants to
achieve effluent levels based on secondary treatment. Mazzone also found the
MDC to be violating permit conditions requiring both plants to cease discharging
sludge into marine waters. Finally, Mazzone found the MWRA "liable for the
MDC's acts because it is basically a continuation of the MDC."28 Due to this
liability, the MWRA is responsible for remedying the violations to the CWA cited
in the decision.
The purpose of the decision was to determine liability, not to establish
remedies. Nevertheless, in his concluding statement, Mazzone offered insight
into his thoughts about the proper role of the court in formulating remedies and
ensuring compliance with them:
The task the MWRA has been assigned is complex and politically
sensitive. It will entail many unpopular decisions. We are all aware that
sewage treatment plants are expensive; that they are complicated and
time-consuming to construct; and that they will not be welcome
neighbors. The MWRA will be in a better position to cope with these
problems than the MDC. It is certainly in a better position than any court
to make decisions about the myriad of details that will arise during the
course of the cleanup effort. . .. The purpose of these proceedings is to
ensure that the MWRA fulfills the mission entrusted to it by the state
legislature. Delay in this mission only enlarges the problem and means
even more expensive and prolonged effort. If the MWRA acts
expeditiously, it need not concern itself with interference from this Court. .
. . At the same time, this Court was invited into this litigation only when
voluntary efforts proved ineffective. The plaintiffs have now proven a
27 United States v. Metropolitan District Commission (D. Mass., 5 September 1985), cited in
Environmental Law Reporter 16 (July 1986): 20621.
28 Ibid.
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violation of a federally protected right, and this Court must protect that
right if the entity entrusted by the state to do so should falter in its task.
This is not to say that it should be solely a state effort. Despite its present
posture as a plaintiff the EPA, as its name indicates, is an environmental
protection agency and its duty is to cooperate in and ensure the
expeditious design, funding, and construction of the necessary facilities.
Fulfillment of this duty will assure that the Harbor will remain a vital
economic and esthetic resource.29
Deferring to the Parties
Mazzone first asked the parties to formulate remedies. Immediately after
the September 5 ruling, the parties began their negotiations, and at the beginning
of October, Mazzone noted the progress being made and decided to give the
parties until December 2 to come up with a schedule for both short-term and
long-term remedial measures that could be entered as an order of the court.30
The parties reacted quite favorably to the court's remedial posture. According to
James Hoyte, both Secretary of EOEA and chairman of the MWRA board, "we're
heartened that the judge understands that we as the authority are in the best
position to get the job of cleaning up the harbor done. He makes it clear that he
expects the court to restrain itself from getting directly involved as long as he
sees the authority moving ahead." Deland added that "if at any point the cleanup
schedule breaks down, there is now a concerned judge who is ready to move and
has the legal authority to move." And CLF's Shelley noted that Mazzone is
"flashing a strong signal that as long as the authority does its job, it will be given
lots of rope. But, once they start to slip, he's going to yank the rope and impose
whatever penalties are necessary."31
29 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission (23 ERC 1350, September 5, 1985): 1363.
30 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Memorandum to All Parties (October 1, 1985):
2.
31 Dumanoski, "Court set to enforce harbor cleanup," The Boston Globe 6 September 1985.
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The content and scope of these negotiations was greatly affected by
MWRA decisions made shortly before Mazzone's September 5th decision and
just after. On July 10, 1985, the MWRA Board selected Deer Island as the
preferred site for new sewage treatment facilities.32 In accord with earlier EPA
and MDC siting studies, this decision assumed that the sewage flows going to
Nut Island would be routed to Deer Island via an under-the-harbor tunnel and,
further, that the treated wastewater would be discharged through an outfall
tunnel with a terminus in Massachusetts Bay. 33 There was still some question,
though, as to whether the facilities would include secondary treatment.
At the end of March, 1985, EPA denied the MDC's second waiver
application, but at the time of the July 10 vote, the Board had yet to decide
whether it would exercise its option to appeal the denial.34 On September 17, the
Board decided not to appeal, stating that "[wie take this step to illustrate our
profound desire to get on with the business of cleaning up the harbor. Further
legal entanglements could well have delayed progress for an additional five
years or more. Such a delay is intolerable."35 Due to these MWRA decisions, the
ultimate goals of the harbor cleanup project became more defined, leaving the
parties with a clearer sense of what they were negotiating about.
The parties continued to meet throughout October and November on a
weekly basis to hammer out an agreement. 36 On December 2, MWRA, EPA, and
CLF each submitted their own project schedules. While there was substantial
agreement among the parties as to short-term remedial measures, there was little
agreement on long-term measures. 37 Mazzone was thus placed in the position of
having to decide how to proceed in the face of conflicting recommendations from
32 Dolin, Dirty Water /Clean Water 75.
33 Ibid.
34 Environmental Protection Agency, Tentative Decision of the Regional Administrator on
the Revised Application Pursuant to 40 CFR Part 125. Subpart G (March 29, 1985).
35 MWRA, The Clean-up of Boston Harbor Status Update (September 23, 1985): 13.
36 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Comments of the Massachusetts Water
Resources Authority on the Status Report of the United States (November 7, 1985).
37 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Memorandum by the United States Regardg
Proposed Form of First Interim Order (December 2, 1985). Response and Comments of
the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority to Proposed Orders and Schedules of CLF
and the United States (December 10, 1985).
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the parties. On December 23, he made his decision and established a "schedule
of interim steps to be taken by the MWRA to help achieve and maintain
compliance with the requirements of the Act."38 In so doing, Mazzone found
"that there is a need for expedition to resolve the ongoing discharges of sludge
and inadequately treated sewage into Boston Harbor and that an interim order is
necessary to ensure that initial steps are undertaken expeditiously to address
these discharges."39
The interim steps focused on the first few years of the project and
generally corresponded with the suggestions of EPA and accelerated certain of
the deadlines recommended by MWRA. 40 The judge presented no rationale for
choosing the deadlines he did and none of the parties questioned his choice.
Most of the deadlines in the interim schedule required the MWRA to either
continue planning efforts that it had inherited from the MDC, or to begin
developing new plans so that the legally required facilities could be built. For
example, the court ordered the MWRA to complete the final facilities plan for the
secondary treatment plant by September 1987. It also ordered the authority to
develop plans that would ultimately enable it to cease discharging sludge into
the harbor. The latter planning effort required the authority to decide, among
other things, how to dewater the sludge and what type of land-based facility to
build to treat the sludge, e.g., incinerator or landfill.
Mazzone decided to give the parties more time to establish a long-term
schedule. Specifically, he ordered the parties to continue their negotiations and
set a deadline, February 17, 1986, for them to report back to the court on their
progress in reaching agreement on a variety of issues including, commencement
and completion dates for the construction of the new primary and secondary
treatment plants, the under-the-harbor tunnel, and the outfall tunnel into
Massachusetts Bay.41
38 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Order (December 23, 1985): 2.
39 Ibid.
40 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Schedule One Compliance Order Number 1
(December. 1985) (February 7, 1986): 1.
41 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Order (December 23, 1985): 6.
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Negotiating the Long-Term Schedule for Secondary Treatment
Throughout January and early February 1986, the parties continued
negotiating over the elements of a long-term schedule. One unifying feature of
the negotiations was the use of the "critical path method" (CPM) as a means for
assessing schedule milestones. The CPM, run by MWRA's engineering
consulting firm, Camp, Dresser & McKee, relied on computer-generated
flowcharts to schedule the sequencing of the numerous tasks required to
complete the harbor clean-up project in the shortest amount of time. It showed
which tasks could be pursued concurrently, those which had to be undertaken
sequentially, and in what order.
The parties used the CPM as the common referent, or yardstick, in
evaluating the schedules they each supported. While the CPM provided a
common analytical tool, the parties differed in their assumptions concerning the
sequencing and duration of the required tasks.42 As a result, on the February
17th deadline set by Mazzone there were still major areas of disagreement. For
example, CLF proposed a schedule under which the MWRA would complete
construction of secondary treatment by 1996.43 MWRA urged the adoption of a
schedule that would see the secondary plants completed by 2000 and operational
by early 2002.44 EPA argued that secondary facilities could be completed by
early 1998, at the latest, and promised the court a specific long-term schedule by
mid-March. 45 When the EPA submitted its proposed schedule it called for the
secondary plant to be built by the fourth quarter of 1997.46
42 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Long Term Scheduling Order (May 8, 1986):2.
43 Ibid, 8; and U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Report of the Conservation Law
Foundation on Dates for the Completion of Treatment Plant Construction (February 18,
1986).
44 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Second Interim Order (MWRA Proposed
form, February 18, 1986).
45 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Report by the United States on Schedules for
Construction of Treatment Plants and Related Facilities, and Certain Other Matters
(February 18, 1986): 4.
46 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Memorandum by the United States in Support
of its Motion for Establishment of Long Term Target Dates (March 19, 1986): 4.
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The differences among the parties focused not only on the date for
constructing the secondary plant, but also the dates for the completion of the new
primary plant and the various tunnels associated with the project. For example,
the CLF schedule called for the simultaneous construction of the primary and
secondary plants; EPA allowed for some overlap in construction; and MWRA
urged sequenced construction, with the primary plant being built first, followed
by secondary.
Mazzone, concerned about the prospects for continued delay, scheduled
an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual issues raised by the parties. The
hearing was postponed at the request of EPA and MWRA who noted that they
had reached some agreement on long-term dates and argued that if they were
given two more weeks to negotiate the need for an evidentiary hearing might
disappear or, at least, the issues needing resolution at the hearing could be
narrowed. In place of the hearing, Mazzone called a conference of the parties at
which time they expressed the desire to continue working toward consensus.
Mazzone gave them until April 18 to reach agreement and let them know that if
no agreement were reached, an evidentiary hearing would be held on the 22nd.47
During that two-week period the parties met numerous times and the
differences among them were somewhat narrowed. For example, the MWRA
and the EPA agreed on the dates for the completion of the under-the-harbor
tunnel and the commencement of primary treatment construction. 48 And the
MWRA, the Commonwealth, BWSC, the City of Quincy, and the Town of
Winthrop all agreed to support a modification of the earlier MWRA schedule
that would have the secondary plant on-line in 1999.49 Although differences
were narrowed they were far from eliminated. The parties had gone as far as
47 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Schedule One Compliance Order Number 3
February, 1986 (April 8, 1986).
48 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Report of the United States on its Proposed
Form of Order On Long Term Construction Scheduling (April 28, 1986); and U.S. v.
Metropolitan District Commission, Long Term Scheduling Order (May 8, 1986):7.
49 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Report of the Massachusetts Water Resources
Authority Concerning Long-Term Scheduling (April 18, 1986); and U.S. v. Metropolitan
District Commission, Long Term Scheduling Order (May 8, 1986).
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they were willing to go in ironing out their differences, leaving the ultimate
decisionmaking authority with the court.
The Parties Present Their Cases
Mazzone held evidentiary hearings on May 1 and 2, at which time the
parties were allowed to present expert testimony and their arguments for and
against the adoption of various long-term deadlines.50 The focus of the
evidentiary hearing was on establishing the start and finish dates for the
following activities: facilities planning, site access, site development, primary
plant construction, under harbor tunnel construction, new outfall construction,
and secondary plant construction. 51
Through their submissions to the court, including many affidavits by
various experts, as well as the testimony presented in court, the various parties
each did their best to convince Mazzone why their preferred schedule was the
most reasonable and should therefore be adopted. In pushing for the 1996
deadline for the construction of the secondary treatment plant, CLF argued that
its schedule, requiring completely overlapping construction of the primary and
secondary plants, was technically feasible.52 From CLF's perspective, both EPA
and, to a greater extent, MWRA's schedule were too conservative and would
allow the degradation of the harbor to continue too long.
EPA also felt that the MWRA schedule was too conservative, but believed
it wasn't' technically wise to have the primary and secondary plants built entirely
at the same time. Instead, EPA's schedule would allow for some overlap in
50 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Long Term Scheduling Order (May 8, 1986).
51 Ibid, 3.
52 Ibid, 8; U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Second Affidavit of James 1. Colantonio
(February 18, 1986); and U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Opp2osition of
Conservation Law Foundation to Massachusetts Water Resources Authority's Motion for
Order Entering its Compliance Schedule (February 28, 1986).
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construction of the two facilities as well as a shortening of the time needed to
build the primary plant.53
MWRA argued against both the EPA and the CLF schedule.54 Building
the secondary plant before 1999 would be, according to the MWRA, technically
unsound.55 Shortening the schedule by overlapping the construction of primary
and secondary plants would likely lead to unsafe and congested engineering
conditions, added noise pollution and other inconveniences with which
Winthrop would have to contend.56 Furthermore, hasty construction would
probably result in a poorly designed and constructed plant that would have a
higher likelihood of operational and maintenance difficulties and continuing
pollution problems. Saving time at the expense of building right was not worth
it.57
The MWRA's concern about the shorter schedules went beyond technical
to financial feasibility. The authority argued that the shorter schedules would
result in significant increases in project cost which would have to be borne by the
ratepayers. 58 And given the likely technical problems associated with shorter
schedules, those ratepayers would be in the position of paying more for a less
reliable plant. MWRA's financial advisor claimed that the CLF schedule would
53 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Memorandum by the United States in Support
of its motion for establishment of long term target dates (March 19, 1986).
54 "CLF and EPA place overriding emphasis on advancing by few years the target
completion date of a plant that is to last a century. They advocate this sort-sighted aim,
wich in fact is not even superior in the short run, at the cost of large potential sacrifices of
quality of technology and reliability of performance and without any regard whatsoever
to the resulting great financial burden on the public. The Authority believes that such a
course is irresponsible." U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Report of the
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority on Scheduling and Compliance ad
Memorandum in Support of Adoption of Proposed Second Interim Order (February 18,
1986): 14.
55 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Report of the Massachusetts Water Resources
Authority on Scheduling and Compliance and Memorandum in support of adoption of
proposed second interim order (February 18, 1986).
56 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Long Term Scheduling Order (May 8, 1986): 7.
57 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Affidavit of David Standley. consultant to the
City of Quincy (April 28, 1986): 7; and U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Third
Affidavit of Richard D. Fox, P.E. (February 27, 1986).
58 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Long Term Scheduling Order (May 8, 1986): 4-
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increase the sewer rate and revenue requirements by roughly $760 million as
compared with the costs of the Authority's schedule.59 EPA and CLF experts
contested MWRA's claims about the financial impacts of the various schedules. 60
The Long-Term Scheduling Order for Secondary Treatment
Mazzone was faced with a difficult task. Having heard all the testimony
and read all the submissions, he now had to decide what the long-term deadlines
would be. As Mazzone stated in his May 8, 1986, Long Term Scheduling Order:
long term dates are essential to the successful clean up of Boston Harbor.
Although my initial scheduling order in this case was entered a mere five
months ago, it is already clear that specific dates must be established for
each major step of this long and complex construction project. The parties
must be held to a clear, understandable, and rational schedule. The Court
and the public must be able to hold specific individuals and agencies
responsible for accomplishing specific tasks within given time periods....
Despite the negotiations between the parties in the last few weeks, and
their agreement on certain dates, they have been unable to present to the
Court a jointly proposed schedule of specific long term dates for the
construction of the new treatment plants and related facilities. This Court
has jurisdiction to protect the cleanliness of the Harbor and the safety of
the citizens who enjoy and use that Harbor, even in the absence of an
agreed schedule. Thus, given that the establishment of long term target
dates is essential to the cleanup of the Harbor, I must set such dates at this
time.61
59 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Second Affidavit of Mark S. Ferber (April 30,
1986).
60 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Memorandum by the United States in Support
of its motion for establishment of long term target dates (March 19, 1986): 18-19.; and U.S.
v. Metropolitan District Commission, Affidavit of Iohn E. Petersen (March 14, 1986).
61 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Long Term Scheduling Order, 3-4.
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Mazzone decided to adopt the MWRA's proposed schedule, which
included the following deadlines: initiate construction of the new primary
treatment plant by December, 1990; commence operation of that plant by July,
1995; complete construction of outfall by July, 1994; initiate construction of
secondary during 1995; and complete secondary during 1999.62 Mazzone's
decision turned on his evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties.
On financial matters, Mazzone discounted the validity of the findings of
Mark Ferber, MWRA's expert, and sided with the conclusions of EPA's expert,
John Petersen, which were, in turn supported by CLF's expert. Mazzone
disputed Ferber's claim that the shorter schedules would result in massive
increases in project cost. In support of this view, Mazzone pointed to the
Petersen affidavit which clearly showed, based on MWRA's own data, that more
than fifty percent of those increased costs were "attributable to operation and
maintenance costs arising from earlier completion of the project. Earlier
completion means earlier compliance." 63 The claim that costs necessary to
comply with the law should be used as an argument against early compliance
simply fell of its own weight.
As for the MWRA's claims that adoption of EPA's schedule would result
in a 20% reduction of federal funding, Mazzone agreed with Petersen who noted
that the amount of federal dollars potentially available under any of the
schedules was too uncertain to support MWRA's contention.64 Finally, Mazzone
used the Petersen affidavit as well as the one submitted by CLF's financial expert
to refute MWRA's claim that the authority would find it more difficult to float
the bonds necessary for construction under EPA's or CLF's scheduling scenario.65
Although Mazzone questioned Petersen's assumption that there would be
no difference in capital costs between the three proposed schedules, he wasn't
62 Ibid, 16-18.
63 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Long Term Scheduling Order 5.
64 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Petersen affidavit, 11; and U.S. v. Metropolitan
District Commission, Long Term Scheduling Order 5.
65 U.S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, Long Term Scheduling Order 5.
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"presented with sufficient evidence to the contrary to disbelieve him."66 Given
the available information, Mazzone dismissed the determinacy of the financial
issue, stating that "the differences in cost associated with the different target
completion dates are insufficient to affect my decision as to the appropriate long
term construction dates."67
On the issues pertaining to construction timelines, Mazzone reviewed the
backgrounds and findings of EPA's, CLF's, and the MWRA's construction and
engineering experts. Mazzone was clearly most impressed by MWRA's expert,
Richard D. Fox. According to Mazzone,
[Fox] was clearly a qualified expert. Mr. Fox has had extensive, direct
contact with many large wastewater treatment plants. . . . Mr. Fox was
clearly better qualified and more familiar with the intricacies of the
existing construction schedule than any other expert at the hearing. He
explained satisfactorily to the Court why the dangers of accelerated
construction could outweigh the benefits to be gained by the advancement
of two years over the EPA's schedule, and several years over the schedule
of the CLF. Further, while I am somewhat curious about the recent
advancement in the MWRA's proposed target dates, I nonetheless find
that the MWRA has made very substantial efforts to show that it intends
to complete the project at hand in as expeditious a manner as it believes
consistent with good engineering practice....
Mr. Fox persuasively pointed out the flaws in ... [EPA's schedule], and I
am forced to accept his opinion. I must also agree with Mr. Fox that the
schedule proposed by CLF must be rejected.... I agree with Mr. Fox that
an overly compressed construction schedule will result in the long run in a
plant that is less reliable and, consequently, expensive to maintain. This
community has long suffered the effects of living with an unreliable
sewage treatment system. Despite my inclination to expedite the process,
I cannot avoid the more convincing evidence and impose a schedule that
169
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may haunt the citizens of the Commonwealth for the next fifty years or
more. 68
In adopting MWRA's schedule, Mazzone noted that its deadlines were
target dates that could and, most likely, would be altered as planning progressed
to take into account changing circumstances and opportunities:
The complexities of the construction project before the Court are vast in
scope. There will, of course, be instances in which various specific
deadlines will have to be altered due to circumstances unforseeable at the
moment. There will also be occasions on which specific tasks can be
completed more quickly than currently anticipated. Therefore, these
target dates will be subject to review at the end of facilities planning.
Nonetheless, target deadlines create a framework within which the parties
may work together to accomplish the common goal. I also do not
underestimate the importance of giving the citizens of this commonwealth
a public assurance that Boston Harbor will be cleaned up within a defined
period of time.69
While Mazzone's long-term scheduling decision was based primarily on
his evaluation of the weight of evidence presented, he was also fully aware of,
and partially influenced by, the implementation benefits associated with giving
the MWRA the schedule it requested. The authority now couldn't blame the
court for forcing it into doing something it felt was unreasonable. The defense
that "it's not our plan" would be unavailable and, therefore, the authority would
have a greater incentive to comply. As Mazzone saw it, "they have only
themselves to blame if they can't comply."70
68 Ibid, 11-13.
69 Ibid, 4.
70 Mazzone interview, 6 December 1993.
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Negotiating the Schedule for CSO Management
Another remedial issue not dealt with in the long-term schedule for
secondary, and barely touched upon in the interim order, was what to do about
CSOs. EPA's original suit alleged that the MDC had violated its permit by not
completing projects for the one hundred and eight CSOs connected to its sewage
system that were intended to bring those CSOs into compliance with the CWA
effluent limitations based the application of best practicable control technology
(BPT).71 In the request for partial summary judgment that EPA presented to the
court, however, the agency did not ask the court to rule on the CSO issue,
preferring, instead, to have the court focus on the issues of secondary treatment
and sludge. That is why Mazzone's September 5 memorandum and order did
not address CSOs. 72 Nevertheless, all of the parties agreed that the pollution
coming from CSOs was serious and had to be addressed and, furthermore, that
the fact that most of the CSOs were receiving little or no form of treatment was a
violation of the CWA's requirements for the application of BPT. In light of this,
right after Mazzone handed down his opinion the parties agreed, at the courts
urging, to work together to develop a schedule of actions for dealing with CSOs.
This task was complicated by the issue of who would take responsibility for
developing and implementing CSO management plans. While the one hundred
and eight CSOs were connected to the MWRA's sewage system, only 19 of them
were officially owned and operated by the authority.73 Others were owned and
operated by cities and towns within the MWRA service area, e.g., Somerville,
and the BWSC. The MWRA was not convinced that it should have to plan and
implement projects for CSOs it did not own and operate, especially since its
liability for CSO effluent violations had not been established. The state and the
EPA wanted the MWRA to assume those responsibilities.
71 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Complaint (January 31, 1985) (D.
Mass, C.A. no. 85-0489-MA), 28.
72 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Report of Massachusetts Water
Resources Authority Concerning Combined Sewer Overflows (April 30, 1986).
73 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Copmlaint, 28
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By Spring 1986 there was still no agreement. In the May 8, 1986, long term
scheduling order Mazzone noted that this issue was still to be decided and stated
that he was "particularly concerned about the CSO problem ... [t]he elimination
of CSO discharges will result in an immediate improvement in the water quality
in Boston Harbor."74 The parties continued negotiating over the Summer and
into the Fall to no avail. In his ninth compliance order Mazzone summed up the
current situation:
Although the parties indicated early in the course of this litigation that a
compromise plan to eliminate CSO discharges might be forthcoming, it is
now apparent that there will be no mutual agreement as to the
responsibility for eliminating those discharges. As I have noted many
times, discharges of raw sewage from CSOs into the most delicate areas of
the Harbor create an immediate threat to the well-being of the citizens of
Massachusetts. These discharges must be halted at the earliest possible
opportunity. The United States has indicated its intention to file a motion
for partial summary judgment as to liability for CSO discharges. A
hearing will be scheduled immediately upon receipt of such a motion.75
In his tenth compliance order, issued October 27, 1986, Mazzone noted the
lack of resolution on the CSO issue and, even though the U.S. had yet to file its
motion, the court decided that if the parties couldn't resolve their differences on
the matter by November 30, the court would hold a hearing designed to promote
action. 76 Responding to the mounting pressure to act, the MWRA Board
"voluntarily undertook responsibility for overall planning for combined sewer
overflow programs and for causing those programs to be implemented either by
the Authority itself or by others."77 Mazzone was pleased with this turn of
events, but noted in his next compliance order that he agreed with EPA and CLF
74 Ibid, 15.
75 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule One Compliance Order
Number 9 (September 29, 1986): 3.
76 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule One Compliance Order
Number 1Q (October 27, 1986): 6.
77 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Massachusetts Water Resources
Authority Revort on CSO Responsibility (October 30, 1986): 1-2.
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that, however laudable MWRA's actions were, it was important for the
Authority's voluntary assumption of responsibility to "be reduced to a working
and binding understanding to avoid future misunderstanding and controversy
over this issue."78 Negotiations among the parties concerning the creation of this
binding understanding moved slowly, and by February 2, 1987, Mazzone again
turned up the heat, deciding that if the issue is not resolved by the 27th of the
month a hearing would be scheduled without delay.79 On the 27th, EPA and
MWRA signed a stipulation in which the authority agreed to assume legal
liability for the management and control of all the CSOs. 80 With this stipulation
in place, negotiations over the specifics of the CSO program began and resulted,
seven months later, in an agreement among the parties on a schedule containing
deadlines that the MWRA would have to meet in completing a final CSO
management facilities plan by May 1990, e.g., issue a draft plan by December,
1989.81 Mazzone, in turn, adopted that schedule. 82
Monitoring Implementation of the Schedule
The primary means the court has of keeping track of the implementation
of the schedule is the reporting system that it established at the outset of the
remedial regime. On the 15th of every month the MWRA is required to submit a
report the court indicating the authority's compliance with the prior month's
schedule deadlines and its progress as of the 15th in moving towards compliance
with future deadlines. 83 The MWRA's reports often will bring up other issues
relevant to the court schedule that it feels the court should be made aware of,
e.g., political developments that may affect implementation at a later date. Other
78 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule One Compliance Order
Number 11 (December 2, 1986): 4.
79 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule One Compliance Order
Number 13 (February 2, 1987): 5.
80 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Stipulation of the United States and
the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority on Responsibility and Legal Liability for
Combined Sewer Overflow Control (February 27, 1987).
81 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Motion for Adoption of Order For
First Combined Sewer Overflow Schedule (August 13, 1987).
82 Dolin, Dirty Water/Clean Water 85.
83 Elizabeth Steele, legal assistant at the MWRA, telephone interview by author, 2
November 1994.
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parties have the opportunity, which they often exercise, to submit there own
reports to the court, in which they can comment on the MWRA's submission or
raise other issues of concern that they feel are relevant to the court schedule.
To help him digest the information in MWRA's compliance reports, as
well as the filings of other parties in response to those reports, Mazzone
appointed a monitor to collect all these submissions and summarize what they
contained, noting in particular those issues that require immediate court
attention. Mazzone, then uses the monitor's report, and the original submissions,
to write his monthly compliance order, in which he documents the progress in
meeting deadlines and discusses court decisions relating to the schedule, e.g., a
change in a deadline. Mazzone also often uses his monthly order to request the
parties to report back to the court on various issues pertaining to the schedule at
a later date.84 In addition to the monthly reports, Mazzone is kept up to date on
the implementation of the court's order through the MWRA's submission of mid-
year and annual progress reports which also identify potential compliance
problems. Finally, occasional hearings on specific issues, at which time all the
parties are represented, offer Mazzone another opportunity to keep abreast of the
implementation process.
Interactions Among the Parties
A good working relationship has evolved among the parties. 85 The legal
and technical representatives of the parties regularly meet with one another in
person and over the phone and transferring documents and proposals
concerning the court schedule, obstacles to implementation, and potential
modifications to the schedule.86 Participation in the meetings depends on the
84 See, for example, U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Three
Compliance Order Number 53, 5.
85 According to Virgina Renick, Associate General Counsel for MWRA, "Generally the
working relationship is constructive." Telephone interview by author, 9 May 1993;
According to Steve Lipman, Boston Harbor Coordinator, Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection, "the working relationship is good among us." Telephone
interview by author, 15 November 1994.
86 According to Renick, "Our technical people and lawyers are always speaking with the
other parties technical people and lawyers." Telephone interview, 3 November 1993.
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nature of the issues facing the parties as dictated by the schedule's requirements.
For example, all the parties were involved in the discussions leading up to the
establishment of the initial CSO management and planning deadlines in the
schedule. On the other hand, parties have the option of not participating if they
believe that the issues being discussed do not affect their interests. For example,
when the topic of discussion was the placement of a water line for the Deer
Island plant through the town of Winthrop, other parties, besides the town and
the MWRA did not participate. Furthermore, the frequency of the interactions
among the parties depends on the scope of the issue under consideration, with
more contentious issues, usually, requiring a greater investment of time.
Remedy Reformulation
The court-ordered schedule is not a static document. There have been
many reformulations of the schedule, including changes in established deadlines
and the addition of new deadlines. The way in which such reformulations come
about follows a consistent pattern in which Mazzone is placed in the position of
responding to proposals for change that are presented to him. In some cases the
reformulation is one that has been negotiated and agreed to by all the parties and
proposed to the court in the form a unified motion. After the court reviews the
motion it invariably incorporates the proposed changes into the schedule. This is
evident in revisions to the long-term scheduling order handed down on May 8,
1986. That order provided that the deadlines it contained would be reevaluated
after MWRA completed the plans for the new Deer Island-related facilities and
those plans were reviewed and approved by the relevant regulatory agencies. By
the end of 1988, that planning and approval process was complete. Now that the
parties knew the design specifications for the facilities they were in a better
position to determine how long it would take to construct them. Thus, the
parties recommended that the earlier deadlines be changed to reflect new
realities. 87 For example, whereas the May 8th order had set July 1995 as the date
for completion of the new primary facilities, the parties now wanted to have July
1994 be the date for completing the first two batteries of primary treatment, and
87 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., joint Motion for Adoption of Long-
Term Scheduling Order (May 10, 1989).
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July 1995 be the date for the completing the final two batteries. Similarly, the
earlier order had set July 1994 as the date for completing the outfall tunnel and
sometime in 1995 as the date for initiating construction of the secondary facilities,
while the new date for the outfall would be July 1995 and construction of the first
of four secondary batteries would begin in January 1993. Mazzone adopted the
parties proposed revisions in their entirety.
In other instances, proposals for reformulating the schedule are presented
to the court in the form of a motion by the MWRA or a joint motion by MWRA
and EPA. The motions are then assented to by the other parties. In light of this
general agreement as to the appropriateness of the proposed reformulations, the
court then incorporates the changes into the schedule. A good example of this
concerns reformulations of the CSO schedule. In September 1990, the MWRA
completed a CSO facilities plan. That plan recommended a variety of CSO
control facilities including the construction of deep rock tunnel storage system to
contain sewage overflows until the time at which they could be pumped out and
adequately treated by the Deer Island plant. The estimated cost of the proposed
CSO facilities was $1.3 billion. After the plan came out, however, the MWRA
argued that additional studies should be undertaken before proceeding to
implementation. 88 The authority believed that actual CSO flows were much
lower than assumed during the development of the facilities plan and that,
therefore, it would be wiser to find out if this was in fact the case, for if it was
there might be opportunities to scale back the CSO facilities and save money
while still providing adequate treatment. EPA agreed with the authority and
they both proposed that the court add specific milestones to the schedule
requiring the authority to undertake further testing, e.g., to commence new flow
measurements by March 1992.89 The other parties supported the schedule
changes and the court adopted them.90
88 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Memorandum of the United States
in Support of Joint Motion of United States and Massachusetts Water Resources
Authority to Add Combined Sewer Overflow Planning Milestones (December 28, 1993).
89 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Joint Motion to Consolidate and
Amend Schedules (January 31, 1992).
90 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Four Compliance Order
Number 74 (March 2, 1992), 5.
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Once the CSO flow tests were completed in late 1993, and it was found
that flows were less than originally assumed, the MWRA and EPA again filed a
joint motion to add new CSO deadlines to the schedule. The deadlines directed
the MWRA, among other things, to submit a report to the parties evaluating
alternative CSO management strategies based on revised estimates of CSO flows,
and to prepare a final conceptual plan for CSO control by December 1994.91
Once again, the other parties supported the changes and the court incorporated
them into the schedule.92
Another example of the joint motion approach concerns the establishment
of a revised schedule for long-term residuals management. Residuals is a term
that includes sludge as well as grit and screenings, the heavy solids that settle out
of the wastewater during treatment and large objects, e.g., pieces of wood, that
are trapped in screens placed at sewage pumping stations and headworks. 93 The
first interim schedule issued by the court in late 1985 established an August 1987
deadline for the MWRA to complete facilities plans for long-term residuals
management. In June 1986, after further review of the feasibility of meeting that
deadline, the MWRA and EPA filed a joint motion for the court to change it to
April, 1988, and to establish December 1991 as the target date for ceasing the
discharge of sludge to the harbor and commencing land-based disposal. 94
Mazzone gave the other parties ten days to comment on this motion, and
receiving no objection, adopted it. This change in the deadline for the
completion of the long-term residuals plan was not the last one. In late 1987 the
MWRA presented a motion, supported by the other parties, to change the
deadline yet again. On December 30, 1987, Mazzone wrote:
I have stated before that any party is free to move for revision of a
scheduled milestone if it can show good cause for changing that milestone
91 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., joint Motion of United State and
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority to Add Combined Sewer Overflow Planning
Milestones (December 28, 1993).
92 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 97 (January 28, 1994), 6.
93 Dolin, Dirty Water/Clean Water 96.
94 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule One Compliance Order
Number 6 (June 27, 1986).
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[please note that the author uses the term "deadline" in referring to what
the court calls "milestones"]. If the assumptions on which the various
milestones are based prove to be erroneous, any party is free to seek relief
from imposition of the schedule and the sanctions, if any, that may be
imposed for failing to meet any of the specific milestones.... This phase
of the harbor cleanup was originally scheduled for completion in August,
1987.... It was revised and scheduled for completion in April, 1988....
The MWRA is seeking yet another revision, this time to October 31, 1989.
As the parties are aware, an unambiguous, enforceable schedule is
essential to moving this complex project forward. Accountability was a
key factor in my adopting this schedule proposed by the MWRA.... I do
not find at this time any good cause for changing this milestone. I will
consider this matter further if a clear and unambiguous schedule is
presented to me which will not affect the 1991 deadline for ending sludge
discharge into the harbor.95
Within the next month the parties convinced Mazzone that a schedule
revision was justified:
In my last Compliance Order . . . I denied the MWRA's motion for
revisions to the long term residuals management portion of the schedule.
At a hearing held on January 19, 1988, on other motions pending before
the Court, the parties reiterated their collective belief that revisions to the
schedule would be useful at this time, primarily because a prospectively
achievable schedule permits the MWRA to enforce deadlines imposed on
its various consultants. Because of the effort expended in arriving at an
achievable schedule, I am reluctant to revise it. However, I am now
persuaded by the parties that the ultimate goal will be best protected by
the establishment of an achievable schedule. Therefore, I find that
95 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule One Compliance Order
Number 24 (December 30, 1987), 6.
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revisions to the milestones relating to the long term residuals management
plan are necessary and appropriate at this time.96
In the great majority of instances when the remedy has been reformulated,
the court has simply adopted changes supported by all the parties. There are,
nevertheless, a very few cases in which the judge has had to entertain a motion
for reformulation over which there was less than complete agreement. In these
cases, however, the level of disagreement among the parties has been "relatively
minor."97 For example, once the planning for the long-term residuals
management facilities was complete and the regulatory approvals in hand, the
parties began negotiating over a schedule for the construction of the facilities.
On most of the proposed schedule modifications there was substantial agreement
among the parties. The Commonwealth, however, opposed adding new
deadlines pertaining to the construction of a residuals landfill in Walpole. The
Commonwealth, for reasons that are more fully discussed in a later section,
didn't want the landfill to be sited in Walpole. Failing to reach agreement on all
issues, the MWRA, in October 1991, filed a motion to add new deadlines relating
to long-term residuals management. 98  Mazzone discounted the
Commonwealth's objections to the proposed schedule, noted the agreement of
the other parties and stated that "[i]t is apparent to everyone involved in the
process that a landfill must be designed and permitted and begin operations on a
timely basis in order for the overall cleanup project to proceed. For these
reasons, I adopt the [MWRA-proposed] milestones relating to the residuals
landfill . . ."99
96 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule One Compliance Order
Number 25 (January 29, 1988), 4.
Renick interview, 8 November 1994.
98 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Long-Term Residuals Management
Scheduling Order (October 31, 1990).
99 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Three Compliance Order
Number 58 (October 31, 1990), 8.
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The Court and the Specificity of the Remedy
The court doesn't determine the specific details of the facilities the MWRA
has to construct in order to come into compliance with the CWA. Rather, those
determinations are the result of the formalized regulatory process in which the
MWRA develops facility plans that are, in turn, subject to public scrutiny as they
are reviewed by the relevant regulatory agencies to ensure that they comply with
the applicable environmental law and regulations.
For example, it was the MWRA that produced the facility plans for the
secondary treatment plant and the two tunnels. Those plans were, in turn,
reviewed and approved by the state and federal regulatory agencies. This
process is exactly the same that would have transpired had the court not been
involved in the case. Of course, the court affects the workings of the formalized
regulatory process by setting deadlines, in the schedule, for the authority to meet
in devising facility plans and for the regulatory agencies to review those plans.
However, determining the timing of the regulatory process is quite different
from a situation in which a judge actually makes the decisions himself.
The Role of the Regulatory Process
The approval of facility plans by regulatory agencies is not necessarily the
end of the process that determines what type of facilities will be built. There is
always the option for any party to appeal regulatory decisions. In this case that
option has been exercised on a number of occasions. For example, Cape Cod
groups concerned that the effluent coming out of the new outfall pipe would
negatively affect endangered species living in Massachusetts Bay brought a suit
against EPA alleging, in part, that in conducting the EIS on the outfall tunnel, the
agency had inadequately studied the impact of the tunnel on such species. For
this and other reasons, the plaintiffs argued that the construction of the sewage
tunnel be halted. Similarly, Walpole filed a suit in state court against the MWRA
arguing that the environmental reviews leading up to the selection of Walpole as
the residuals landfill site failed to comply with the law governing those reviews
and, as a result, the MWRA should be enjoined from putting the landfill in the
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town. Ultimately, neither of these, or any of the other legal challenges to
regulatory decisions relating to schedule have been upheld. Thus, neither the
court nor the parties has yet had to consider altering facility plans to take into
account the outcomes of litigation over the regulatory process.
Implementation of the Remedy
There are four ways in which the court has influenced the implementation
of the schedule. The court's backing of the schedule creates incentives for the
MWRA and the relevant regulatory agencies to meet the schedule's deadlines.
The court's presence increases the investment community's confidence in the
authority's financial stability, thereby enhancing the authority's ability to float
the bonds which are necessary to fund the projects required by the court order.
The court's presence also decreases the potential for legislative restrictions on the
MWRA's ability to secure the funding necessary to comply with the schedule.
And when obstacles are placed in the way of implementation, the court has used
its powers to overcome them.
Incentives for Compliance with the Schedule
The court schedule serves as a focal point for action. It is a clear statement
of what actions the MWRA is supposed to complete and when. The items on the
schedule rise to the top of the authority's agenda.100 This is no surprise. The
harbor project is one of the MWRA's top priorities, not because of court
involvement, but because of the authority's explicit mission to comply with water
pollution control laws.
Court involvement, however, creates an even stronger incentive for the
MWRA to comply. As the "gorilla in the closet," the court is ready to force the
MWRA to act if necessary through the application of sanctions, e.g., levying of
100 Renick interview, 3 May 1993, Paul Levy, former Executive Director of the MWRA,
personal interview by author, 14 September 1993; Shelley interview, 10 May 1993; and
Fowley interview, 23 November 1993.
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fines.101 When the MWRA Board of Directors makes decisions, it knows that the
court is, in effect, looking over its shoulder. As Paul Levy, former MWRA
Executive Director, notes, "when voting on something they would ask 'is this on
the schedule?"' If it was, chances are that "what would take years to be decided
[in the absence of the court] would be decided in months."102
Although the "gorilla in the closet" image has negative connotations, from
the MWRA's perspective the court's presence is a welcome incentive to
compliance. While MWRA was initially opposed to court intervention, the court
schedule has become a security blanket of sorts for the authority, giving it
increased confidence that it will be able to ultimately fulfill its organizational
mission. As Mazzone notes, "it is a comfort to the MWRA to know that if they
don't perform they will be held to the schedule."103
Court involvement also affects the incentives of the state and federal
regulatory agencies. Those agencies place a priority on MWRA-related projects,
thereby minimizing delays arising from regulatory review. 104 Here, too, the
potential for the court to apply sanctions acts as an inducement for prompt
action, e.g., holding the head of an agency in contempt if his/her agency fails to
review schedule-related projects in a timely fashion. But it is not the potential
coercive power of the court, alone, that creates incentives for compliance. As
Levy notes, "the judge is like a father figure, nobody wants to tell him that it is
my fault that the schedule is not being met." This sentiment reflects a larger
truth. Namely, that the court, as an institution, is accorded great legitimacy in
the context of this case. When it placed its imprimatur on a schedule, a powerful
element of moral suasion was brought into play that is based on the strongly
held ideal that the court is a just arbiter of what the law requires.105 In large part,
101 Renick interview, 3 May 1993.
102 Levy interview, 14 September 1993;.
103 Mazzone interview, 4 May 1993.
104 Fowley interview, 23 November 1993; Levy interview, 14 September 1993;. Renick
interview, 3 May 1993. According to Douglas Wilkins, the Assistant Attorney General
who worked on this case from 1985 through 1992, "the court does raise things to the top
of the agenda." Telephone interview by author, 2 November 1994.
105 Fowley interview, 23 November 1993.
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therefore, the MWRA and the regulatory agencies seek to comply with the
schedule because the court authoritatively says that is what must be done.
Calming the Bond Market
Mazzone's willingness to uphold the integrity of the schedule has helped
the MWRA achieve high bond ratings. Such ratings are critical to the effective
implementation of the court-ordered schedule, for the higher the ratings the
more easily the authority can sell the bonds needed to finance the cleanup.
Higher ratings also makes it possible for the authority to sell their bonds even
though the investors would earn a fairly low interest rate. Paying investors such
a low interest rate should, in turn, translate into significant savings for MWRA
ratepayers over the life of the bonds. Throughout the MWRA's existence its bond
rating, as determined by credit rating companies such as Standard & Poors, has
not fallen below A-. 10 6 This is in marked contrast to Massachusetts' bond ratings
during the same period. For example, in 1989, the state's rating was just a notch
above junk bond status.107 In accounting for the MWRA's high credit rating,
Standard & Poors cites the authority's "strong management and efficient
organizational structure and the stabilizing influence of federal court
oversight."108 If anything threatens the MWRA's ability to repay it bonds with
interest, the bond market has faith that the Court can and will take steps to make
sure the authority can fulfill its fiduciary obligations.
On one occasion, at least, Mazzone felt it necessary to specifically reassure
the bond market of his resolve. This happened in late 1989, as an initiative
sponsored by the Citizens for Limited Taxation began to pick up steam. That
initiative was designed to roll back all fees imposed by any state authority or
agency to 1988 levels, require the Secretary of Administration and Finance to
106 Mazzone interview, 6 December 1993. At the end of 1993, the Standard & Poors
upgraded the MWRA's bond rating from A- to A. MWRA Advisory Board, Summarv Qf
the MWRA Board of Director's Meeting (November 17, 1993): 1.
107 Dolin, "Boston's Murky Political Waters," 26.
108 Standard & Poors Credit Week "Boston Harbor Clean-Up Makes Progress" (May 6, 1991):
38.
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determine how much should be charged for public services, and make any
changes in fees subject to legislative approval.109 The MWRA argued that
passage of such a measure, stripping the authority of its fiscal autonomy, would
likely negatively affect its ability to meet its debt service obligations and to
comply with the schedule. When the MWRA notified Mazzone that the credit
rating agencies were concerned about the potential impact of the initiative, he
wrote,
What the parties evidently seek is an assurance that this Court will order
the MWRA to meet its debt service obligations and will use its coercive
powers to ensure that such an order is obeyed. . . . until the issue is
squarely presented ... it would be inappropriate for me to speculate about
a future decision. . . . However, while I cannot provide the specific
assurance the parties seek, my previous statements over the course of the
past four years should suffice to reassure all concerned that the Harbor
cleanup will go forward in accordance with the schedule, and that there is
a vast array of remedial and equitable powers available to the Court under
the law to ensure compliance with that schedule. 110
Ultimately, the initiative made it onto the 1990 ballot and was voted down.
Therefore, Mazzone was not required to exercise the court's authority to ensure
the project's continued implementation.
Deflecting Legislative Restrictions
A few Massachusetts politicians have responded to MWRA ratepayer
concerns about rising water and sewer rates resulting from the implementation
of the court-ordered schedule by introducing bills in the state legislature that
would strip the MWRA of its rate-setting powers and bring the authority more
109 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., MWRA monthly compliance report
for August 1989 and progress report as of September 15. 1989 (DATE): 6.
110 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Three Compliance Order
Number 47 (November 30, 1989), 2.
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under the control of state government. 111 The court is highly aware of these
developments and sympathetic to ratepayer concerns. Indeed, on numerous
occasions, Mazzone has encouraged the MWRA to "explore all legal and feasible
means of reducing the financial burden this project will impose on the MWRA's
ratepayers."11 2 However, when it has appeared that political developments were
heading towards a situation in which compliance with the schedule might be
threatened, Mazzone has made it clear that, no matter how the state or local
political situation changes, his responsibility is to ensure that federal law is
complied with and that he will do everything in his power to make sure that
happens. An example of this is offered by Mazzone's response to a piece of
legislation filed by two state senators in 1991.113
The bill in question was designed to reign in the MWRA. It included
provisions that would subject the authority to regulation as a public utility, with
the Department of Public Utilities having the right to approve rate increases, and
give the MWRA Advisory Board control over final budgetary approvals. 114
Mazzone reacted to the introduction of these bills with the following observation:
Throughout the course of this litigation, this Court has consistently
refrained from taking any action that intrudes on the legislative process. It
is worth recalling that the legislative process first established the MWRA
as an independent agency. This pending legislation seems aimed at
stripping the MWRA of its independence and its ability to make the
difficult, politically charged decisions that are necessary in this effort. Of
course, the legislature should not ignore what it believes are important
areas for increased attention. Its oversight and efforts to improve are
necessary and welcome in our political system. But, the construction
111 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Four Compliance Order
Number 68 (August 28, 1991), others.
112 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Three Compliance Order
Number 64 (April 25, 1991), 2.
113 The two senators in question were Paul Harold (D-Quincy) and Christopher Lane (R-
Medfield). Scott Lehigh, "Judge says bill could declaw MWRA," The Boston Globe 25
September 1991, 25.
114 Lehigh, "Judge says bill could declaw MWRA." U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District
Commission, et. al., Schedule Four Compliance Order Number 68 (August 28, 1991).
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project underway as a result of the remedial order in this case is not a
project that may be abandoned just because it is no longer acceptable to
the "Political Environment," or because it costs too much in a temporarily
stalled economy or because it sites certain facilities in the backyards of
voters who elect legislative representatives. The orders of this Court are
designed to compel compliance with a federal law that the
Commonwealth has flouted for years. As I have repeatedly stated, the full
remedial powers available to this Court will be used to scrutinize closely
any attempt that would derail the project and undermine or circumvent
those orders.115
Nothing ever came of the bill. Part of the reason was that many legislators
believed that things should be left as they are with the MWRA having the
responsibility for making the difficult, costly, and necessary decisions that the
legislature had earlier decided it wasn't willing to make. Another part of the
reason, undoubtedly, was the knowledge that were the legislature to strip the
authority of its ability to comply with the schedule the Court would not sit idly
by. Mazzone's veiled threat raised the very real possibility that, if the bill became
law, the bill's implied purpose, to keep the authority from making politically
unpopular decisions, would not be realized because the court would use its
powers to ensure that the unpopular decisions necessary for compliance with the
schedule were made.
Overcoming Obstacles
This case includes a variety of examples of the court using its coercive
powers to maintain the integrity of the schedule. This section focuses on three
examples having to do with water and fire.
115 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Four Compliance Order
Number 68 (DATE), 2-3.
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Water
During the summer of 1990, MWRA informed the court of difficulties it
was having in securing local permits from the city of Quincy that were necessary
for the authority to proceed with the construction of the sludge-to-fertilizer plant
located there.116 In early October of that year, MWRA still had yet to get permits
for local water and sewer hookups and it claimed that if those permits were not
obtained by mid-October the construction schedule would be placed in
jeopardy.117 As a result, Mazzone issued an order on October 18, requiring
Quincy to respond to MWRA's claims that it was holding up the issuance of
permits. Mazzone also scheduled a hearing later that month to discuss this
matter, noting his concern that "any unjustified refusal to issue these permits will
disrupt the schedule resulting in delay and increased costs."118 By bringing this
issue to a head at the hearing and making clear the intention of the court to
intervene more coercively if the issues couldn't be resolved, Mazzone spurred
action. According to the lawyer who represents Quincy, the threat of sanctions,
in this instance and in general, creates an "enormous incentive" for the parties to
comply with the schedule. 119 The permits were issued by the end of the month.
Reflecting on this turn of events, Mazzone wrote, "I have always encouraged the
parties to reach an agreement on this and similar matters so that the Court is not
compelled to intervene in what should be a local affair."120
Within two years another water-related issue threatened the schedule's
integrity. In order to operate the new primary plant, a water line had to be
routed to Deer Island. That line had to go through the Town of Winthrop, but
not before a variety of issues were resolved concerning the extent and nature of
116 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Three Compliance Order
Number 56 (August 22, 1990), 3.
117 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Three Compliance Order
Number 57 (October 2, 1990), 2-3.
118 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Order (October 18, 1990).
119 Koff interview, 1 November 1994.
120 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Three Compliance Order
Number 58 (October 31, 1990), 3-4.
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the line's construction. 121 Furthermore, the town had to issue certain easements
and street-opening permits before construction could proceed. 122 Throughout
the late 1991 and into the summer of 1992, MWRA and Winthrop negotiated over
these issue with little success.123 On August 5, Mazzone noted this impasse and
his intention to hold a hearing on the issue if the parties couldn't resolve it
themselves by August 22. Reports that the parties were nearing agreement
caused Mazzone to cancel the hearing scheduled for August 23rd. 124 While the
parties had narrowed their differences, negotiations stalled in mid-September
and Mazzone held a hearing. Shortly thereafter, Mazzone made clear his
frustration and resolve to break the impasse:
Despite several optimistic reports that agreement was near and the
holding of a hearing at which I encouraged the parties to reach agreement
so that Court intervention would not be required given that the remaining
areas of disagreement were very small, the parties have failed to reach
agreement. As I stated at the hearing, it is deeply disappointing that an
agreement could not be reached. On a project of this magnitude, it is
discouraging that a dispute over the timing of approvals of the plans for
one water line should require the intervention of the federal court
overseeing the case. There have been, and will be far more divisive issues
ahead of us, and no satisfactory explanation has been made to me by
Winthrop as to why it cannot commit, without seemingly ever-increasing
conditions, to a relatively straightforward schedule.... In light of the
very generous concessions by the MWRA and in the absence of any sound
121 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 79 (August 5, 1992).
122 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Special Report of the
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority Concerning Winthrop Water Line (October 23,
1992); and U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Order (September 25,
1992).
123 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Four Compliance Order
Number 71 (November 26, 1991); U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al.,
Schedule Five Compliance Order Number 79 DATE .
124 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 80 (August 26, 1992).
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explanation for Winthrop's indecision, I reluctantly conclude that my
direct intervention is required.125
That intervention was the issuance of an September 25th order requiring
the construction to proceed by December 2, 1992.126 In the shadow of the Order,
the parties were able to resolve their differences and hammer out an agreement.
On October 23, MWRA reported to the court that it "expects the renewed spirit of
good will and cooperation between the parties to prevail as the parties continue
to work together closely," and asked the court to vacate its September 25th order
and approve the agreement in its place.127 Mazzone did so gladly, commending
"the parties on their diligence and efforts to resolve this matter without further
court intervention."128 Despite the agreement the issue was not completely
resolved. By March 1993, the easements and permits had not been issued and
Mazzone decided to turn up the pressure again, stating that if these outstanding
matters were not resolved by mid-April the court would consider holding a
conference on the matter.129 Resolution came, no conference was held,130 and the
construction of the water line through Winthrop began. According to the lawyer
representing Winthrop, the pressure brought to bear by the court "did hurry
things along."131
Fire
On the morning of August 6, 1992, a small fire occurred at the sludge
pelletizing facility at the Fore River Staging Area (FRSA) in Quincy. Immediately
125 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 81 (September 25, 1992), 4-5.
126 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Order (September 25, 1992).
127 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Special Report of the
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority Concerning Winthrop Water Line.
128 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 82 (October 26, 1992): 6.
129 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 87 (March 31, 1993).
130 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 88 (April 27, 1993); U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al.,
Schedule Five Compliance Order Number 89 (June 4, 1993).
131 Harlan Doliner, telephone interview by author, 2 November 1994.
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after the fire, MWRA notified city officials, suspended operations at the facility
and began taking steps to determine the causes of the fire and the steps necessary
to operate the plant safely.132 That same day, "[iun the interest of public safety"
the Quincy fire chief issued a directive that all operations at the plant cease until
he ordered otherwise. 133
This posed a serious problem for the MWRA and the integrity of the clean
up of Boston Harbor. Although the plant was temporarily shut down, the
sewage plants weren't. Each day, each plant produced tons of sludge. With the
pelletizing plant closed down that sludge couldn't be converted into fertilizer
which would normally be shipped off site for sale. While the MWRA initiated
the development and implementation of a backup plan to transport the sludge to
a disposal site, in lieu of turning it into fertilizer, it needed to be able to store the
sludge temporarily.134
The Chief's directive, however, not only shut down the pelletizing facility,
it also forbid the use of the sludge storage tanks at the FRSA, despite the fact that
those tanks were not involved in the fire. Without the use of the tanks, MWRA
would be forced to rely on the storage capacity on-site at the two treatment
plants. This posed a particularly acute problem at Nut Island, where storage
capacity would be exceeded by August 10. If this happened, MWRA would be
forced to discharge the sludge into the harbor, violating the court schedule's
prohibition of sludge discharges to the harbor after December 1991.
To avoid this outcome, MWRA asked the court, on August 10, to issue an
order overriding the Fire Chief's directive as it related to the storage tanks at the
132 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Memorandum of the
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority in Support of Motion Concerning Sludge
Storage at Fore River Staging Area (August 10, 1992).
133 Ibid; Thomas F. Gorman, Chief Quincy Fire Department, Official Directive (August 5,
1992).
134 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Special Report of the
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority Concerning Sludge Pelletizing Facility
(August 7, 1992); U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Memorandum of
the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority in Support of Motion Concerning Sludge
Storage at Fore River Staging Area.
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FRSA. The MWRA argued that with the use of the FRSA tanks, storage capacity
would be extended to August 16th, giving it much needed time to address
Quincy's concerns and put into place disposal plans.135 Mazzone issued the
order, averting sludge discharges to the harbor.136 Interim disposal plans were
implemented, Quincy's concerns were addressed, and ultimately the pelletizing
plant came back on line.
The Walpole Landfill: An Example of the Dynamics of Court
Intervention
The controversy over the siting of a residuals landfill in Walpole is singled
out for extensive review in this section because it offers insights into a variety of
the key issues of concern in this dissertation. Those issues include the court's
ability to overcome obstacles to implementation, its role in remedy formulation,
and its ability to respond flexibly to changing circumstances.
In January 1989, the MWRA Board selected a site in Walpole,
Massachusetts as its preferred location for a residuals landfill.137 The selection
process began in 1986 and involved the evaluation of nearly 300 sites within the
state. The landfill was to accept grit and screenings from the sewage treatment
plants.138 The landfill was also to be used as a backup for sludge disposal. It was
to be a backup because another element of the authority's residual management
plan was constructing a pelletizing plant in Quincy that would turn sludge into
fertilizer. The Walpole landfill would be used only if the authority were unable
to market the sludge as fertilizer or, in some other way, legally dispose of it139
135 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Memorandum of the
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority in Support of Motion Concerning Sludge
Storage at Fore River Staging Area.
136 Ibid.
137 Dolin, Dirty Water/Clean Water 93.
138 Ibid, 96..
139 U. S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, 757 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1991): 123.
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Before the landfill could be built, however, a number of hurdles had to be
cleared. The MWRA's residuals management plan had to undergo favorable
environmental review by state and federal environmental agencies, and the
MWRA had to acquire the Walpole site, which was owned by the Massachusetts
Department of Corrections. Under Massachusetts law, before the MWRA could
acquire ownership, the state legislature would have to pass a bill that allowed for
the transfer of land.140 Because construction of the landfill was a crucial part of
the clean-up plan, and especially in relation to the December 1991 deadline for
the cessation of sludge discharges to the harbor, Mazzone closely monitored
MWRA's progress in clearing these hurdles. 141
The MWRA simultaneously began pushing for the approval of its landfill
plans and the filing of the necessary land-transfer legislation. On the approval
side of the ledger things went well. On November 20, 1989, the EOEA accepted
the MWRA's Final Environmental Impact Report (FEIR) on long-term residuals
management, that not only included the designation of the Walpole landfill, but
also the decision to build the sludge pelletizing facility in Quincy.142 On March
30, 1990, EPA issued its own Final Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement approving MWRA's long term residuals management plan.143
On the land transfer side of the ledger, progress was delayed repeatedly.
The MWRA began efforts to have the land transfer legislation filed soon after
voting in favor of the Walpole site and Mazzone ordered the authority to keep
the court updated as to the status of its efforts. 144 In June 1989, Governor
Dukakis decided to postpone filing the legislation. Later that summer, the
Governor again decided to postpone filing the legislation, preferring to wait until
the state and federal environmental review process had run its course. While
accepting this rationale, Mazzone warned that, "[i]n the event of any slippage in
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid. 124.
142 Ibid. MWRA, Residuals Management Facilities Plan/Final Environmental Impact Report
(August 1989).
143 EPA, Region 1, Public Record of Decision on the Final Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement. Long-Term Residuals Management for Metropolitan Boston (March
30, 1990).
144 U. S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, 757 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1991), 124.
192
Chapter V
Dolin, Remedial Adjudication
the schedule for completion of the ... environmental review process, however, I
will reconsider whether further action is appropriate concerning this issue."145
The state and federal reviews were completed, as noted above, but by May 1990,
EPA was expressing great concerns about the problems related to getting access
to the Walpole site. As a result, they asked Mazzone to issue an order requiring
the MWRA to make plans for an alternative landfill in order to maintain the
integrity of the schedule. 146 Mazzone deferred his decision on the EPA's motion
and held onto the hope that action would be taken soon to resolve this problem:
I will not interfere in local and state processes so long as there is no real
and imminent threat to the schedule that has been imposed to remedy
decades of violation of federal law.... The legislature and executive have
always before acted on a timely and responsive basis when faced with
critical decisions relating to the Harbor clean up. I have no reason to
believe they will not do so at this time.147
At this point the Dukakis administration, which had since submitted land
transfer legislation, told the court that it was committed to getting the legislation
approved. At the same time, however, the House had voted to put off
consideration of the legislation until December 5, 1990. Responding to this turn
of events, Mazzone wrote,
I believe the best course is to withhold current action until December 5,
1990.... As I have repeatedly stated throughout this litigation, this court
should not become involved in the substantive decision-making process
required to site, design, and build the facilities necessary to achieve full
and timely compliance. ... My role is to see that decades of violations of
federal law were identified, and, once identified, terminated as quickly as
reasonably possible. . . . At the same time, I am mindful of the huge risk
that attends my decision to forego action until December 5, 1990. At stake
145 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Three Compliance Order
Number 44 (August 24, 1989), 3.
146 U. S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, 757 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1991), 125.
147 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Three Compliance Order
Number 53 (May 30, 1990), 9.
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is the credibility of the Court's schedule and the public's faith in the
integrity of the entire project.... In the event that necessary legislation
has not been approved by that date and that slippage in the schedule
results from the paralysis surrounding the siting issue, I will entertain and
intend to grant a motion for sanctions designed to ensure immediate
resolution of this matter.148
A large part of the paralysis Mazzone refers to was the result of the
political power of the Not In My Backyard Syndrome (NIMBY). 149 The selection
of the Walpole site engendered a swift and strong reaction from local
residents. 150 Despite MWRA's extensive search and site analyses and the
approvals of various environmental agencies, the people of Walpole did not
believe that the siting decision was either fair or environmentally sound. Neither
did Norfolk, Walpole's neighbor closest to the proposed site.
This opposition was not solely a reflexive case of NIMBY. While it is true
that neither wanted the facility, Walpole already housed a state maximum
security prison and Norfolk a minimum security prison, both towns claimed they
had done their fair share for the state with respect to siting locally unwanted land
uses (LULUS).
Walpole and Norfolk filed suits in state and federal court challenging the
review processes that led to the selection of the Walpole site. 151 Beyond that, the
citizens of Walpole and surrounding communities successfully pressured the
local, state and federal politicians representing them to oppose the siting
148 U. S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, 757 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1991): 125.
149 For an analysis of NIMBY, see Daniel Mazmanian and David Morell, "The 'NIMBY'
Syndrome: Facility Siting and the Failure of Democratic Discourse," in Norman J. Vig
and Michael E. Kraft, eds., Environmental Policy in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1990):125-144.
150 David Arnold, "Walpole residents say they've done their share for the state," The Boston
Globe 22 December 1988; Renee Graham, "Day of Decision on Walpole landfill Norfolk
Residents to join protest," The Boston Globe 4 January 1989): 21; Alexander Reid, "400
protest sludge landfill for Walpole," The Boston Globe 18 March 1990, 25.
151 U. S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, 757 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1991): 124.
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decision.152 And during the 1990 Gubernatorial campaign, the ultimate victor
ran in opposition to placing the landfill in Walpole. All of these pressures
combined to stall the transfer legislation.
On October 31, 1990, the court schedule was amended with a timeline for
the construction of the long-term residuals management facilities.153 With
respect to the landfill, the schedule now required facility design to be completed
by November 1991, construction to commence on or before September 1992, and
for the landfill to begin operation by March 1994.154 With these dates fast
approaching, the need to quickly resolve the land transfer impasse grew. In late
November, 1990, Mazzone warned that if legislation weren't approved by
December 5, he would hold a hearing on the matter. Despite the clear intention
of the court to step in if the legislature failed to pass the bill, the House voted on
December 10, not for the transfer, but against it.155 Mazzone's patience had worn
out. On December 26, he wrote,
The United States suggested some months ago that awaiting legislative
resolution of this issue would prove unavailing. . . . Unfortunately, the
United States has proven correct. . . . My confidence was misplaced. As
the Conservation Law Foundation has put it succinctly, the legislature has
defaulted to the court.156
The EPA now asked the Court to either order the Commonwealth to
transfer the Walpole site to the MWRA or, alternatively, place a moratorium on
sewer hookups in the MWRA service area until the Authority was able to acquire
a suitable landfill site. 157 After a hearing on this motion in early January 1991,
152 James L. Franklin, "Congressional Delegation agrees to help in Walpole fight," The Boston
Globe, 8 March 1991),18.
153 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Long-Term Residuals Management
Scheduling. Order (October 31, 1990).
154 Ibid.
155 James Franklin, "House kills measure to transfer Walpole site for use as landfill," The
Boston Globe 11 December 1990, 11.
156 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Three Compliance Order
Number 60 (December 26, 1990), 2.
157 Franklin, "EPA asks court for landfill in Walpole," The Boston Globe 7 December 1990,
33.
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Mazzone issued a moratorium on February 25, 1991.158 In doing so, Mazzone
noted that such an action was explicitly contemplated by the CWA as an
appropriate sanction in the face of continued violations of permit conditions.159
Although he clearly preferred not to intervene in this manner, he made it clear
that the time to do so had come.160
Mazzone's move placed newly-elected Governor, William Weld, in a
difficult spot. He had run against the Walpole siting decision and wanted to
make good on his campaign promise. 161 At the same time the moratorium
jeopardized the state's economy which he desperately wanted to jump-start. In
the hope of getting the judge to lift the moratorium, Weld announced, on April 1,
the appointment of a special commission to find an alternative, in-state, landfill
site to take Walpole's place. The Commission's focus on in-state, as opposed to
out-of-state, alternatives reflected the EPA's insistence that the MWRA construct
an in-state, backup landfill, in part due to EPA concerns about the reliability of
out-of-state options.162
With the Commission scheduled to report within 120 days, the
Commonwealth asked Mazzone to suspend the moratorium pending the
completion of the Commission's work. When Mazzone denied this motion, the
Commonwealth appealed the denial as well as the imposition of the moratorium
158 It was not a blanket moratorium. There were exceptions made for facilities necessary to
protect public health and safety, sources discharging less that 2,000 gallons of wastewater
per day, and facilities needed to carry out the schedule. U. S. v. Metropolitan District
Commission, 757 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1991): 129-130. On April 1, the moratorium was
expanded to include hookups for less than 2,000 gallons.
159 "In the event any condition of a permit for discharges from a treatment works ... is
violated, .. . the Administrator ... may proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction to
restrict or prohibit the introduction of any pollutant into such treatment works by a
source not utilizing such treatment works prior to the finding that such condition was
violated." 33 U.S.C. §1342(h).
160 "I have consistently stated my reluctance to take a substantive decision-making role in the
process, and I have been sensitive to the conflict between state and federal authority that
court action would implicate. However, I have also made it clear that I would consider
taking action at such time that this court's scheduling order is jeopardized. That time has
come." U. S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, 757 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1991): 126.
161 Ross Gelbspan, "Panel finds no option to Walpole landfill," The Boston Globe 9 August
1991, 19.
162 Ibid.
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to the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, arguing that Mazzone's
actions were unreasonable. 163 The Circuit Court sided with Mazzone and upheld
the moratorium on April 22, 1991.164
Hours after the Circuit Court decision, Weld vowed to soon introduce the
land transfer legislation, stating that "the economy of Massachusetts will grind to
a halt" if the moratorium is not lifted, and, further, that his administration "really
doesn't have any option but to take action to satisfy the federal judge."165 The
transfer legislation passed the legislature on May 21, 1991, and was signed the
same day by Weld. Mazzone then lifted the moratorium, stating that "hopefully,
this puts the [landfill] matter behind us."166
Mazzone's optimism, however, was misplaced. On November 20, 1991,
the MWRA Board voted to direct the authority to develop and issue a Request
for Proposals to consider alternatives for residuals management backup other
than the current plan of using Walpole. The vote was actually two-pronged.
Given the court schedule, which contained deadlines for the construction of the
Walpole landfill, the Board knew that Mazzone wouldn't allow the search for an
alternative to proceed at the expense of continued progress towards complying
with the schedule. Thus, part of the Board's vote was a commitment to ensure
that work on the Walpole landfill continue in accord with the schedule, while the
search for alternatives was under way. The actual search didn't begin until April
1992, when the Authority appropriated $100,000 for that purpose.167
The MWRA's decision to re-open the search was based on politics and the
belief that an acceptable alternative might still be found. Furthermore, the
political pressure to find an alternative to Walpole didn't disappear with the land
transfer, it intensified. Although the Governor's Commission reported, in
163 U. S. v. Metropolitan District Commission, 757 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mass. 1991), 134.
164 Ibid.
165 Gelbspan and Frank Phillips, "Weld will file bill for landfill on Walpole site plan," The
Boston Globe 23 April 1991, 27.
166 Sean P. Murphy and Jerry Ackerman, "Judge lifts sewer hookup ban with landfill site in
MWRA hands," The Boston Globe. 22 May 1991, 37.
167 Gelbspan, "Agency's new landfill search revives old dispute," The Boston Globe 1 April
1992, 18.
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August 1991, that it had failed to find an acceptable, in-state alternative to
Walpole, the administration didn't give up the fight. Instead, the Commission
took the offensive, arguing that "the EPA is requiring an excessive level of
certainty in requiring an in-state landfill," and that the agency should reconsider
its opposition to out-of-state options.168
Congressman Barney Frank (D-MA), who represented Walpole and
strongly opposed the landfill decision, also wanted EPA to reconsider its stance.
In October 1992, a measure authored by Frank was included in an EPA
appropriations bill. 169 That measure, while allowing the EPA to require
sufficient, in-state, backup capacity for MWRA sludge, grit and screenings, also
stated that the MWRA should not be required to construct a backup landfill if
other legally acceptable alternatives were found within a year. Although neither
the Commission's stance or the Frank amendment affected EPA's position, it
certainly created substantial political pressure in favor of continuing the search
for an alternative to Walpole.
That pressure was not lost on the MWRA Board, which included three
members appointed directly by the Governor, including the chairperson, as well
as other members who were sympathetic to Walpole's and Norfolk's concerns.
The MWRA's decision, however, wasn't solely based on political pressure. There
was also sentiment among a majority of the Board members that with one more
evaluation, the authority just might be able to come up with an alternative that
would prove acceptable to EPA.170
EPA reacted to the MWRA's decision with dismay:
The authority is free to conduct any study and the EPA will fairly evaluate
any concrete proposals that result from it. On the other hand, this action
by the authority seems far more likely to prolong the controversy and
168 Gelbspan, "Panel finds no option to Walpole landfill."
169 Gelbspan, "Frank amendment may provide another year to find sludge site," The Boston
Globe 28 September 1991, 27.
170 Gelbspan, "Agency's new landfill search revives old dispute."
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create false hopes than to result in a better alternative to the Walpole
site.171
EPA also reiterated its position that "there is going to have to be an in-state
backup site."172 The MWRA Advisory Board, which represents MWRA
ratepayers, was also dismayed by the authority's decision, arguing that the siting
issue had been studied enough and, therefore, why ask the ratepayers to shell
out another $100,000?173 Mazzone's reaction was predictable. Throughout the
case his interest has always been to maintain progress in meeting the schedule's
broad deadlines. He has invariably left it up to the parties to determine the
specifics of how those deadlines will be achieved. Thus, Mazzone felt that if the
MWRA were able to devise an alternative to the Walpole landfill that was legally
acceptable and would still allow for the backup landfill capacity to be in place by
March 1994, that would certainly be acceptable. 174 He was, however, skeptical
about the authority's actions, and let the MWRA know his concerns shortly after
the Board's vote:
the cost of yet another study is an additional expense to the ratepayers,
while, at the same time, the Board purports to be concerned about the
impact of rising rates on those same ratepayers. Those ratepayers can
expect that Secretary Tierney [the head of the board], as well as the
majority of the Board, have discovered a reasonably-founded basis to
reopen this divisive issue and are not merely taking public advantage of
Congressman Frank's amendment described in earlier orders. Advances
in knowledge that would make this project more cost effective and
efficient are always welcome. . . . As I have said on countless occasions,
171 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Response of the United States to
certain recent filings (November 21, 1991), 2.
172 EPA Region 1 Administrator, Julie Belaga, quoted in Gelbspan, "Agency's new landfill
search revives old dispute."
173 Joseph Favaloro, Director of the Advisory Board, stated that the decision was "another
raid on the ratepayers. We are concerned and angry that, whatever the motives behind
this decision, the end result will cost ratepayers another $100,000. How many times are
we going to go through the same exercise?" Gelbspan, "Agency's new landfill search
revives old dispute."
174 Mazzone interview, 6 December 1993.
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the remedial schedule ... will not be frustrated by political concerns. This
is not to say that the Secretary and the Board should not explore every
feasible alternative in carrying out their obligations to direct the MWRA
and to make the hard decisions necessary to fulfill its purpose. It is to say
that their actions and the underlying rationale should be fully explained
so that the added burden to the ratepayers is justified. 175
Thus began a two-track process, with the authority simultaneously
preparing to move forward with the Walpole site and seeking out alternatives.
From the Spring of 1992 through the early summer of 1993, the move towards
construction of the Walpole landfill was halting, and the schedule's deadline for
the commencement of construction, September 1992, was missed for a variety of
reasons including delays in getting state approval of the landfill permit and the
need for additional site field work.176 The court was quite concerned about the
missed deadlines, but decided that the delays had not reached a critical point,
thereby requiring his active intervention to assure the integrity of the schedule's
requirement for backup landfill capacity by March 1994.
At the same time, the MWRA had been expressing increasing faith in its
ability to devise an alternative landfill plan that would satisfy all the parties.
Indeed, on July 7, 1993, the MWRA presented the court with an outline of its
proposed plan to use an out-of-state landfill in place of Walpole.177 Despite the
MWRA's optimism, the EPA was growing increasingly concerned about the
prospects of having backup capacity in place by 1994 if the MWRA didn't act
soon to finally resolve the landfill debate, one way or another.
To that end, the EPA requested that the court order the MWRA to issue a
notice to proceed with construction of the Walpole site by October 12, 1993.178
175 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Four Compliance Order
Number 71 (November 26, 1991): 7-9.
176 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 85 (February 1, 1993).
177 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 91 (July 30, 1993), 6.
178 Ibid.
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The MWRA countered that the appropriate deadline was November 1, and the
court agreed. 179 Reflecting on Mazzone's decision to set the November 1
deadline, an EPA spokesperson said "there's been a lot of talk and not a lot of
action. The Judge is telling the MWRA there's a length of time we'll listen to the
talk, and then it's time for action."180
During July and August, the MWRA further refined its proposal and got
the other parties to sign on. On September 9th of that year the MWRA submitted
a motion to modify the long-term residuals management scheduling order. In
place of the immediate construction of the Walpole landfill, the MWRA would
instead move forward with a plan that included entering into a contractual
arrangements with a private firm that would guarantee 30 years worth of
commercial disposal capacity of the authority's sludge cake output at a landfill in
Utah, with backup sludge disposal capacity at another landfill in North Dakota,
and an option for additional grit and screenings disposal capacity. 181 The
proposed plan would also guarantee additional backup commercial disposal
capacity if there are any problems at the aforementioned landfills. Furthermore,
the authority, in agreement with the Towns of Walpole and Norfolk, would
maintain ownership of the Walpole site so that a landfill could still be built there
if the need arose. In their motion to the court, the MWRA made clear the benefits
of the new plan:
Unlike the Walpole landfill which provides backup capacity for only two
to three years ... the alternative plan provides backup capacity for ... the
next 30 years. . . . by substituting multiple backup landfills available
through commercial means in place of sole reliance on a landfill to be
owned by the MWRA, the alternative provides a better way to achieve the
Court's objective of ensuring long-term compliance with the Clean Water
Act.... Finally, the alternative plan can be in place within the original
179 Ibid, 7.
180 Stephen Power, "Court gives MWRA sewage ultimatum," The Boston Globe 3 August
1993, 63.
181 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Memorandum of the
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority in Support of Motion to Modify Long-Term
Residuals Management Scheduling Order (September 9, 1993).
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March 1994 Court-scheduled milestone for operation of the Walpole
landfill.182
At the October 1, 1993, hearing on MWRA's motion, each party rose to
support the new plan.183 Mazzone, clearly excited by this turn of events,
commended the parties and stated that the alternative was "better than" the
original plan and, therefore, altering the schedule to reflect the alternative was a
"meritorious modification in accordance with federal law."184
The Outcomes of Court Intervention
From 1985 through the end of 1993, MWRA missed many of the
schedule's numerous deadlines. Nevertheless, those "misses" were often
relatively minor, e.g., overshooting the date for submitting a draft facility plan by
a few months, and did not add up to a flouting of the schedule's basic integrity.
Indeed, during that period the MWRA was quite successful in meeting or beating
the schedule's major and most important deadlines. For example, the authority
ceased discharging sludge into the harbor by the court imposed deadline of
December 1991, and commenced construction of the first battery of secondary
treatment two months in advance of the milestone scheduled for January 1993.185
In addition, the upgrades of the old primary plants on Deer and Nut Island, as
well as the construction of the new primary plant and the two tunnels was on
track. This is why Mazzone was correct in stating that, as of December 1993, the
182 Ibid, 3-4.
183 MWRA, CLF, Quincy, and a representative of Walpole who was allowed to speak, all
lauded the new plan as being better than the old. EPA accepted the plan, but was
unwilling to call it better than the one it replaced, although the agency agreed it was
good enough and would fulfill legal requirements. In an interview the week before the
hearing, the acting Regional Administrator said that EPA's decision to support the
MWRA proposal "was not based on politics, but on the merits of the plan." Quoted in
Scott Allen, "EPA ends push for Walpole landfill, approves sending sludge to Utah," The
Boston Globe 24 September 1993, 23. Also see, Michael Grunwald, "Judge buries
Walpole dump plan, group triumphs: MWRA moves sludge site," The Boston Globe 10
October 1993), 1.
184 Author's notes at the October 1, 1993 hearing.
185 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 86 (February 26, 1993).
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MWRA had "complied reasonably with the schedule" and that the project is
essentially "on time."186
Since late 1993 there has been continued progress. For example, CSO
planning is proceeding in accord with the reformulation of the CSO planning
deadlines. The authority has also missed one major deadline and fallen behind
in its efforts to meet key future deadlines. July 1994 was the deadline for
commencing operation of the first two batteries of the new primary treatment
plant. As of the date of this dissertation, those two batteries are still not on line.
The authority plans to have them up and running by January 1995, and that
seems to be a reasonable assumption given the fact that as of August 1994, 94% of
the construction of the batteries was complete.187 The delay was in large part
due to severe winter weather conditions which slowed the pace of construction
considerably.
While Mazzone, as well as the other parties, expressed concern about the
delay, they are all confident that the authority is doing the best it can to complete
construction as soon as possible. As Mazzone stated, "[t]he reasons given by the
MWRA for the delays are ... coherent and understandable, particularly given
the complexity of the project and the difficult winter conditions that have
prevailed this year."18 8 Interestingly enough, despite the delay with the first two
batteries, the authority is slightly ahead of schedule in its efforts to meet the July
1995 deadline for completing construction of the final two batteries of primary.189
The construction of the outfall tunnel and the inter-island tunnel has fallen
behind schedule. As is the case with the first two batteries of primary, the
reasons for this slippage are primarily the result of problems that are beyond the
court's control. There were fires in both tunnels that halted construction for a
while, while safety concerns were addressed. And the workers in the inter-island
186 Mazzone interview, 6 December 1993.
187 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Six Compliance Order
Number 104 (August 23, 1994), 1-2.
188 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 98 (February 28, 1994), 3.
189 The Boston Harbor Project July 1994 MWRA report -- 7.
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tunnel have encountered unstable and porous rock, which has led to
considerable flooding and a slowdown in tunneling activities. As a result of
delays it appears unlikely that the authority will meet either of the original
deadlines for tunnel completion.
As for environmental restoration, MWRA's efforts have led to a cleaner
harbor. In its 1990 report card, The State of Boston Harbor, MWRA gave the
harbor an almost failing grade of D+.190 The various components that went into
determining that overall grade included evaluations of the safety of swimming
beaches, fish contamination, sediment contamination, and aesthetics. A year
later, the grade had risen to C-, a change that surprised MWRA, which had not
expected to see improvements so soon.191 The most recent State of the Boston
Harbor reports did away with the grading system. Nevertheless, there is no
doubt that the improvements already seen are being sustained and, if anything,
the state of the harbor has become a bit better as a result of continuing upgrades
and system repair. According the Eric Hall, water quality specialist at EPA, there
is "no question" that MWRA's efforts have led to water quality improvements.192
Court intervention has not only affected the environment, but also the
pocketbooks of those who are serviced by the MWRA. From the day the MWRA
was created everyone knew that complying with the CWA would be extremely
expensive. Indeed, that was one of the main rationales for creating an
independent authority. In its drive to comply with court schedule the authority
has already awarded over two billion dollars in contracts to pay for the various
projects that are either completed or underway. And current estimates place the
overall price tag of moving to secondary at anywhere from 3.4 to 4.3 billion
dollars, and that doesn't include the amount that will be necessary to complete
whatever CSO facilities are finally agreed upon.193
190 Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, The State of Boston Harbor: 1990 (November
1990).
191 A. C. Rex, et al., The State of Boston Harbor: 1991 (MWRA, Technical Report No. 92-3,
January 1993). Also see, David Luberoff and Dominic Slowey, "'Sludge judge' faults the
politicians," Middlesex News 13 September 1987).
192 Telephone interview by author, 8 November 1994.
193 The variation depends on who's doing the estimating, what they are including, and how
they count current dollars. Dolin, "Boston's Murky Political Waters," 31; Deegan, 772-
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As a result the expenditures to date, MWRA ratepayers have seen their
water and sewer bills skyrocket. In 1985, the average annual water and sewer
bill for a family of four within the MWRA service area was just under $200.194
Since that time the MWRA has had to raise rates to the point where, in 1993, the
average water and sewer bill was $572, which is among the highest average rates
in the nation.195 And, one thing is certain, those rates will continue to rise many
years into the future.196 Rising rates, in turn, have fueled ratepayer anger which
has translated into political pressure to keep rates down.
This pressure has not been lost on the MWRA. From its inception the
authority has pursued ways of reducing the cost of service to the ratepayers.
Early authority efforts focused on getting the federal government to financially
support the cleanup. The hopes for large-scale federal support, however, faded
significantly in 1987 when Congress amended the CWA and phased out the
construction grants program between 1987 and 1990. Nevertheless, the lobbying
efforts of the MWRA and various state political representatives to secure cleanup
appropriations from Congress and the Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton
have netted hundreds of millions of dollars in support from the federal
government. The MWRA has also been able to secure some additional funding
from the state. Federal and state aid has helped to reduce the financial burden
borne by the ratepayers. 197 Despite this, it is expected that roughly 90 percent of
the cleanup costs will still have to be paid by the MWRA ratepayers. 198
773; Allen, "MWRA rates rank 54th in new survey," The Boston Globe 23 October 1993;
Allen, "Where it all goes," The Boston Globe 13 December 1993, 8-9. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Office for Administration and Finance. Division of Capital Planning and
Operations. Management Review of the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority's
Boston Harbor Project -- Deer Island Facilities, Final Report (May 1994).
194 Dolin, "Boston's Murky Political Waters," 31.
195 According to a recent EPA survey, the MWRA rates rank 54th in the country. Allen,
"MWRA rates rank 54th in new survey,
196 How high the rates will go depends on who's doing the calculating. get numbers from
different estimates, ranging from around 1,000 up to 2,000 dollars.
197 According to Paul DiNatale, MWRA Spokesman, "Without the assistance that we've been
receiving from the state and federal government, our rates would be off the chart." Scott
Allen, "Water-sewer bills 3d costliest in US," The Boston Globe 3 November 1994, 33.
198 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, House Committee on Post Audit and Oversight,
Subcommittee on MWRA Operations, The Boston Harbor Cleanup Project: Funding
Options and Engineering Alternatives to Produce Rate Relief (May 20, 1993): 1.
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The authority has also sought ways to reconfigure the project so that cost
savings could be realized. One example of this is the authority's efforts to re-size
CSO facilities in light of more accurate information on sewage flows. MWRA is
also looking into ways of building a cheaper secondary treatment plant. Such
treatment is defined under the CWA in terms of pollutant removal efficiencies,
not specific treatment technologies. Thus, as long as the treatment technology
used eliminates 85 percent of the BOD and TSS it complies with the secondary
requirement. Currently, the MWRA is moving ahead with the design
construction of a relatively standard, activated sludge secondary treatment plant.
However, the Authority, is also exploring the potential of achieving secondary
using a cheaper treatment alternative advocated by a group of engineers at MIT,
headed by Donald R. F. Harleman -- chemically enhanced primary treatment.
The latter uses a coagulant, such as ferric chloride, to produce "flocs" that settle
out and can be collected as sludge. Citing the use of enhanced primary treatment
in Europe, Canada, and California, the engineers claim that it will achieve
reductions in TSS and BOD that are comparable to, but not quite as high as, those
achieved by more traditional secondary treatment. Thus, to meet the CWA's
secondary requirements, the engineers recommend that, in addition to
retrofitting the new primary plant to become a chemically enhanced facility,
MWRA should also build a small, add-on secondary plant that would bring the
effluent up to CWA standards. This reconfigured facility, it is argued, would be
more efficient than the one it replaces and, therefore, be able to handle more
sewage flow. Increased efficiency, in turn, would enable MWRA to build smaller
facilities. The engineers estimate that the newly configured plant would reduce
construction, operation and maintenance costs considerably. 199 MWRA is also
exploring the possibility of eliminating one or two batteries of the planned
secondary treatment plant, arguing that it may be possible to meet secondary
standards despite a reduction in treatment capacity.
199 Dolin, "Boston Harbor's Murky Political Waters," 30-31. At the writing of this
dissertation, the MWRA was about to come out with a study of advanced primary
treatment that indicates that using this technology would not reduce the costs of
acheiving secondary and, indeed, would likely increase those costs. Renick interview, 8
November 1994.
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The court's position with regards to the cost of the project and how it
should impact the schedule is clear. Mazzone has consistently argued, from the
outset of the remedial process, that rising costs and the political outcry they
engender are no defense against compliance with the CWA as embodied in the
schedule's remedial actions. Yet, at the same time, he has consistently
encouraged the "MWRA to explore all legal and feasible means of reducing the
financial burden ... [the] project will impose on the MWRA's ratepayers."200
The Federal Court Case, Legitimacy, Capacity, and Effectiveness
The federal court case has many years left to run. Nevertheless, enough
has transpired to analyze the legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness of the federal
district court's intervention in the remedial process. The following sections take
each of these issues in turn.
Legitimacy in Remedy Formulation and Implementation
The court's role in remedy formulation and implementation in this case
has been highly legitimate. This becomes clear in the following sections which
analyze not only how the remedial process was structured and the types of
remedial decisions that were made, but also how the various parties perceived
the nature and scope of the court's intervention.
Deferring to the Parties
Mazzone has consistently deferred to the parties to make the remedial
decisions.201 According to one party, Mazzone's "whole approach has been to
get the parties to reach consensus. 202 Another comments that "the judge has
made it clear that the parties should work things out by agreement."203 A third
200 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Order number 53 3.
201 "I always encourage the parties to reach agreement." Mazzone interview, 4 May 1993.
202 Renick interview, 25 August 1994.
203 Fowley interview, 20 September 1994.
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adds that "Mazzone has always deferred to the parties."204 This deferential
posture has certainly had an impact on the deliberations. From the outset of the
remedial regime up through the present, the parties have endeavored to reach
agreement on remedial decisions, ranging from establishing the original long-
term schedule for secondary treatment to reformulating the CSO schedule.
In most cases the parties have been able to present the court with remedial
reformulations that they all support. "In almost every case in which Mazzone
has deferred to the parties, such deference has been successful."205 Of course, the
means by which the parties have reached agreement has varied. For example,
the proposal to change the long-term scheduling dates for secondary and the
tunnels was negotiated and agreed to by all the parties before a motion for
reformulating the schedule was presented to Mazzone.
In other cases, however, e.g., the reformulation of CSO deadlines, the
MWRA and EPA hammered out the specifics of the proposed changes among
themselves and then presented their proposal to the other parties who ultimately
supported it. In light of the criteria there is room to question the legitimacy of
this approach. Having the parties presented with what appears to be a fait
accompli, proposed remedial change by the MWRA and EPA seems contrary to
the idea that the court is most legitimate when all the parties reach agreement on
remedial decisions as a result of negotiations among themselves. A closer look at
situations in which remedial changes are supported by all the parties but are not
negotiated by all the parties indicates that legitimacy is not sacrificed.
First, it is not as if the negotiations between any of the parties is done in
secret. The parties have developed a close working relationship that involves
"many layers of communication and interaction."206 As a result all the parties are
aware of any remedial changes that are being considered at any one time. For
example, all the parties knew that MWRA and EPA were negotiating potential
changes to the CSO deadlines.
204 Doliner interview, 8 November 1994.
205 Ibid.
206 Renick interview, 8 November 1994.
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Second, having all parties participate in negotiations over remedial
changes assumes that all the parties are, in fact, interested in being involved.
This is not always true. As a representative of Winthrop, noted, "the CSO issue
doesn't enjoy a high level of interest for Winthrop. We were told about the
negotiations between MWRA and EPA ahead of time and said okay, waiting to
see what they came up with."207 In other instances, parties have expressed a
similar willingness to let negotiations proceed in their absence.
Third, even though the proposed remedial changes are hammered out by
a subset of the parties, all the parties are given the chance to review any such
proposal before it is submitted to the court. This is both a matter of professional
courtesy among lawyers and a function of the local rules of the District Court
which require all motions to be circulated among the parties before submission to
the court. 208 If the parties oppose proposed remedial changes they can make
their opposition known to the court. The fact that parties don't oppose the
motions means they find the changes acceptable. Thus, whether proposed
remedial changes are negotiated by all the parties, or negotiated by some and
supported by all, in such instances the courts' deference to the parties to reach
agreement on remedial decisions has been a success, and the judge, as a result,
has been able to avoid making those politically and administratively sensitive
decisions on his own.
This analysis would likely be quite different, however, if the negotiations
among EPA and MWRA were done in secret and the other parties felt that they
were being put in the position of commenting, after the fact, on issues about
which they were greatly concerned. As a representative of Winthrop noted,
while they were willing to sit back on the CSO issue, if the MWRA and EPA had
"not included us in negotiations over, for example, the level of disinfection done
at Deer Island [which is very important to us] we would have gone into low
earth orbit."209
207 Doliner, interview, 9 November 1994.
208 According to Renick, "MWRA would not want to catch any of the parties by surprise in
submitting a motion to the court." Interview, 25 August 1994. Fowley interview, 20
September 1994; Doliner, interview, 9 November 1994.
209 Doliner, interview, 8 November 1994.
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There is evidence that the court's deferential stance has been instrumental
in fostering the creation of the positive working relationship that has evolved
among the parties. As one of the respondents noted, "the parties know that if
there is a disagreement among them, Mazzone will urge them to resolve it and,
therefore, the parties' first response is to try to solve the problem themselves."210
There is also evidence that the parties' ability to reach agreement on remedial
issues does increase the level of commitment to seeing the remedy successfully
implemented. "Our commitment to seeing the remedy achieved is enhanced by
the good working relationship we have developed with the other parties and our
support for most of the remedial decisions that have been made."211 Another
respondent added that, "the relationship among the parties and the agreement
certainly helps generate increased commitment to the implementation of the
remedy. There is a feeling of ownership of the process."212
Deference up to a Point
Another aspect of legitimacy is the determining the moment when court
should replace deference with action. Judge Mazzone has repeatedly indicated
that, while he would prefer the parties to make the remedial decisions, he will
step in if they are not able to do so. In determining whether a judge's assumption
of the remedial formulation role is legitimate one has to evaluate the
persuasiveness of the justification the judge uses for stepping in. When Mazzone
has gotten directly involved in remedy formulation his justifications have been
persuasive. The best example of this is the initial negotiations over the long-term
schedule. As he had done in regards to the earlier interim order, Mazzone first
deferred to the parties, hoping that they could resolve their differences over long
term scheduling. He established a deadline for negotiations to which none of the
parties objected. When the parties asked for more time to narrow their
differences, he gave it. Only after the parties reached an impasse did Mazzone
step in, and none of the parties opposed the judge's assumption of the remedial
role. As Mazzone noted at the time, since a long-term schedule was essential to
210 Ibid.
211 Lipman interview, 15 November 1994.
212 Shelley Interview, 5 August 1994.
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moving the MWRA into compliance with the law and helping to clean up the
harbor, continued delay in devising such a schedule could not be tolerated.
Mazzone's posture of deference up to a point had one particularly
important impact. By making clear his intentions to make a decision if the
parties could not, Mazzone altered the dynamics of the negotiations. The
uncertainty over how the judge would decide the issues, created an incentive
among the parties to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on their own.
Although no final agreement was reached, Mazzone's judicial strategy was not a
failure. The parties did narrow their differences. They negotiated to the point
where they would rather risk a court decision adverse to their interests than
make any more concessions.
Specificity of the Remedy
The criteria presented in chapter two argued that it is illegitimate for the
court to make specific funding and administrative, e.g., personnel, decisions that
are traditionally made by the institution or other politically responsive entities.
Mazzone has avoided getting the court involved in making such decisions. This
supports his claim that the "court has consistently taken the position that it
would not involve itself in the day to day affairs of the MWRA ... ."213 Whether
the remedy has been formulated by Mazzone or by the parties and adopted by
Mazzone, the required remedial actions have been limited in scope. The
schedule, for example, does not require the MWRA to hire staff, to create new
divisions to oversee the project, or issue a certain number of bonds in a particular
manner. Those types of decisions are left to the authority's discretion. What the
schedule does do is establish deadlines for the MWRA to meet in developing and
finalizing facility plans, and beginning and completing the construction of those
facilities. It is left up to the authority to fill in the funding and administrative
blanks that will enable it to comply with the deadlines.
213 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 77 (May 28, 1992), 3.
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Given the scope of the schedule it is equally clear that court intervention
has been legitimate in the sense that the remedy has respected the integrity of the
regulatory process. According to Mazzone, it has been the court's position that
"whenever possible, applicable regulatory agencies are to remain responsible for
making substantive decisions concerning the design, construction, and operation
of the new sewage facilities." 214 The courts actions bear this out. While it is the
MWRA's responsibility to plan, design, construct, and operate the sewage
facilities, it is the responsibility of the relevant regulatory agencies to review and
approve the authority's actions every step of the way. The court schedule creates
a framework within which those reviews and approvals take place; it doesn't
make those decisions, it responds to them. As one party noted, "Mazzone is a
very strong proponent of having decisions made by the appropriate body or
party."215
The Remedy Reflecting the Violation
This case highlighted three major violations of the CWA -- the discharge
of sludge into the harbor, the failure of the MWRA's sewage plants to provide
secondary treatment, and the failure to provide adequate treatment for CSOs.
The legitimate focus for the court-ordered remedy, therefore, would be on
addressing those three violations, as opposed to other issues that are not before
the court, and that is exactly what the schedule does focus on. That does not
mean, however, that every requirement in the schedule is dictated by the terms
of the CWA. Take, for example, the sludge issue. To comply with the CWA the
MWRA had to stop discharging sludge into the harbor, yet the act says nothing
about what alternative means of sludge management is to be used. Nevertheless,
the court had to become involved in ensuring that alternative means were
developed, for one cannot stop discharging thousands of tons of sludge daily if
there is not some other management option available. Ceasing the discharge of
sludge and developing land-based, sludge management facilities became issues
that were inextricably linked. The court couldn't address one without addressing
the other.
214 Ibid.
215 Wilkins interview, 2 November 1994.
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Higher Courts and Congress
As with any judicial remedy, parties who oppose a remedial decision have
the option of appealing the trial court's ruling to a higher court or taking their
grievances to the legislative body. In this case only one of Mazzone's remedial
actions has been appealed to a higher court -- the imposition of a moratorium as
a response to the landfill siting situation. The court of appeals upheld the
moratorium and, in so doing, confirmed the legitimacy of that remedial action.
As for appeals to Congress to change the law in a way that would overturn any
of the court's remedial decisions, the MWRA has focused its lobbying efforts on
getting increased federal funding for the project, not on getting the requirements
of the CWA changed in a way that would render illegitimate any planned
remedial actions. And Congress, which is well aware of the huge costs of the
Boston Harbor project has not sought to amend the CWA in a way that would
either change the act's requirements as they relate specifically to Boston Harbor
or to change the requirements in a general way that would impact the project.
The Perspectives of the Parties
In asking the parties whether Judge Mazzone has acted legitimately, both
during remedy formulation and implementation, there was unanimous
agreement that he had. Among the responses were:
Mazzone involvement has been superb. I don't know of any party that is
not respectful of the role he has played. He continues to defer to the
parties to try to resolve things. He exercises power when needed, and
only then. He has not been intrusive, but supportive. No party feels that
the court has acted illegitimately.216
We are very happy with the judge, not that we agree with every one of his
decisions.217
216 Koff interview, 12 May 1993.
217 Fowley interview, 23 November 1993.
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The court's actions have been highly legitimate. He has shown restraint
while still getting the results he's looking for. He gives the parties an
opportunity to make decisions and overcome obstacles on their own.218
Mazzone has drawn the right balance between intervention and restraint
in a way that is ... accomplishing the plaintiff's purposes and Congress's
intention.219
Despite the battle over the moratorium, which pitted the Commonwealth
against the court, the former party still feels that, overall, Mazzone has "acted in a
legitimate manner, he's been superb."220  Because the court has been able to
maintain its inherent legitimacy in the eyes of the parties, it has avoided
opposition to its orders that might have arisen had one or more of the parties
perceived the court as overstepping the bounds of appropriate judicial behavior.
Capacity and Remedy Formulation
The court has shown it has the capacity to formulate remedies in large
part because it has created a context of deference within which the actual
formulation process is carried out, in most instances, by the parties, who
collectively have more capacity than the court to make remedial decisions.
Those parties, especially EPA and MWRA, are extremely knowledgeable about
the nature of the violations, the alternative remedies that are potentially
available, and the feasibility of remedial alternatives.
The court has placed great confidence in the ability of the parties to
formulate remedies. There is not a single instance in which the court has
significantly modified any remedial actions that were agreed to by all the parties.
This is not to say that the court reflexively accepts any agreement. Mazzone, as is
his responsibility, reviews the proposed remedial actions to ensure that they are
218 Doliner interview, 8 November 1994.
219 Shelley interview, 10 May 1993.
220 Wilkins interview, 3 November 1994.
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in line with the law and will serve to keep the MWRA moving towards
compliance. 221
The court's, as opposed to the parties', capacity to formulate a remedy can
be analyzed using Mazzone's deliberations surrounding the long-term schedule
for secondary. To date, it is the only significant example of the court making a
substantive remedial choice on its own, as opposed to adopting the remedial
choice agreed to by the parties. The information Mazzone had available to him
in deciding which of the three long-term schedules to adopt was extensive. The
MWRA, EPA, CLF presented detailed descriptions of their proposed plans as
well as analyses of the plans, buttressed by numerous affidavits by the experts of
three proposing parties and testimony delivered during the two days of court
hearings. The court was thus presented with a classic case of adversary science,
in which each expert disagreed with the next and the analyses they brought to
bear were designed to support their own schedules and discredit the other
schedules.
In light of the criteria for capacity the first question to ask is did the court
have the best available information pertaining to the alternative remedial
proposals? There is good reason to argue that it did. The experts brought in by
MWRA and EPA were quite knowledgeable about the area's sewage system, the
construction of sewage facilities in general, and the financial aspects relating to
such construction.
CLF's experts, however, by its own admission, were somewhat at a
disadvantage compared to the others, due to both the financial limitations of the
group in hiring experts and the fact that many experts didn't want to testify
against the "the golden goose [MWRA], since they all wanted to get a piece of the
action or at least be able to bid on the 2-4 billion dollar treatment plant."
As a result, CLF had to retain expert consultants "of lesser reputation [than
those retained by the other parties] from the farm leagues."2 2 As CLF's attorney
221 Mazzone interview, 6 December 1993..
222 Shelley, quoted in McCreary, 156.
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noted, "we got a guy who builds skyscrapers."223 In addition to the experts
presented by CLF, MWRA, and EPA, Mazzone received submissions and
testimony from the other parties in the case, which offered additional valuable
information for him to consider.
Of course Mazzone was not in the position of having to make the "correct"
remedial decision, for there was no right choice. Each schedule was based on
debatable engineering and financial considerations as well as assumptions about
future events. The ultimate wisdom of any remedial decision Mazzone made at
the time would be reflected in the implementation process which was yet to
come. The question to ask is whether Mazzone's selection of MWRA's schedule
was a reasonable choice at the time it was made. There are reasons to argue that
it was. It is evident in Mazzone's eighteen page, long-term scheduling order that
he had carefully reviewed the data presented to him and had weighed the pros
and cons of the three schedules. Although Mazzone had no particular expertise
in either treatment plant financing or construction coming into the case, through
the course of the case he had become quite knowledgeable on these subjects.
This was a natural outgrowth of his spending ten to fifteen hours per week on
the case and reading the extensive and detailed documents that the parties
provided to the Court in preparation for the May evidentiary hearings. 224
The order also shows that Mazzone evaluated the strength of the
assumptions upon which the various proposals were built. This is seen most
clearly in his consideration of cost, where he discounted the MWRA's claim that
EPA's and CLF's schedule would result in greatly increased costs as compared to
the authority's. It is important to reiterate that the judge was not divining truth.
Rather, he was performing the most fundamental judicial task of weighing the
strength of the evidence placed before him and deciding which evidence is most
compelling. What Mazzone essentially did in choosing MWRA's schedule is to
go with the recommendations of the experts he believed. While it may trouble
some that Mazzone's decision was based primarily on his own balancing of the
data, what this situation shows is that whenever the court has to make any
223 Shelley interview, 10 May 1993.
224 Mazzone interview, 6 December 1993.
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remedial decision there is an irreducible element of judgment that comes into
play.
The data alone, however, was not the only reason Mazzone adopted the
MWRA's schedule. He factored in the value of giving the MWRA just what they
asked for. As one respondent noted, "it was politically astute and tactically
shrewd to give them their schedule. If they hung themselves with it at least they
couldn't complain it was EPA's or CLF's."225 This too, appears reasonable,
especially since it was the authority who had the primary responsibility for
actually implementing the schedule.
Further support for the reasonableness of Mazzone's decision comes from
the reactions of the two parties whose schedules were not chosen. Neither CLF
nor EPA appealed Mazzone's decision. Indeed, both parties felt he had made a
reasonable choice. According to a CLF representative, "the process was fair and
the decision was made on substantial grounds and we can live with it." An EPA
representative stated that "Mazzone made a good decision. Lawyers are trained
to make these choices . . . Although we were disappointed in terms of losing ...
that was probably the right thing for the judge to do."226
Time, too, has reflected positively on the court's capacity to formulate
remedies. The long-term schedule has proven to be an aggressive one and, thus
far, largely effective in moving the MWRA into compliance with the secondary
treatment requirements. Indeed, given the massive nature of the project and the
difficulties to date, the CLF believes that its proposed schedule was probably
"unrealistic."227 As for the parties' collective capacity to formulate remedies that
are effective, here too, time has reflected positively. For example, the party-
generated residuals schedule did in fact lead to a cessation of sludge dumping by
the scheduled deadline of December 1991, eliminating one of the most important
violations of the CWA.
225 Shelley interview, 10 May 1993.
226 Fowley interview, 20 September 1994.
227 Shelley interview, 10 May 1993.
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Capacity to Implement
The court has been quite successful in implementing the schedule. Most
of the deadlines have been met. Where things are behind schedule, e.g., the first
two batteries of primary and tunnel construction, it is due to factors that are
outside of the court's control. Indeed, such factors would have caused delays in
moving toward compliance whether or not the court was involved. Part of the
reason why the court schedule has been successfully implemented, to date, is
attributable to the characteristics of the MWRA. The Authority is a powerful ally
of the court in the implementation process for three reasons. First, one of its
primary missions is to comply with federal water pollution control laws. Thus
the authority and the court share the same fundamental goals.
Second, MWRA has substantial powers that enable it to carry out its
mission, e.g., access to independent revenue sources and the ability to hire high-
quality personnel. Without such powers the court's task would be much more
difficult. For example, if the state case hadn't led to the creation of an authority,
the district court might have had to face the more difficult and uncertain
prospect of trying to force the legislature to give the MDC sufficient resources to
come into compliance.
Finally, the MWRA not only has the power to further the implementation
of needed measures, it also has the will. As with most new organizations,
MWRA includes among its staff a large number of highly dedicated professionals
who are greatly invested in seeing the organizations' mission achieved.228 There
is no indication that the MWRA has lost any of its earlier drives.
However much the implementation of the court schedule is aided by the
characteristics of the MWRA, focusing too much attention on this
implementation variable is a mistake. The court's ability to monitor the
implementation process, respond to changing circumstances, and overcome
228 For an excellent discussion of why new bureaucracies are usually staffed by advocates or
"zealots" who support the organizations' mission see Anthony Downs, Inside
Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967): 5-10.
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obstacles placed in the way of implementation, all combine to enhance the courts
implementation capacity.
Monitoring
The MWRA's monthly court reporting, its mid-year and annual progress
reports, the responses of the other parties to the MWRA reports, and Mazzone's
monthly compliance orders, all serve to create a running dialogue between the
court and the parties focusing on the implementation of the court schedule. As a
result of this dialogue, Mazzone is kept up to date on the progress of the
implementation process. As deadlines approach and compliance appears
unlikely, the parties, on their own, or at the urging of the court, will usually
present information as to why the deadline might be missed, what steps can be
taken to avoid missing it, and whether a modification in the schedule is
warranted. 229 Thus, the schedule, along with the submissions and any hearings
pertaining to it, serves both as an early warning device and a source of data that
the court can use to assess whether schedule modifications are justified.230
Mazzone's ability to monitor the implementation process is aided by the
nature of the remedial actions in the schedule. Those actions, e.g., preparing
plans, having them reviewed, and constructing facilities, are highly visible. The
plan is done or it is not, the review is complete or it is not, and the facility is in
229 The usefulness of the schedule is illustrated by the following text, which appeared in one
of Mazzone's compliance orders: " . . . the MWRA failed to commence construction of the
interim residuals facilities at either Deer or Nut Islands. As previously reported, an
unforeseen need for extensive cleaning of Digest #4 at Nut Island has delayed
commencement of construction. The MWRA now expects to award the construction
contract in September, 1990. As suggested by the United States, the MWRA should
report on its efforts to prevent any delays in future milestones relating to this project.
There has also been an unexpected minor slippage concerning the Deer Island interim
residuals facilities, which arises from bid protest that has since been favorably resolved.
The MWRA indicates that the resulting minor delay in commencement of construction
will have no adverse effect on the September, 1991 milestone for completion of
construction." U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Three
Compliance Order Number 55 (July 30, 1990), 2.
230 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Long Term Scheduling Order (May
8, 1986), 2.
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construction or still on the drawing board. Even if the authority wanted to
misrepresent its progress in complying with the schedule, it would not be able to
get away with it. Compliance, or lack thereof, with the deadlines is too easy to
verify, especially given the presence of regulatory agencies, federal, state, and
local, which are keeping a close eye on the MWRA's progress.231
Responding
As one of the lawyers at MWRA noted, "every few years the project looks
quite different, it evolves over time."232 Indeed, from the outset of the remedial
regime Mazzone expected the remedy to be modified in light of changing
circumstances and he has consistently shown a willingness to respond to such
circumstances by reformulating the remedy when he is convinced that
modifications are appropriate. This is evidenced in his adoption of
reformulations in the schedule relating to secondary treatment facilities, CSO
management, and the location of the residuals landfill in Walpole. In each case
the fact that all the parties agreed that a remedy reformulation was necessary and
appropriate undoubtedly made Mazzone's decision to adopt the proposed
changes easier than would have been the case had the parties disagreed.
Nevertheless, just because the parties agree to a remedial reformulation doesn't
diminish the court's role in actually having to make the decision that a proposed
reformulation is "meritorious" and worthy of adoption. Mazzone could have, for
example, rejected the Utah alternative to the Walpole landfill despite the fact that
all the parties supported it. According to one of the parties, the fact that
Mazzone didn't reject the alternative is testimony to his ability to respond
appropriately to changing circumstances. "Not many judges would have said
okay to the Utah stuff. Mazzone showed wisdom and humility in making the
right decision."233
231 For example, EPA has staff on site who keep track of the construction taking place at
Deer and Nut Islands, and in the tunnels.
232 Renick interview, 25 August 1994.
233 Wilkins interveiw, 2 November 1994.
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Mazzone's decision in the Walpole situation is especially interesting
because it shows that there are limits to the courts' willingness to respond to
changing circumstances. While Mazzone was initially skeptical of the wisdom of
the MWRA's decision to continue searching for alternatives, he accepted the
possibility that such a search might be successful and simply required the
MWRA to prove its case. Mazzone would alter the schedule if such an alteration
were justified.234 His flexibility, however, was not unbounded. The MWRA had
to make its pitch within the window of opportunity provided by the court, and
the authority could not abandon plans for the Walpole landfill while conducting
its search for an alternative. If the MWRA had been unable to come up with a
plan acceptable to the court by November 1, 1993, the scheduled date to begin
construction of the Walpole landfill, Mazzone would have taken whatever steps
he deemed necessary to ensure that the MWRA began construction on that
day.235
Overcoming Obstacles
One of the key ways in which this court intervention has overcome
obstacles to implementation is by keeping those obstacles from arising in the first
place. As the history of the MDC indicates, a serious obstacle to the
implementation of an environmental program is the complexity of joint action
and accompanying delays in regulatory decisionmaking. As the implementation
process drags on without resolution, achievement of the goals of the process is
put off further into the future. Delays in decisionmaking have not been an
obstacle to implementation in the federal case. The items on schedule are placed
at the top of the agenda of the authority and relevant regulatory agencies. This is
due, in large part, to the combined impact of the perception among the parties
that because the court is acting in a legitimate manner its orders demand respect
and should be complied with, as well as the knowledge that the court can
234 ". . . the Court stands ready, as I have stated many times before, to consider with an open
mind any motion filed by any party for justifiable schedule modifications." U.S. EPA v.
Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order Number 91
(July 30, 1993), 7.
235 Mazzone interview, 6 December 1993.
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employ meaningful sanctions to enforce compliance with the schedule's
deadlines.
Another potential obstacle to implementation is securing adequate
funding to pay for remedial actions. Here, too, court intervention has helped to
keep this potential obstacle from materializing in two ways. First, the bond
market has confidence in the courts' ability to use its powers to ensure the
institutional stability of the MWRA, thereby enabling the authority to implement
the various projects covered by the schedule and fulfill its obligations to
bondholders. Second, court intervention, and the belief that the court would use
its powers to enforce the schedule regardless of changes in the MWRA's
institutional makeup, has also played a role in keeping the state legislature from
taking any actions that would strip the authority of its power to set rates in a way
that enables it to pay for the implementation of the schedule.
As the water, fire, and sludge landfill examples indicate, it is not only
potential obstacles to implementation that the court has successfully dealt with.
Those examples show the court's ability to address actual obstacles to
implementation through the use of both the threat of sanctions and sanctions
themselves. In these cases it was not the courts legitimacy as an institution that
broke the impasse, but its ability to employ coercive powers. As a lawyer for
EPA noted in commenting on Quincy's closure of the sludge processing facilities,
"if the court only relied on moral suasion [its legitimacy as an institution] nothing
would have happened. Without the court ordering Quincy to open the plant,
along with the potential for sanctions if they didn't, sludge would have been
dumped in the harbor."236
Effectiveness
The ability to evaluate the effectiveness of court intervention is extremely
limited because the case is far from over. Most of the major deadlines with
236 Fowley interview, 23 November 1993.
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respect to the completion of the secondary treatment facilities are yet to come,
and a schedule for actually constructing necessary CSO management facilities
has not even been established. Nevertheless, enough has transpired begin to ask
whether court intervention has led to the cessation of violations within a
reasonable amount of time and at a reasonable cost. In light of the criteria, there
are good reasons to argue that the answer is yes.
Of the three violations of the CWA which the court schedule is intended to
address only the one relating to sludge has been remedied. The cessation of
sludge discharges into Boston Harbor in December 1991, is clear evidence of the
effectiveness of court intervention in leading to compliance with the law.
Compliance was also achieved within a reasonable amount of time and at a
reasonable cost. Mazzone's ongoing encouragement of the parties to seek ways
to save time and reduce cost in coming into compliance applies to all aspects of
the schedule including sludge management.
Mazzone, however, was not presented with any proposals by the parties
for shortening or lengthening the 1991 date and, therefore, his response to such
potential alterations in the time to compliance cannot be assessed. As for the
issue of cost savings relating to the cessation of sludge discharges, Mazzone was
marginally involved. The costs of achieving the 1991 deadline were those
associated with the development of the land-based, sludge management
alternatives necessary to make sure that marine waters were never again used as
a repository for MWRA's sludge.
In large part, the determination of how much those facilities would cost
was an outgrowth of the regulatory process, where the decisions were made
about the type and the design of the facilities. Mazzone had nothing to do with
those decisions. He did, however, play a direct role in the decision allowing the
Utah alternative to replace the Walpole landfill. There were many reasons
Mazzone found the Utah alternative to be a "meritorious" modification of the
schedule, one of which was the fact that it was a less-expensive alternative than
building the landfill in Walpole. Thus, in adopting the modification Mazzone
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helped to ensure the reasonableness of the cost of achieving compliance with the
1991 deadline.
From the parties' perspective, both the time and cost of achieving
compliance with the CWA's prohibition against sludge discharges were
reasonable. When the parties supported the initial adoption of the 1991 deadline,
back in June 1986, that meant that they believed that a little over five years was a
reasonable amount of time to reach compliance. Over the years, the parties re-
evaluated the deadline on a number of occasions, yet none of them argued for its
alteration. 237 As for the cost of the facilities, none of the parties felt the costs of
the land-based facilities were unreasonable or that opportunities for cost savings
had been missed. Indeed, the court's adoption of the Utah alternative, which was
supported by all the parties, is an example of taking advantage of a cost savings.
As for whether court intervention is likely to lead to the future cessation of
CWA violations within a reasonable time and at a reasonable cost, there are some
promising signs, but, of course, it is too early to know. Despite unavoidable
delays, the construction relating to the attainment of secondary treatment is
progressing. The planning for CSO management facilities is also progressing.
As one of the parties comments, "Mazzone is always pushing the authority to
move forward as aggressively as possible," and, based in his statements and
actions to date, there is reason to believe that Mazzone would be receptive to any
proposals for reducing the time to compliance.238
The court also continues to be receptive to proposals for cost savings
presented by the parties. This is clearly evidenced by Mazzone's acceptance of
the changes in the CSO management facility planning deadlines. The parties, in
turn, show every indication of being confident that all reasonable efforts to
reduce costs are being pursued. This is seen in the parties response to a June
1993 motion by the Commonwealth.
237 Lipman interview, 15 November 1994.
238 Shelley interview, 5 August 1994.
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In that motion, the Commonwealth requested the court to order the
parties to regularly report on design changes that might result in cost savings
and scientific studies that would indicate whether such savings are achievable,
and to develop statements that indicate what steps would be necessary to
implement the new proposals.239 The Commonwealth did not offer this motion
because it thought that the parties' cost saving efforts to date were inadequate.
As the lawyer representing the Commonwealth notes, "we just wanted to push
the envelope on the issue and press further inquiry."240 All of the other parties
opposed this motion, arguing among other things that such additional reporting
requirements were unnecessary given the history of cooperation among the
parties and regular reporting, and that the motion was "perilously close to
frivolous." Mazzone agreed and denied the motion:
It is clear to the court that the MWRA is attempting on every front --
indeed, on some fronts that may not be acceptable under the Clean Water
Act -- to reduce the cost of the project. While I continue to believe that
regular monthly reporting is critical to the ongoing progress of this
project, I agree that the existing, monthly format is adequate and that an
additional layer of forced reporting by multiple parties is unlikely to
forward the goal of cost reduction and might instead impede the
attainment of that goal. 241
239 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 91 (July 30, 1993).
240 Tom Bean, Assistant Attorney General, Massachusetts, telephone interview with author,
15 November 1994.
241 U.S. EPA v. Metropolitan District Commission, et. al., Schedule Five Compliance Order
Number 91 6.
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Remedial Adjudication in Environmental
Institution Cases: Lessons Learned
The issues of legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness will be of central
importance in any case of remedial adjudication involving environmental
institutions. The analysis of the state and federal court actions in light of these
criteria provides the basis for drawing out a number of lessons of which all of the
parties involved in remedial adjudication should be aware. This chapter presents
those lessons. Through an understanding of the dynamics of remedial
adjudication the parties will be in a better position to structure the process in a
way that expeditiously moves the dispute to a satisfactory conclusion.
In keeping with the analytical construct presented in chapter two, the first
part of this chapter is divided into sections on legitimacy, capacity, and
effectiveness. Given the interrelationships among these issues, there will be
instances where this neat division is sacrificed to more accurately account for the
textured nature of the remedial adjudication process. The chapter then discusses
the central importance of the judge in the process, recounts the lessons learned,
offers suggestions for further study, and comments on the future of
environmental institution, remedial adjudication.
Legitimacy
Legitimacy focuses on the proper role of the court and the parties during
remedy formulation and implementation. The case studies indicate the
instrumental value of judicial deference to the parties, as well as the need for the
court to take over the role of remedy formulation in certain circumstances. The
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cases also offer evidence that the inherent legitimacy of the court as an institution
contributes to its ability to ensure the implementation of its orders. Finally, the
federal case offers an opportunity to consider the legitimacy of the court
requiring strict compliance with the law in all circumstances.
Deference to a Point
In his analysis of remedial adjudication, which focused primarily on
constitutional cases, Cooper noted that there usually were two stages in the
remedy formulation process. In the first stage, the court acts as a facilitator,
encouraging the parties to formulate a remedy, or at least narrow their
differences. This is the equivalent of the deferential stance presented in the
criteria for legitimacy. Judges, however, declared limits on the amount of time
they were willing to defer and assume the facilitator role. When that point was
reached, the second stage began in which the judge became more "a validator or
ratifying official who placed the court's imprimatur on specific parts of the plans
submitted by the parties without regard to voluntary acceptance by other
parties."1
The Facilitator Role
The federal case offers evidence that there are a number of benefits that
accrue when the judge is able to successfully defer to the parties, and thereby
play the role of facilitator. It can enhance the legitimacy of court intervention by
keeping the court out of the role of making politically or administratively
sensitive remedial decisions that are better left to the parties. Deference can
increase the likelihood of the parties developing a working relationship which
can help them to resolve differences and, therefore, make remedial decisions on
their own. By agreeing to a remedy, the parties are more likely to feel
"ownership" of it and be committed to seeing it successfully implemented.
Finally, deference can save the court valuable time, the time it would have taken
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the judge to either choose among remedial options or formulate the remedy
himself.
The legitimacy of the facilitator role, as construed in this dissertation,
depends, in part, on the participation in the remedial negotiations of the
regulatory agency with the responsibility for implementing the law that has been
violated. The rationale for including the regulatory agency, as already
discussed, goes to the heart of the concerns about ensuring the legitimacy of
judicial intervention as well as the capacity of the court in both remedy
formulation and implementation. In the federal case, the participation of the
regulatory agency was not an issue because EPA had brought one of the suits
that was the foundation upon which the remedial process was built. Thus
deference to the parties included EPA. Indeed, in all cases where the regulatory
agency brings suit against an environmental institution, it will necessarily be
involved in the remedial process when the court is able to successfully defer first
to the parties.
There can be, however, cases in which the regulatory agency is not a
party. Under citizens' suit provisions, a citizens group may decide to sue only
the environmental institution for violating the law and not the regulatory agency
for failing to ensure that the law was properly enforced. For example, CLF sued
the city of New Bedford under the citizens suit provision of the CWA for
violating CSO requirements. 2 EPA was not named in the suit and the court-
ordered schedule, under which the city is now operating, was formulated by CLF
and the city, without the direct involvement of the agency.
The citizens' suit provision of the CWA, as well as other environmental
laws such as the Clean Air Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
allow the administrator of EPA to intervene in a citizens' suit as a matter of
right.3 But, in light of the importance of the regulatory agency's participation in
2 Shelley Interview, 5 August 1994.
3 The language in the CWA, CAA, and RCRA, all states that "In such action under this
section [citizens suits] , the Administrator, if not a party, may intervene as a matter of
right." 772. 375, 559. Bureau of National Affairs, U.S. Environmental Laws (Washington
D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs, 1988): 375, 559, 772.
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remedial negotiations during the facilitator stage, lawmakers should seriously
consider amending the citizens' suit provisions of environmental laws, at both
the federal and state level, in a way that requires the relevant regulatory agency
to intervene in the case if they are not specifically named in the suit.
The Validator/Ratifier Role
The validator/ratifier role is as important as the facilitator role.
Ultimately, the court must make the remedial decisions if the parties are unable
to do so. The state case shows that deciding when to take over the remedial
formulation process may not be a simple task and will require the judge to weigh
the pros and cons of doing so and to justify his assumption of remedial
responsibilities. The federal case, on the other hand, indicates that a good way
for the judge to structure the remedial process so that he can more easily identify
when to assume such responsibilities is to set deadlines for remedial negotiations
among the parties. Deadlines can be an effective means of both placing pressure
on the parties to reach agreement and defining the limits of the facilitator role.
The knowledge that the court will step in on a certain date if the parties fail to
reach agreement, is likely to create incentives among the parties to agree because
of the parties' uncertainty about what remedial decision the court would make.
The Potentialfor Enhancing the Facilitator Role
Given the instrumental value of the court successfully adopting the
facilitator role and getting the parties to formulate the remedies, it might be
worthwhile for those involved in environmental institution, remedial
adjudication to consider the use of persons trained in the skills of negotiation to
assist the parties in coming to agreement, such as a facilitator, mediator or a
special master whose task it is to help the parties explore their differences and
bridge them through consensus building processes. There are many examples of
environmental litigation in which such persons have helped the parties overcome
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differences and reach agreement.4 However, there are two reasons that neither
the state nor the federal case presents an opportunity to contribute any insights
into the benefits of assisted negotiation. First, neither case has any examples in
which negotiation assistance was used. Second, there is no clear cut evidence
that such assistance would have led to improved outcomes.
In the state case, during the development of the procedural order, the state
was adamantly opposed to any kind of negotiations. During the implementation
phase of the procedural order, a trained negotiation specialist might have had
more success than Haar in helping the parties reach agreement on more of the
remedial tasks in the order. However, even if that had happened, negotiations
among the parties would not have been of any consequence until the legislature
and the administration agreed on a way of creating the institutional capacity
necessary for the area's sewage system to be brought up to legal operating
standards. It is not clear how any more formal negotiated process would have
aided the legislature and the administration in resolving the institutional
capacity issue any sooner or more satisfactorily.
In the federal case, by contrast, more formal negotiations among the
parties might have led them to resolve their differences over the original long
term schedule for secondary treatment. The negotiations, as they were
conducted, did result in an exchange of information and a narrowing of
differences. But, it was more a case of one set of experts versus another.5 A
trained negotiator or facilitator might have been able to help the parties more
fully explore the validity of the assumptions upon which their arguments were
based, and help them to find more common ground. A trained negotiator also
might have been able to help overcome the unequal distribution of resources
among the parties. For example, CLF had to go to the "farm leagues" for its
4 See, for example, McGovern; Lawrence Susskind, "The Special Master as Environmental
Mediator," Environmental Law Reporter 17 (July 1987): 10239-10241; and Connie Ozawa,
Recasting Science (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).
5 The situtation in which one set of experts disputes the findings or interpretations of
another set of experts in a public fora has been termed "advocacy science." See, for
example, Susskind and Cruikshank, 29; and Ozawa and Susskind, "Mediating Science-
Intensive Disputes," Journal of Public Poilcy Analysis and Management 5, no. 1 (1985):
23-39.
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technical support. By creating a context for sharing information, creating new
information and exploring options, a negotiation specialist might have placed the
CLF on more equal technical footing with EPA and MWRA.
However, it is not clear how assisted negotiation would have resulted in a
better solution. All of the parties felt that Mazzone had made a reasonable
remedial choice given the information available at the time, and none of them
opposed the schedule or worked to undermine it. And, subsequent
implementation certainly has supported the wisdom of Mazzone's choice. Also,
by making the remedial decision after giving the parties a certain amount of time
to work out their differences, Mazzone ensured that a remedial decision was
made in fairly short order.
There is the strong possibility that formal negotiations, replete with joint
fact-finding and the exploration/resolution of differences, would have taken
much longer than what actually transpired. Thus, even if agreement were
reached, it might have required more time, thereby pushing the actual task of
remedying the violations even further into the future. Furthermore, in virtually
all their subsequent negotiations, the parties in the federal case have been able to
reach agreement on their own, without formal outside help. While formal
negotiations are useful in many circumstances, it is highly unlikely that they
could have improved matters in either the state or federal case.
Legitimacy and Implementation
The federal case offers evidence to support the contention that one of the
most important powers that a court posesses to ensure the implementation of its
orders is its moral sanction. This is an extension of the courts' inherent
legitimacy as an institution. By acting in a manner that the relevant political
actors perceive as legitimate, Mazzone has had a positive influence on the desire
of those actors to comply with the terms of the court-ordered schedule. The
courts' imprimatur on the remedy brings a powerful element of moral suasion
into play. This element is based on the perception that the court is a just arbiter
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of what the law requires and that, therefore, the courts' orders deserve respect
and should be carried out.
The flipside of this causal nexus is that if a court acts illegitimately, the
relevant political actors will tend to oppose court orders, thereby reducing the
courts' ability to further implementation. The state case offers evidence that
appears to contradict this claim. The fact that some of the courts' actions on
behalf of the "ultimate remedy" were illegitimate did not result in a backlash of
the political actors whose actions were necessary to get the remedy implemented.
Indeed, quite the opposite is true. Garrity's actions were instrumental in getting
the authority bill passed and signed into law. Thus, using an "ends justifies the
means" rationale, it could be argued that illegitimate judicial behavior is
acceptable as long as it leads to desirable outcomes.
While the state case provides evidence that casts doubt on the
instrumental value of the court acting in a legitimate manner and, in fact
provides some evidence that there is an instrumental value to illegitimate
behavior, this should not be construed as an argument in favor of illegitimacy.
The judicial process is not just about reaching certain ends; it is also about the
means used to achieve those ends. If judges, on a regular basis acted as did
Garrity towards the end of his tenure on the bench, it would most likely lead to a
''waning of judicial legitimacy" and a corresponding increase in resistance to
judicial orders. 6 Such resistance is especially problematic because the courts are
inherently weak institutions. This is primarily because the judiciary is largely
dependent on the cooperation of the other branches of government to carry out
its orders. 7 If those branches strongly oppose court orders because they believe
6 Rose has formally defined "waning judicial legitimacy" as "a diminution of the public
respect for and decrease in the public's sense of obligation to be bound by the rulings of
courts, resulting from the perception that courts do not themselves conform to an abide
by accepted legal principles limiting their authority." Jerome G. Rose, "New Additions to
the Lexicon of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, Seton Hall Law Review, Vol. 14 (1984),
885, cited in Rose, "Waning Judicial Legitimacy: The Price of Judicial Promulgation of
Urban Policy," The Urban Lawyer 20, no. 2 (Summer 1988), 802.
7 As Alexander Hamilton stated, ""The judiciary ... It may truly be said to have neither
FORCE nor WILL, [sic] but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid
of the executive arm for the efficacy of its judgment." Quoted in Smith, Courts and Public
Policy 21.
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the court to be acting in an illegitimate manner, there is likely to be little that the
court can do to force them to implement their decrees.
Legitimacy and Strict Compliance
According to the criteria for legitimacy, it is the responsibility of the court
to enforce compliance with the law. In light of this, Mazzone's actions with
respect to secondary treatment have been highly legitimate. The law requires
secondary treatment, and until the law changes Mazzone will not waive that
requirement regardless of how much it costs to achieve it. "When the law
changes, the order changes."8 By requiring the MWRA to achieve secondary
treatment, Mazzone's remedy clearly reflects the nature of the violation, and once
the authority achieves such treatment levels, it will be in compliance with that
part of the law. But, one can question whether the courts should require strict
compliance with the law in all circumstances. What if, for example, Mazzone
had refused to order the MWRA to meet the secondary standard because he
believed that the costs of achieving secondary outweighed the benefits and, as a
result, ordering the MWRA to meet the standard would not be in the public
interest? Would that be a legitimate judicial action? This section provides five
reasons why it would not. Before presenting those reasons, however, it is useful
to briefly consider the events surrounding a court case involving the city of San
Diego in which one of the main issues is the CWA's secondary treatment
requirement. 9
8 Mazzone interview, 4 May 1993.
9 The discussion of the San Diego case is based primarily on the following sources: U.S. v.
City of San Diego, Memorandum Decision and Order Rejecting Proposed Partial Consent
Decree Lodged January 31. 1990. and Setting Status Hearing for April 25. 1994 (United
States District Court, Southern District of California, Civ. No. 88-1101-B, March 31, 1994);
U.S. v. City of San Diego, Order Setting Status Hearing: And Ordering Parties to Meet
and Confer (United States District Court, Southern District of California, Civ. No. 88-
1101-B, April 29, 1994); Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies, "Secondary
Treatment Rejected in San Diego," Law Digest (Summer 1994): 1-6; National Research
Council, Managing Wastewater in Coastal Urban Areas (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 1993): 47-51; and Hugh Barroll, Assistant Regional Counsel, EPA,
Region IX, telephone interview by author, 29 November 1994.
233
Chapter VI
Dolin, Remedial Adjudication
In the mid-1980s, after failing to get a waiver from the secondary
treatment for its sewage treatment plant, San Diego and the EPA entered into a
consent decree that would have required the city to upgrade its sewage
treatment plant to secondary by 2003, plus take a variety of other actions relating
to improving water quality, e.g., building water reclamation facilities. EPA and
the city submitted the consent decree to federal district court judge Rudi
Brewster in 1990. After hearings that raised concerns about the costs and
appropriateness of the decree, Brewster put off his decision on whether to enter
the decree and ordered the city to conduct pilot tests to determine if the plant
could use alternative technologies to achieve secondary levels of effluent
reduction for less money than would be the case if the conventional technologies
identified in the decree were used.
In early 1994, after three weeks of testimony, Brewster decided that the
consent decree was not in the public interest and he refused to enter it. This
decision was, in part, due to Brewster's perspective on the secondary issue. He
found that while the city's improved treatment processes still were unable to
meet secondary standards, they were close to meeting those standards, and that
the plant's discharges did not harm the marine environment, but in fact were
beneficial to it (e.g., adding nutrients). As a result, Brewster argued that to spend
all that money, when there appeared to be no environmental benefit coming from
doing so was an improper use of the public's money.
Following the court's decision, EPA asked the court to order the city to
comply with the secondary requirements of the CWA. The city and the other
parties in the case urged the court to deny such a request, "in large part due to
their concern that such an order would 'kill' their efforts in the [U.S.] Senate and
with EPA to obtain relief from the secondary requirement, either by legislative
amendment or by administrative waiver."10 Brewster said that he couldn't wait
indefinitely for congress or the EPA to act and that as the law presently stood, the
city must ultimately comply with secondary treatment standards. He gave the
parties until January 1995 to come up with a plan that would enable the city to
10 U.S. v. City of San Diego, Order Setting Status Hearing: And Ordering Parties to Meet
and Confer (April 29, 1994), 2.
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achieve secondary standards, thereby giving the city and the other parties some
time to further pursue legislative and/or administrative relief. Soon thereafter,
San Diego got the relief it was looking for. On October 31, 1994, President
Clinton signed into law an amendment to the CWA which specifically gave San
Diego the right to reapply for a waiver.11 The city is now in the process of
putting together their waiver application.
Assessing the legitimacy of Brewster's decision to reject the consent decree
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The rules governing judicial evaluation
of consent decrees give the judge considerable discretion in deciding whether to
adopt them, and one of the criteria for such decrees is finding that they are in the
"public interest."12 What is interesting, from the perspective of the current
analysis, is Brewster's response to EPA's request to enforce the secondary
requirement. Despite his misgivings, Brewster took essentially the same stance
as Mazzone -- secondary is what the law requires and that is, therefore, what the
court must require, only congress has the right to change that.
The San Diego case, like the hypothetical that introduced this section,
serves to raise the question of whether a judge who is involved in remedial
adjudication should enforce compliance with the law when he believes that
achieving such compliance would not be in the public interest because the costs
outweigh the benefits, even though the law doesn't require a cost-benefit
calculation? In other words, should the courts be "helpful partners" to the
legislature, balancing the cost and benefits of applying laws of general
application to specific circumstances and refusing to enforce compliance in cases
where to do so runs counter to the judge's estimation of what is in the public
interest? Or should the courts' task be to determine what the law requires in the
way of compliance and then use its powers to move the institution into
compliance, even if the judge believes that to do so would not be in the public
Ocean Pollution Reduction Act, an amendment to the CWA, creating a new Section
301(j). Photocopy provided by Barroll. At the time of the writing of this dissertation, this
amendment had yet to be formally published in the U.S. Code.
12 U.S. v. City of San Diego, Memorandum Decision and Order Rejecting Proposed Partial
Consent Decree Lodged January 31. 1990, and Setting Status Hearing for April 25. 1994
(March 31, 1994): 12.
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interest? Five reasons are presented as to why the second approach is the
legitimate one and why, therefore, both Mazzone's actions and Brewster's
ultimate stance with respect to the enforcement of the secondary treatment
requirement represent legitimate judicial behavior.
First, by inserting its opinion as to what is in the public interest, the court,
in effect, takes over the policymaking role and replaces the legislative body's
conception of what is in the public interest with its own.13 For example, in
establishing the secondary treatment as a uniform floor requirement, Congress
put into writing its determination of what level of environmental protection is in
the public interest. In a society that values the principles that underlie the
separation of powers doctrine, it is not acceptable for the courts to displace
legislative mandates unless they are found to be unconstitutional. Of course, it
may not be easy as it is in the case of secondary treatment to determine what the
law requires in the way of compliance. The statute may be ambiguous and the
legislative history confusing. Nevertheless, however ambiguous or confusing the
task may be, it is the court's responsibility to, in fact, determine what the law
requires and then, to the best of its ability, move the violating institution into
compliance.
Second, the degree to which the courts are perceived to be making policy
by inserting their own conception of what is in the public interest, they run the
risk of damaging their legitimacy as an institution and losing the power that
flows from the perception that they are acting in a legitimate manner. Third, if
this type of judicial policymaking is accepted as legitimate behavior, then it
becomes even more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to determine where to
create boundaries separating legitimate from illegitimate judicial action. For
example, although it may be relatively clear in the San Diego case that the costs
of going to secondary far outweigh the benefits, what decision should the court
make in cases where divergence of costs and benefits is not as wide, e.g., when
the costs outweigh benefits by a "significant" margin or only by a little bit?
Furthermore, the courts ability, or the ability of any entity for that matter, to
13 "By enacting the environmental statutes, Congress established the public interest in a
clean environment." Miller, 79.
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accurately assess costs and benefits and factor them into remedial
decisionmaking is highly questionable. 14 While the costs of a remedy, e.g., the
money required to build a new pollution control facility, may be relatively easy
to measure, many of the benefits, e.g., rejuvenation of ecosystems and aesthetic
improvements, are not.
Fourth, the fact that the court requires strict compliance doesn't mean that
cost is irrelevant to remedy formulation. Although in requiring strict compliance
with the law the court has no flexibility in determining the appropriate ends or
goals of enforcement, the court retains flexibility in determining the means by
which those goals will be attained. Thus, whether the remedy is formulated by
the parties or the court, the latter can use its discretion to help ensure that the
goals are attained in a cost-effective manner, thereby ameliorating the financial
impact of compliance.
Fifth, if the application of the law results in a situation that political actors
perceive as unjust or not in the public interest, they always have the option of
pressuring legislators to redress such an injustice by amending the law. The San
Diego case and the related congressional amendment to the CWA illustrate the
potential effectiveness of such pressure tactics. By insisting on strict compliance
with the law, the courts can serve a valuable purpose by exposing the true
ramifications, financial and otherwise, of legislative enactments and, thereby,
generating political pressure for the legislature in question to reconsider the
wisdom and appropriateness of the law itself either with respect to a specific
situation or in general.15 According to Plater,
Where the judge believes that a statute does not serve the public interest in
a particular case, he or she is of course free to say so, but must
nevertheless give the law its required effect. In such cases the practical
result of statutory enforcement, by injunction or otherwise, will often be a
14 Walter A. Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Policy Second Edition (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991): 128-134.
15 According to Farber, if the courts provide "ad-hoc relief to individual violators," it could
make it more difficult for congress to see the effects of its lawsl and, thereby, lead to a
reduction in congressional accountability. 543.
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transfer of the controversy to the legislature, which is the proper
repository of the power to promulgate statutory exemptions and
amendments. 16
There are many examples of such "remands to the legislature."17 As
Farber notes, "to the extent that existing statutory schemes [enforced by the
court] are too rigid, Congress has proved that it is quite capable of providing
legislative remedies. Polluters have found that it is possible to obtain
congressional relief from unduly harsh statutory provisions."18 And there is no
reason why state legislatures could not provide similar relief from the strict
application of environmental laws promulgated at the state level.
Capacity to Formulate
In addition to helping to ensure the legitimacy of judicial intervention, by
successfully deferring to the parties, the court can also help to ensure that it has
the capacity to formulate remedies. In the course of the federal case, the court
schedule has been formulated and reformulated numerous times, and in
virtually every instance the remedial decisions have been agreed to by all the
parties and adopted by the court. Mazzone's deferential posture has enabled
him, in effect, to leverage the court's capacity by leaving decisionmaking in the
16 Plater, 528. This rationale is reflected in former Chief Justice Warren Burger's words in
the majority opinion for TVA v. Hill:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that in our Constitutional system the commitment to
the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by
judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the public weal [public
interest]'. Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), at 195, cited in Jonathan Mallamud, "Courts, Statutes and
Administrative Agency Jurisdiction: A Consideration of Limits on Judicial Creativity,"
South Carolina Law Review 35, no. 2 (Winter 1984): 231.
17 The judicial phenomenon of the remand to the legislature was first described by Joseph
Sax in 1971 in his book Defending the Environment, 175-192. For specific examples of the
judicial remand see Plater, 583-588, and Farber, 516-517 and 543-544.
18 Farber, 543.
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hands of the parties who, collectively, clearly have the technical and institutional
expertise and knowledge to make sound remedial decisions.
Deference to the parties during remedy formulation may not be
successful, or a judge may decide that deference is not an appropriate option
given the circumstances. In either situation, the court inevitably must take on the
task of remedy formulation. The two cases show that in doing so, the court has
the capacity to make sound remedial decisions. In the state court case, Garrity
successfully used the special master as a means of supplementing the court's
capacity to gather relevant information and develop remedies. While Mazzone
opted not to rely on a court adjunct to assist him, he nonetheless showed himself
capable of successfully taking on the task of remedy formulation.
The state case shows how the historical record and expertise developed
prior to the initiation of litigation can facilitate the task of remedy formulation
when undertaken by the court. Rather than having to develop data pertaining to
violations and alternative remedies himself, Haar was able to gather such
information from numerous studies, reports, EPA administrative orders, and the
expertise of individuals familiar with the area's sewage situation. This body of
information enabled Haar to be more synthesizer of information than creator,
undoubtedly making his task easier than it would have been in the absence of
such data. Similarly, when Mazzone had to decide among the three long-term
schedules, he had the benefit of relying on the expertise and knowledge of the
parties as well as the vast written record. There is strong reason to believe that in
most cases of environmental institution, remedial adjudication the courts, if put
in the position of having to formulate a remedy, will be able to draw upon a
substantial body of data and expertise, as did Haar and Mazzone. These cases
will most often be brought only after other enforcement options have failed and
the nature of the pollution problems and potential solutions has been extensively
debated and studied.
239
Chapter VI
Dolin, Remedial Adjudication
Capacity to Implement
Remedy implementation takes place within a dynamic environment that is
constantly changing. The court's capacity to ensure the implementation of its
orders in such an environment depends on its ability to monitor implementation,
respond flexibly to changing circumstances, and overcome obstacles to
implementation.
Monitoring
In order to effectively monitor implementation, the court must have a
means of gathering information about the institution's progress in meeting court-
ordered deadlines. The cases provide evidence of the efficacy of using either a
special master to gather this information and then transmit it to the court, or
requiring the institution to periodically report on their progress. In either case,
the court is aided in its monitoring task by the nature of the remedial steps that
are likely to attend environmental institution cases. The development of reports,
facility plans, environmental reviews, and construction are all very public
activities and, as such, it is relatively easy to determine whether or not they have
been performed. This is especially true when the other parties to the case,
besides the institution, are given the opportunity to submit comments to the
court. Through their comments, those parties can provide the court with an
independent source of information that can be used to verify what is, and what is
not, transpiring at the ground level where implementation is taking place.
Mazzone's and, to a lesser extent, Garrity's success in monitoring the
implementation process contradicts the perception that courts don't have the
personnel or the time to effectively monitor the many activities which are being
carried out, or not carried out, as a result of their decrees. 19
19 "The judges do not have at their disposal, among other things, the independent
investigatory and fact-finding capabilities of the efficient administrative apparatus.
Indeed, they do not really have the time to function simultaneously as administrators and
judges -- except on occasion." Scheingold, 123. Shapiro claims that courts "rarely have
the administrative resources to follow-up on their resolutions." M. Shapiro, Courts 13
(1981), quoted on page 63 of Mnookin. According to Birkby, "The judge has no means
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The monitoring function is not only important as a means of keeping track
of whether the institution is meeting court-ordered deadlines, but also of
identifying both changing circumstances that might require the reformulation of
the remedy and obstacles to implementation so that they can be addressed by the
court. The federal case shows that in creating a context in which the parties,
especially the environmental institution, are encouraged and expected to be
responsible for informing the court about changing circumstances and obstacles,
through the use of reporting requirements, occasional hearings, and the
submissions of motions to amend the remedy, the court is able to keep up to date
on the way in which the implementation situation is evolving and whether any
court actions should be considered, e.g., amending the remedy or using the
court's coercive powers to deal with an obstacle to implementation.
Responding
Identifying changing circumstances is of little value unless the court is
able to respond flexibly to those circumstances by reformulating the remedy
when appropriate. Such flexibility enables the court to ensure that the schedule
is realistic and that it takes advantage of opportunities to save time and/or
money while still achieving remedial goals. The federal case indicates that the
court certainly has the capacity to respond in a flexible manner, when confronted
with persuasive arguments that remedy reformulation is appropriate. There is,
however, the potential for the court to be too flexible. If, for example, instead of
seriously evaluating the merits of proposed remedial reformulations, courts were
to repeatedly extend remedial deadlines without strong justification for doing so,
the remedial schedule itself would run the risk of becoming a tool for indefinite
delay, with the prospect for compliance being put off further into the future.
Overcoming Obstacles
Identifying obstacles to implementation is of little value unless the court
has a means to overcome them. One way in which the court can overcome such
for systematically following up on his or her orders. Typically, a court issues an decree
or order and assumes that everyone affected by it will do what they are supposed to." 6.
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obstacles is by keeping them from arising in the first place. The ability of the
courts to do this is an outgrowth of both their legitimacy as an institution and
their potential to apply tangible sanctions. The most fundamental sanction,
already alluded to above, is the courts' moral sanction which provides a strong
incentive for the relevant parties to take the actions necessary to implement a
court order.
A moral sanction alone, however, would not get the court very far. If
there were not the implied threat of the court enforcing the implementation of its
orders with the use of tangible sanctions, e.g., levying fines or placing a public
official in contempt of court, the relevant parties would likely have little
incentive to comply with court orders, for there would be no repercussions for
not complying.
Furthermore, for an implied threat to be effective, the parties must believe
not only that the threat is credible, in that the court will use its tangible sanctions
if its orders are violated, but also that those sanctions are severe enough to make
the alternative of not complying unattractive. 20 Comments by the parties in the
federal case indicate that a combination of the courts' moral sanction and the
potential for the court to apply tangible sanctions has positively influenced the
parties' efforts to comply with the court-ordered schedule and, as a result, has
kept one of the most serious obstacles to implementation -- delays in
decisionmaking -- from becoming a problem. In the state case, by contrast,
without the credible threat of sanctions to back up the procedural order, the
parties had less incentive to comply despite the court's support of the order.
When implementation obstacles do arise, the court is far from powerless
to overcome them. As the Winthrop water line example from the federal case
indicates, the mere threat of court intervention to overcome an obstacle may be
enough to get the parties to resolve the impasse themselves. And, the fire
20 "The utility of sanctions depends upon their severity and credibility." Diver, 100. The
importance of credibility in maintaining the effectiveness of threats is indicated by
Schelling's work on conflict; see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960): 40.
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example in the federal case shows how a court order, backed by an implied
threat of sanctions if the order is not obeyed, can indeed be an effective force in
overcoming an obstacle to implementation, in this case the shutdown of the
sludge processing facility.
Another way in which the courts can overcome obstacles to
implementation is by actually threatening to apply tangible sanctions. This can
be seen in Garrity's use of the receivership threat to coerce the legislature into
passing an authority bill. Here, both elements of an effective threat were in
evidence. The legislature viewed the threat as credible. Garrity's placement of
the BHA into receivership was a clear indication that he was willing to use this
drastic form of sanction as a means to an end. And the haunting specter of
receivership was a threat severe enough to make the legislature, as well as the
administration, take steps to avoid it.
As long as the threat, either implied or clearly stated, of judicially imposed
sanctions remains credible and severe enough, the court can overcome obstacles
to implementation of its orders without actually having to place its power on the
line through the application of tangible sanctions. The ability to influence
implementation in this way is especially important in light of the traditional
reluctance on the part of the courts to apply sanctions against public facilities or
public officials that are impeding the implementation of court orders.
For example, fines are often seen as counterproductive because they take
money away from the task of achieving compliance with the law.21 Holding
officials in contempt may only create martyrs to the cause and harden the resolve
of those officials to continue opposing judicial decrees. 22 Receivership is seen as
21 Gelpe, 94.
22 "In practice, courts seldom exercise their contempt power against governmental
defendants. This reluctance probably reflects a fear of polarizing the dispute by creating
a martyr around whom disaffected groups can rally." Diver, 100. For example, in the
South Boston school desegregation case, a three-man majority of the school committee
voted to disobey a court order to submit an acceptable desegregation plan. The Judge,
W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., held the three men in contempt and considered sending them to
jail, "[b]ut fearing that would only make martyrs of them, he let them purge themselves
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an extraordinary remedy, not lightly employed, and it is not clear that by taking
over the day-to-day operations of a facility the court will be in any better position
to overcome the obstacles to implementation that led to receivership.23
Nevertheless, the court cannot always rely on the threat of sanctions to
produce action. The use of the moratorium in the federal case shows the
potential value of applying sanctions in order to further the implementation of
court orders. The effectiveness of the moratorium was due to the severity of the
sanction. The political costs of transferring the landfill site to the MWRA were
far less than the political and economic costs of allowing the moratorium to
continue. The moratorium's effectiveness was also due to its ability to mobilize a
powerful constituency, in this case the development and real-estate community,
to become, in effect, an ally of the court in the latter's efforts to spur action. This
ability to mobilize the development and real-estate community was also in
evidence during the short-lived moratorium in the state case.
While the cases don't offer evidence to support this point, there is little
doubt that there is a potential cost to the court associated with threatening and
using sanctions to overcome obstacles to implementation. Repeated threats
without actual follow-through when the threats go unheeded could diminish the
value of the threat in the long run. If the threat is not credible, it will not have the
intended effect. There is also the possibility that if the judge imposed sanctions
for every violation of a schedule, it would diminish the court's ability to further
the implementation of its orders. Such actions might lead the parties to perceive
the judge as acting in an unfair and illegitimate manner and cause them to
oppose the court's actions. It seems that the most prudent course for the court to
take is to husband its enforcement resources by threatening and applying
sanctions only in the most serious instances in which the integrity of the court
order is in jeopardy, as was the case in the Walpole landfill situation.
244
of contempt by submitting a palpably unacceptable ... plan." J. Anthony Lukas,
Common Ground (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985): 243.
23 Columbia Law Review, 835-836.
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Effectiveness
The two cases provide a limited opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness
of remedial adjudication. Nevertheless, they do offer some lessons on this issue.
The state case presents a cautionary tale of judicial intervention and effectiveness.
While the court's actions were clearly effective in leading to the creation of the
authority, some of those actions were also illegitimate. As noted earlier, such an
ends justifies the means approach to remedial adjudication, while successful in
this case, is not likely to be a sustainable judicial strategy over time.
In the federal case to date, the courts' actions have been highly effective,
not only from the perspective of leading to a cessation of violations, but also in
doing so within a reasonable amount of time and at a reasonable cost. By
encouraging the parties to explore ways to save money and time, Mazzone has
helped to spur such exploration. But as is likely to be the case with any
environmental institution case, judicial encouragement will not be the only factor
that will contribute to effectiveness. The institution itself, by virtue of its public
nature and responsiveness to local concerns, will undoubtedly have strong
incentives to pursue time and cost savings where possible, and to urge the court
to alter the remedial scheme in order to take advantage of such savings.
The federal court has also helped to ensure effectiveness by being willing
to take advantage of potential cost savings presented in the form of remedial
reformulations. Without such receptivity, the effectiveness of court intervention
would be diminished.
The Role of the Judge
The judge is the single most important actor in remedial adjudication. His
perspective on the proper role of the court, and the actions he takes as a result,
will have the greatest impact in determining the legitimacy, capacity, and
effectiveness of court intervention. Because the formulation and implementation
of remedies is not simply a reflexive process in which the judge can follow a
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clearly prescribed set of actions that are delineated in advance by legal
requirements and the canons of appropriate judicial behavior, the judge must
exercise considerable discretion during all phases of remedial adjudication. The
way in which the judge chooses to exercise that discretion structures the remedial
process. He makes the decisions about whether deference is appropriate, who to
include in negotiations, when to take on the remedial role, how to resolve
disputes over proposed remedial actions, when and how to use the courts' power
to overcome obstacles to implementation, whether to encourage time and cost
savings, and how to respond to proposals for remedy reformulation. This is why
the judicial philosophy of the judge is such an important element in remedial
adjudication. As a representative of one of the parties in the federal case noted,
"you can't take the person out of the judge."24
The central importance of the judge is clear in the two cases. In the state
case, the importance of the judge became apparent even before the case began.
The lawyers for the city of Quincy waited until Garrity rotated into the city's
district before filing suit because they believed that an "activist" judge was
important because he would "prod the agency into action." The strategy proved
to be successful. It was Garrity's "activist" bent, combined with his desire to step
down from the bench, that led him to take a variety of actions that were either
illegitimate or of questionable legitimacy. Mazzone, on the other hand, possesses
a much more conservative judicial philosophy than Garrity which has been
reflected in his actions to date.
It is not only the approach that the judge decides to take that is important,
but also the manner in which he pursues the chosen path. For example, in
commenting on Mazzone, a representative of one of the parties stated that "a
different judge might not have been as skillful in playing the negotiation role --
24 Shelly interview, 16 November 1994. In his comments on the ability of judges to analyze
technical, non-legal issues, Judge Oakes indicates the importance of the human
component. "In the end, much depends on the conscientiousness or ability of the
individual judge, just as much depends, at other levels in the system, upon individual
traits of agency officials or laboratory scientists." James L. Oakes, "The Judicial Role in
Environmental Law," New York University Law Review Vol. 52 (June 1977): 512.
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pushing people to reach agreement and consensus without having to choose
himself."25
Lessons Learned
The two cases presented in this dissertation illustrate the complexity of
remedial adjudication in environmental institution cases. The parties involved in
such cases can be seen as working within a system in which the shared goal is the
creation of a remedial process that exhibits the characteristics of legitimacy,
capacity, and effectiveness. This dissertation's analysis of the state and federal
case has revealed nine key lessons of which such parties, particularly the judge,
should be aware, so that the shared goal can be achieved.
1). Perhaps the most fundamental lesson is the importance of the judge
taking on the role of facilitator of the remedial regime. By successfully deferring
to the parties during remedy formulation, the judge can enhance both the
legitimacy and capacity of judicial intervention. Deference allows the politically
responsible entities to make the relevant policy and administrative decisions.
And, it leaves the resolution of the scientific and technical issues that inevitably
attend remedy formulation in the hands of those most capable of undertaking
that task. Deference also is likely to contribute to the establishment of a working
relationship among the parties that enables them, and not the court, to take the
lead in determining whether circumstances warrant reformulating the remedy
and, if so, what type of reformulation is most appropriate. A good working
relationship among the parties and the opportunity for them to structure the
scope of the evolving remedy will, in turn, tend to increase the parties'
commitment to seeing the remedy implemented.
2). Unlimited deference to the parties is not an option that the courts
can exercise. The main goal of remedial adjudication, to bring the violating
institution into compliance, cannot be achieved if remedial indecision is let stand.
25 Shelley interview, 16 November 1994.
247
Chapter VI
Dolin, Remedial Adjudication
Establishing deadlines for the parties to make remedial decisions, after which
time the court will step in if a decision has not been reached, appears to be a
particularly useful technique not only to spur the negotiations among the parties,
but also to help the judge determine when his direct intervention is appropriate.
3). The courts can have the capacity to formulate remedies. In making
remedial decisions, courts need to get the best information available on the
causes of the violations and the remedial alternatives. This involves using the
data that was developed prior to the litigation, e.g., agency reports, and seeking
out the perspectives of those who are most familiar with the law's requirements
and the peculiar circumstances surrounding the institution. The role of the court
is not to come up with the "right" remedy but to formulate a remedy that is
reasonable and likely to bring the institution into compliance with the law.
4). Legitimate remedies must strive to bring the institution into
compliance with the law's requirements, regardless of whether or not the judge
believes that doing so is in the public interest. If the application of a general law
in a specific situation leads to a politically unacceptable outcome, it should be up
to the legislators to change the law, thereby forcing the court to modify the
remedy. While the court can use its discretion to determine the means of
reaching compliance, it should not have the power to, in effect, replace legislative
goals with ones that are judicially crafted.
5). The greater the courts' capacity to monitor remedy implementation
and respond flexibly to changing circumstances, the greater the chances that the
implementation process will run smoothly. Monitoring is made easier given the
very public, highly visible, and readily verifiable nature of the types of remedial
actions that attend environmental institution cases, e.g., the development and
regulatory review of plans and the construction of new facilities. A court's ability
to flexibly respond to changing circumstances is likely to be enhanced by the
degree to which the court can successfully defer to the parties to not only identify
the need to reformulate the remedy, but also to present a remedial option or
options for the court to review.
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6). One of the best ways for the courts to deal with obstacles to
implementation is to keep them from arising in the first place. Monitoring and
flexibly responding to changing circumstances alone, is not enough to ensure the
remedy will be implemented. By carrying out the tasks of remedy formulation
and implementation in a manner that is perceived as legitimate by the relevant
political actors, the courts can generate strong incentives for those actors to see to
it that court orders are complied with, and that traditional obstacles to
implementation, e.g., delays in decisionmaking, are avoided. The impact of such
incentives is increased by the degree to which the parties believe that, should
they impede implementation of court orders, the court will employ severe,
tangible sanctions intended to keep the implementation process on track.
7). The courts can overcome implementation obstacles, once they do
arise, in two ways. First, they can threaten to impose a tangible sanction on the
party that is causing the problem. The effectiveness of such a threat will depend
on that party's perception of whether the threat is credible and severe enough to
warrant taking action to avoid the imposition of the sanction. Second, the court
can actually apply a tangible sanction. The effectiveness of this approach
depends on severity of the sanction. For the sanction to work, it must impose a
cost on the party that is greater than the cost of continuing to refuse to comply.
8). The courts' capacity to implement is enhanced when the relevant
actors percieve the court to be behaving in a legitimate manner. As an
inherently weak institution, courts depend on the support of the other branches
to further their remedial goals. By acting illegitimately, courts may only serve to
turn needed allies into foes.
9). The effectiveness of judicial intervention is inextricably linked to
the courts' legitimacy and capacity. If the court acts illegitimately, it risks losing
its capacity to implement its orders, and if the court doesn't have the capacity to
formulate sound remedies, remedial implementation will not lead to the
cessation of violations. Furthermore, while judicial encouragement of the search
for remedial time and cost savings is an important element in ensuring
effectiveness, the search itself is useless unless the courts are capable of flexibly
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responding to new information and taking advantage of those time and cost
savings opportunities when they appear.
Suggestions for Further Study
This analysis of legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness suggests several
other questions for further study on the topic of remedial adjudication in
environmental institution cases.
The Use of Adjuncts
The state case offered some perspective on how a special master may be
used to aid the court in carrying out its remedial adjudication duties. This is
hardly the only type of adjunct that the court could use, nor is it the only way a
special master's services could be employed. As noted earlier, assisted
negotiation holds out the potential promise helping parties resolve differences.
In light of this, it would be interesting to further explore how the use of court
adjuncts, trained in negotiation techniques, might help the parties in remedial
adjudication reach consensus on remedial design so that the court can maintain
the role of facilitator, thereby helping to ensure the legitimacy, capacity, and
effectiveness of judicial intervention. 26
An adjunct might also provide useful assistance during implementation.
The federal case indicates that the hands-on style of Mazzone requires a
significant investment of one of the judiciary's scarcest resources -- time.
Mazzone spends ten to fifteen hours a week on this case.27 Given the fact that the
judiciary is already stretched to the limit in terms of caseload, the potential for
such environmental institution cases to further overburden the judiciary is very
real. In light of this, the potential for a special master, or some other court
26 For an excellent discussion of how adjuncts might be used to enhance the legitimacy,
capacity and effectiveness of remedial adjudication in public law cases (both
constitutional and statutory cases), see Sturm, "A Normative Theory of Public Law
Remedies."
27 Mazzone interview, 4 May 1993.
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adjunct, to take over some of the responsibility for managing the implementation
process should be studied more closely.
Termination of Judicial Intervention
One of the most difficult issues in constitutional cases of remedial
adjudication is determining when judicial intervention should end. 28 The issue
of termination can be problematic for a variety of reasons. For example, in cases
where the violations are partly, but not wholly resolved, the judge may feel the
need to remain involved in the hopes of achieving more complete relief. The
judge, or some of the parties, may believe that despite improvements in the
institutional capacity of the violating institution and its ability to behave in a
constitutionally acceptable manner, such gains might be lost if the court is no
longer, in effect, looking over the institution's shoulder. And, if the goals of
judicial intervention, in terms of the remedial requirements, are not clear, the
court may stay involved because it lacks cues to help it determine when
termination is appropriate.
In light of these concerns, it would be interesting to inquire into how the
issue of termination plays out in the context of environmental institution cases.
For example, is there anything in the nature of environmental statutes that
facilitates the establishment of clear remedial goals, with associated schedules for
completion, thereby making it easier to identify when judicial intervention
should end? Does the presence of regulatory agencies and the integral role they
play in enforcement of environmental law provide some assurance that the gains
achieved as a result of judicial intervention will be sustained once the court
leaves the scene? Does the development of a good working relationship between
the institution and the regulatory agency, during the time when the court is
involved, lay the groundwork for a continuing relationship after the court
terminates its involvement, and will such a continuing relationship improve the
chances of the institution avoiding a slide back towards non-compliance?
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Consent Decrees
This analysis focused on cases in which the courts are involved in both
remedy formulation and reformulation. Given the fact that litigation is much
more likely to end in the signing of a consent decree, it might be interesting to
explore how the issues of legitimacy, capacity, and effectiveness play out in that
context. For example, the issue of the courts' legitimacy and capacity with
respect to remedy formulation will undoubtedly present itself quite differently,
because it is the parties who must devise the remedy, and any reformulations of
the remedy, which the court, in turn, evaluates and accepts or rejects. It may be
that the issues of capacity to implement and effectiveness will have to be
considered in a different light as well.
Looking to the Future
The likely future course of remedial adjudication in environmental
institution cases is difficult to discern. It may be that the number of such cases
will continue to be relatively few and that environmental institutions that are
violating the law will be brought back into compliance via the use of other
enforcement techniques that fall lower down on the hierarchy of enforcement
options than the full-blown involvement of the courts in both remedy
formulation and implementation, e.g., consent decrees or administrative orders.
Or, such cases might become more common as towns, cities, and regional
districts refuse to implement environmental mandates without receiving the
funding for the latter from federal and/or state coffers. 29 In those situations, the
29 The problems posed by unfunded or underfunded government mandates has been a hot
topic of debate for years. See, for example, Michael Fix and Daphne A. Kenyon, Coping
with Mandates: What are the Alematives (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press,
1990); John W. Moore, "Mandates Without Money," National Journal (October 4, 1986):
2366; and Enviromental Law Review Committee to the Mayor and City Council of The
City of Columbus, Environmental Legislation: The Increasing Costs of Regulatory
Compliance to the City of Columbus (May 13, 1991). With the recent takeover of
Congress by a Republican majority, this issue is likely to take conter stage in a national
debate over regulation of all types, not just environmental. Indeed, a bill to bar the
federal government from imposing mandates without providing adequate funds is the
top priority on the 1995 Senate agenda. And insiders believe that early passage of such a
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court may be increasingly brought into the fray and put into the position of
enforcing the laws through the formulation and implementation of remedies.
Either way, it is hoped that the lessons drawn from the two Boston Harbor court
cases will provide insights that can be used to enhance the legitimacy, capacity,
and effectiveness of the courts in cases of environmental institution, remedial
adjudication that do arise.
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bill by Congress is likely. See David S. Broder, "States makning bid for more power,"
The Boston Globe 12 December 1994, 15.
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List of Interviewees
Steve Angelo (D), Representative, Massachusetts House of Representatives,
Saugus, Massachusetts (8/93)
Noel Barrata, Chief Engineer, MDC (3/7/89,4/14/89, and 10/7/93)
Hugh Barroll, Assistant Regional Counsel, U.S. EPA, Region IX (11/29/94)
Tom Bean, Assistant Attorney General, Massachusetts (11/15/94)
Abram Chayes, Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard Law School (Fall
1993)
Ron DeCeasare, former 301(h) Task Force Manager (1/14/93)
Harlan Doliner, lawyer representing Wintrhop, Massachusetts (11/8/94 and
11/9/94
Jeffrey Fowley, Chief of the Water Office, Office of Regional Counsel, U.S. EPA,
Region 1 (11/23/93 and 9/20/94)
Dick Fox, former head of Construction, MWRA (Fall 1992)
Paul Garrity, former Superior Court Judge, Massachusetts (12/14/93)
Charles V. Gibbs, fomer head of Seattle Metro Sewage District and past President
of the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (2/8/93)
Charles M. Haar, Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law, Harvard University
(11/8/93)
Eric Hall, Water Quality Standards Coordinator, U.S. EPA, Region 1 (11/8/94)
Donald R.F. Harleman, Ford Professor of Civil Engineering, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (Fall 1993)
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William Kane, former CSO Program Manager, MWRA (3/3/89)
Peter Koff, lawyer representing Quincy, Massachusetts (5/12/93 and 11/1/94)
Madeleine Kolb, former analsyst at the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Quality Engineering (10/18/93)
Paul Levy, former Executive Director, MWRA (9/14/93)
Steven Lipman, Boston Harbor Coordinator, Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection (11/15/94)
John Lishman, former member of the 301(h) Task Force (1/14/93)
A. D. Mazzone, District Court Judge, District of Massachusetts (5/4/93 and
12/6/93)
Joe G. Moore, Jr., former head of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration (1/5/93 and 1/21/93)
Kenneth Moraff, Assistant Regional Counsel, Water Office, U.S. EPA, Region 1
(Fall 1993)
Neil O'Brien, Director of Research, House Committee on Natural Resources,
Massachusetts House of Representatives (10/8/93 and 11/11/94)
Brian Pitt, Environmental Engineer, Management Division, U.S. EPA, Region 1
(4/12/89)
Zygmunt Plater, Professor of Law, Boston College (Fall 1993)
Virginia Renick, Associate General Counsel, MWRA (5/9/93, 11/3/93, 8/25/94,
and 11/8/94)
Peter Shelley, Senior Attorney, Conservation Law Foundation of New England
(5/10/93, 8/5/94, and 11/16/94)
Michael Sloman, former Assistant Attorney General, Massachusetts (11/16/94)
John Snedecker, former Commissioner of MDC (4/7/89)
Elizabeth Steele, Legal Assistant, MWRA (11/2/94)
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Laura Steinberg, lawyer representing the Boston Water and Sewer Commission
(11/8/94)
Jekabs Vittands, a consultant with Metcalf & Eddy and Project Manager for the
MDC's waiver application (4/12/89)
Douglas Wilkins, Assistant Attorney General, Massachusetts (11/2/94)
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